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Online reverse auctions, in which a buyer seeks to select a supplier and suppliers
compete for contracts by bidding online, revolutionized corporate procurement early this
century. Shortly after they had been pioneered by General Electric, many companies
rushed to adopt reverse auctions but the adoption soon slowed down due to the negative
effects of auction-induced competition. Today, as firms continue to experiment with the
reverse auctions, it is important to understand how the interplay of the auction context,
the service characteristics, and buyer-supplier relationships affects auction outcomes and
the success of the auctioned projects. 
This PhD dissertation investigates online reverse auctions in service industries (e.g.
software development, building construction). The differences between services and pro ducts
(services can be more difficult to describe and require more intensive communica tion)
challenge theories that try to explain auction outcomes. We study several aspects of
auctioning service contracts: the buyer’s choice between auctions and negotiations; the
contract allocation decisions in auctions; the heterogeneity of buyers’ procurement
behaviour; and the effect of auction outcomes on buyer-supplier relationships and project
performance during the project execution.
Some of the key findings are: 1) that the buyer’s repeat exchange interaction with ven -
dors as well as the satisfaction with a vendor’s past performance lead to the buyer’s
preference for using bilateral negotiation to allocate the next project; 2) that there are five
buyers’ tactics that allow to increase the likelihood of contract allocation; 3) that the
outcomes of online reverse auctions can aggravate project managers’ role constraints and
that project managers can use relational exchange competences to overcome these
constraints. 
Overall, buying services through online reverse auctions is quite different from buying
products. This thesis makes the first steps to develop theoretical knowledge to account for
that difference. 
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Preface        .                     
 
Curiosity gave the initial momentum to this research. During the winter of 2002-
2003, together with some colleagues we were sitting in an office of an IT company, 
desperately trying to win outsourcing contracts on online marketplaces. Hélas, most 
our efforts were futile. Not only the clients were not rushing to accept our bids, but 
the bids of our competitors from India or Russia were equally ignored in most auc-
tions. And occasional buyers who did pick a winner seemed to change their strategy 
unpredictably over time – sometimes awarding projects to their incumbent suppliers 
and sometimes putting projects up for an open bidding. 
This first encounter with online reverse auctions raised a number of mind-boggling 
questions. For instance, why would buyers often ignore good bidders and leave auc-
tions without choosing a winner? What is the buying strategy of repeat buyers in the 
long run? How do relationships between the buyer and supplier develop after the 
auction when the service is being delivered? 
Although auctions have been around for hundreds of years, they still pose many exit-
ing questions that practitioners and researchers strive to answer. The advent of the 
Internet has increased many-fold the scope and diversity of auctions, but so did the 
amount of questions that need answers. In this thesis I take a step towards uncover-
ing some of the issues surrounding reverse auctions that firms and individuals use to 
procure services, such as IT or construction services.  
Understanding how auctions work and how they produce outcomes requires under-
standing of the behaviour of bidders and buyers alike. In reality, auction participants 
do much more than just biding and accepting bids –  they make preparations for auc-
tions; interact with each other during the auction run and work together to deliver the 
services after the auction ends. This has implications for auction outcomes; this is 
why these and other aspects of buyer and supplier behaviour are addressed here. 
Now after over four years of academic research I am back in the IT business, and 
part of the job consists in bidding, in any given month, for five to ten outsourcing 
contracts for customers around the world. In tenders I constantly find myself fretting 
over the winner’s curse, trying to reduce (or enhance, if it is to our advantage) the 
information asymmetry between us and the buyer over certain contract features and 
guessing the types and bidding strategies of competitors. And, as a straightforward 
takeaway of this thesis, I’m trying to identify buyer’s type early into the tender (to 
understand how much efforts to invest in bidding), working to help prospective cus-
tomers reduce bid evaluation costs and struggling to mitigate the impact of auction 
outcomes on the way we deliver services at the contract execution stage.  
It feels good to be able to apply the results of this investigation to practice. Hope-
fully, the readers of this thesis can find them useful, too.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
The concept of reverse auctions was right in the GE sweet 
spot and we wasted no time in spreading the new technology 
across our businesses. We now run global auctions daily 
— $6 billion worth last year, $12 billion this year, gener-
ating over $600 million in savings for the company in 
2001.1 
 
…they [reverse auctions] damage supplier relationships 
and degrade the stature of the supply management profes-
sion by compelling buyers to remain strongly focused on unit 
prices, versus total cost.... Therefore, the use of reverse auc-
tions should be explicitly discouraged by ISM2 and similar 
organisations.3 
 
 
1.1. Motivation  
This thesis is about online reverse auctions for services, in which buyers seek to select 
a supplier and suppliers compete for service contracts by submitting their bids online. 
Nowadays as businesses are experimenting extensively with the use of online reverse 
auctions, particularly in the service industries, the stage is set for many practically and 
theoretically motivated problems to be investigated in this respect. In this thesis we 
focus on a set of problems related to the use of auctions, award of contracts, buying 
patterns and the effect of auctions on service project outcomes in two contexts – 
online markets for IT services, and in the building construction industry. The specific 
contributions of this thesis consist in 1) explaining how a buyer’s exchange history 
affects their allocation mechanism choice on the online market for IT services; 2) 
determining the effect of tactics that allow buyers to increase the likelihood of con-
                                                
1From the farewell address of Jack Welch at the shareholders meeting in April 2001. 
www.callcentres.com.au/GE4_Jack_Welch.htm 
2
 Institute for supply management. 
3From an interview of Bob Emiliani, Professor at Central Connecticut State University, to 
Enterpreneur.com, July 7, 2006. www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/149460706.html 
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tract award on online marketplaces for IT services; 3) identifying the repeat buying 
patterns in the online markets for IT services and the theoretical properties of such 
patterns; and 4) explaining how the outcomes of reverse auctions in the building con-
struction industry affect the winning contractors and project outcomes. 
Online reverse auctions revolutionized corporate procurement in the beginning of 
the 21st century. Shortly after they were pioneered by General Electric, companies in 
great numbers rushed to adopt reverse auctions to optimize the way they buy prod-
ucts and services. Some internet start-ups, such as Freemarkets and Elance Online, 
successfully used them to come up with brand-new online business models. At the 
core of the initial popularity of reverse auctions was the belief that by placing part of 
the procurement process online and bringing transparency into the market prices, 
companies were able to optimize their procurement and achieve significant price re-
ductions. Indeed, in many reported cases, companies were able to cut their contract 
prices by as much as 30% (Beall et al., 2003). This created much excitement in the 
business media and academic press. Headlines such as “IT Auction Site is Ace for 
Buyers” were common (Motorola, 1999). 
However, the adoption of reverse auction soon stumbled into fierce opposition from 
suppliers from a number of industries, industrial associations and even some buyers. 
The concerns were that by creating extreme price transparency and stimulating com-
petition, reverse auctions allowed buyers to squeeze their suppliers, to priority to low 
cost at the expense of quality, to destroy the value of long-term buyer-supplier rela-
tionships, and, on the suppliers’ end, to encourage behaviour such as low-balling in 
bidding and “cutting corners” during contract execution. The newspaper and journal 
headlines changed to the likes of “Potential Pitfalls of E-Auctions” (Kwak, 2002) and 
“Reverse Auctions Destroy Relationships” (Altman, 2003). 
What happened is that as a business innovation, reverse auctions simply matured 
from one stage of the lifecycle to the next. In the early stages of their life, new tech-
nologies and business innovations provoke feelings ranging from excitement to dis-
appointment before they eventually find a stable niche in business practice. Gartner’s 
widely-cited Hype Cycle (Gartner, 2007) outlines several phases of emerging technol-
ogy that carry self-explanatory labels such as “Peak of Inflated Expectations”, 
“Trough of Disillusionment” and “Slope of Enlightenment” and reflect what busi-
ness thinks of the new technology and how media cover it at different points of time. 
More often than not, the initial enthusiasm about the promises of a technology is 
eventually overshadowed by disappointment when limitations and drawbacks surface; 
as experimentation and learning go on, however, organisations come up with ways to 
extract business value from the technology and it becomes a mainstream element. 
Today, there is “a calmed enthusiasm and wiser (more realistic) approach towards the 
design and use of auctions” (Elmaghraby, 2007: 410). A recent survey conducted by 
Supply Management.com found that as much as 40% of buyers use online reverse 
auctions (SupplyManagement.com, 2007). Reverse auctions are used to procure a 
wide range of products and services, from several hundred euros’ worth web design 
17
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tasks to a billion euro automotive parts contracts. Reverse auctions seem to have 
reached the “Slope of Enlightenment” phase of Gartner’s Hype Cycle, in which the 
press loses interest in the technology, although businesses continue experimenting 
with it.  
One area where the application of reverse auctions is undergoing a considerable 
amount of exploration and experimentation is the procurement of services. Although 
long before the internet age auctions were used in areas such as tendering for con-
struction projects, now they are increasingly employed for procuring a variety of ser-
vices, from legal advice to software development and tax consulting (Arbin & 
Hultman, 2003; Zhong, 2007). “The enterprising adoption of auctions for the pro-
curement of services, such as marketing, insurance, legal, information technology, as 
well as products and goods that possess a strong qualitative dimension, such as food 
additives and promotional items” is a key characteristic of today’s landscape of online 
reverse auctions (Elmaghraby, 2007: 410). 
We identify three interrelated problem areas that necessitate research into the pro-
curement of services via reverse auctions. These are auction context, service charac-
teristics, and buyer-supplier relationships. 
Reverse auctions for services are to a large extent influenced by the context in which 
they take place (Elmaghraby, 2007). Being a part of the procurement process (Figure 
1-1), auctions are inevitably affected by factors related to events that occur before 
bidding or even during bidding (exchange initiation, exchange preparation and auc-
tion/negotiation stages). One such factor is the past experience of auction actors 
(Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994). Past projects between the buyer and supplier in settings 
such as building construction can affect the amount of information available to a par-
ticular supplier with regard to important aspects of a forthcoming construction pro-
ject (e.g. the likelihood of design changes), and therefore affect the bidding behaviour 
(Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994). Similarly, in custom software development previous 
projects between buyer and vendors greatly affect the outcome of bidding for further 
projects, as the incumbent vendor is able to learn from past projects and reduce his 
production costs (Whang, 1995). Another example of contextual factors affecting 
reverse auctions is the high information intensity of procurement in settings such as 
the building construction or software development services. Exchanging large 
amounts of information regarding project specification and bids makes procurement 
expensive (Goldberg, 1977) and can even force buyers to abandon auctions without 
awarding a contract when costs become too high (Snir & Hitt, 2003). 
Adoption of auctions for the procurement of services is not trivial since the service 
characteristics are quite different from those of physical products. Services are char-
acterised by intangibility, heterogeneity, simultaneity and perishability (Axelsson & 
Wynstra, 2002) This means that services are not material (and cannot be easily broken 
down into their elements), have diverse and customized properties, are consumed at 
the same time as they are produced and cannot be stored. Many of the services be-
long to the categories of credence or experience goods, which makes ex-ante specifi-
18
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cation and assessment of service quality difficult. Also, in many situations a compe-
tent service provider may be required to identify the problem and propose a solution 
even before the contract is signed. Services of this type (e.g. management consulting 
or website development) have diagnosis and implementation phases (Lovelock, 
1983).  
Yet another issue related to the discussion of service characteristics and auction con-
text is buyer-supplier relationships. The procurement of services (but not all prod-
ucts) requires buyers and suppliers to interact for a period of time while a service is 
being delivered. This is often the case, for instance, in the development of custom-
ized enterprise information systems, or in management consulting projects. Such in-
teraction is likely to allow buyer-supplier relationships to exhibit themselves beyond 
the themes usually discussed in the literature on reverse auctions for goods, which 
include issues such as the effect of auction design and other parameters (e.g. number 
of bidders) on the suppliers suspicion of a buyer’s opportunism and willingness to 
make idiosyncratic investments (Jap, 2003; Jap, 2007). Therefore, the issue of buyer-
supplier relationships is especially important in the procurement of services. 
 
 
Figure 1-1. The Procurement process using online reverse auctions: thesis structure 
 
It is only recently that systematic research into these three problem areas, supported 
by some solid empirical evidence, has started to emerge, e.g. Snir and Hitt (2003), Jap 
(2003), Jap (2007), Gattiker et al (2007). However, although some questions have 
been addressed by these studies, many new ones emerge. There are calls for more 
research efforts to understand, for example,  the context in which reverse auctions 
take place (Elmaghraby, 2007; Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994), the longitudinal effects of 
reverse auctions (Jap, 2007), factors underlying actors’ behaviour (Engelbrecht-
Wiggans, 2000; Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994), and the impact of auctions on buyer-
supplier relationships (James, 2003). 
In this dissertation we explore reverse auctions in two industries – IT services and 
construction – and translate the discussion of the three problem areas (service charac-
teristics, auction context and buyer-supplier relationships) into concrete, context-
specific, theory-driven research questions. We address these themes in four empirical 
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studies, each of which has a distinct theoretical underpinning and relies on a specific 
methodology and deals with one or several stages of the auction-driven procurement 
process (Figure 1-1). The investigation guided by these questions will lead to insights 
into how different aspects of the three problem areas determine reverse auction use, 
actors’ behaviour and auction outcomes. 
Online reverse auction is a business innovation that is here to stay. With this disserta-
tion we hope to enhance the research into online reverse auctions and to help ad-
vance the practice of their use into a more mature stage of the life cycle. 
 
1.2. Literature and Research Issues 
1.2.1. Auction context  
An auction is defined as “a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining 
resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from participants” (McAfee & 
McMillan, 1987). The early literature distinguished four key auction mechanisms:  
English, Dutch, first-price sealed bid, and second-price sealed bid (Milgrom, 1989). It 
was demonstrated that under a set of assumptions, first-price sealed-bid auction is 
strategically equivalent to the Dutch auction, and the English auction is strategically 
equivalent to the second-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey, 1961), which means that 
buyers in these pairs of auctions would follow identical bidding strategies in terms of 
revealing their valuations. The cornerstone of auction theory is the Revenue Equiva-
lence Theorem, which states that under the assumptions of independent private val-
ues (IPV) and risk neutral bidders the basic types of auctions generate identical pay-
offs (Vickrey, 1961). 
In analytical models, auction theory relies heavily on a number of strict assumptions 
about the auction setting and the properties of economic agents. The key assump-
tions state that: 1) auction is a single isolated event with a fixed set of bidders; 2) 
symmetric Nash equilibrium is based on assumed ex ante symmetry in the distribu-
tion of private information; 3) auctions rules are commonly known, firm and credible; 
4) there is common knowledge of the distributions underlying private information 
(Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994).  
Although the auction theoretical models reveal important properties of equilibrium 
and bidder’s strategy in different auction formats, their empirical tests have often 
failed. The most vivid examples are, perhaps, the efforts to empirically test the Reve-
nue Equivalence Theorem. Multiple attempts to empirically test the theorem in labo-
ratory and field settings, found, at best, limited support for the theorem: more often 
than not, empirical results were contradictory to theoretical predictions (Coppinger, 
Smith, & Titus, 1980; Cox, Roberson, & Smith, 1982; Hansen, 1985, , 1986; Johnson, 
1979; Kagel, Harstad, & Levin, 1987; Lucking-Reiley, 1999; Mead, 1966).  
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A key reason for the lack of empirical support for this and other theoretical models is 
that assumptions underlying these models are often incompatible with the context 
and participants’ behaviour in empirical settings. One of the most restrictive assump-
tions is the assumption of symmetric behaviour. “Even when all aspects of the auc-
tion, including information, are ex ante symmetric, the assumption of symmetric be-
haviour may be untenable… In a wide variety of experiments in symmetric settings, 
the null hypothesis of symmetric behaviour can be overwhelmingly rejected” 
(Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994: 379). Unlike the idealized bidders in theoretical models, 
bidders in empirical settings are likely to be heterogeneous, e.g. in terms of their 
knowledge (expert vs novice bidders) (Lucking-Reiley, 1999) or relationships with the 
bid-taker (Zhong & Wu, 2006).  
Particularly in the case of online reverse auctions, where suppliers bid for a buyer’s 
contract via the internet and prices go down during the bidding (Jap, 2003; Van Heck 
& Vervest, 1998), there are a number of characteristics that make empirical settings 
considerably different from most theoretical models. Most models focus on physical 
goods with value expressed by price alone, whereas online reverse auctions increas-
ingly involve more sophisticated value functions that can include value components 
beyond price (Jap, 2002). Bidding at reverse auctions is interdependent, as several 
auctions often take place simultaneously or in sequence (Jap, 2002). Requirements for 
winner selection often allow the buyer to choose the winner based on other criteria 
beyond price (Zhong, 2007), or the buyer can refrain from awarding the contract at 
all (Snir & Hitt, 2003). One author even speaks about the science of analytical auction 
modelling and the business practice as of two different worlds: “It is not clear 
whether the differences between these two worlds is due to poor communication and 
education (on both sides!), or whether the differences stem from a more fundamental 
contradiction and/or omission between how we model a buyer’s and supplier’s deci-
sion process (e.g., rational and profit maximizing) and what the reality truly is. Hope-
fully, academic contributions crossing the disciplines of operations management, 
marketing, economics and psychology will help close the gap and hence further the 
intelligent and effective use of auctions for procurement.” (Elmaghraby, 2007: 24). 
As a reaction to the discrepancies between abstract models and reality a new research 
focus has emerged, on the context in which auctions occur. From this perspective 
reverse auctions are seen as just one of the components of the procurement process 
(Elmaghraby, 2007), an element of business strategy (Pinker, Seidmann, & Vakrat, 
2003) and as embedded in a series of interdependent events (Pinker et al., 2003). By 
focussing on auction context, researchers aim to provide insights into actors’ behav-
iour (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 2000), auction outcomes (Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994) 
and auction design (Rothkopf & Whinston, 2007). The interaction between an auc-
tion and its context is a two-way process: the context affects auction design and actor 
behaviour, while auction results lead to changes in economic relationships (Rothkopf 
& Harstad, 1994). 
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Understanding actors’ behaviour (in particular, how it is defined by their prior his-
tory) is particularly important within this approach. For instance, Rothkopf and 
Winston (2007) suggest that a bidder’s past performance or reputation can provide 
information for improving auction design (Rothkopf & Whinston, 2007). According 
to Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2000), “…there is a lot to be learned from trying to under-
stand why real sellers do the things that they do, and why real bidders do the things 
that they do…” (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 2000: 2).  
In this dissertation we follow the above advice. Although in this thesis the discussion 
of the role of auction context is present to some extent in all empirical chapters, it is 
particularly important in Chapter 2. Specifically, we use the context to gain new in-
sights into an issue discussed in a number of previous studies: the buyer’s choice be-
tween reverse auctions and bilateral negotiations (Bajari, McMillan, & Tadelis, 2006). 
We look at the buyer’s past interaction with vendors and investigate how this affects 
the choice of the allocation mechanism for their next transaction.  
1.2.2. Procurement of services 
We use the following common definition of a service: “A service is a process consist-
ing of a series of more or less intangible activities that normally, but not necessarily 
always, take place in interactions between the customer and service employees and/or 
physical resources or goods and/or systems of the service provider, which are pro-
vided as solutions to customer problems” (Grönroos, 2000: 46). In the literature one 
can identify a number of properties of services (such as in the construction services 
or software development services) that have implications for auctioning. Such proper-
ties are project complexity, information asymmetry and information exchange be-
tween buyers and suppliers with regard to service contents and production costs, 
costly bidding in service auctions, and costly evaluation of bids and learning effects 
from past projects (Bajari et al., 2006; Goldberg, 1977; Snir & Hitt, 2003; Whang, 
1995). 
Goldberg (1977) noticed that the requirements for ex post customization (that are 
typical of many complex contracts, such as public utilities services) impose a high 
demand for information exchange between the buyer and bidders at the pre-
contracting stage (Goldberg, 1977). When the need for information exchange is high, 
using auctions instead of negotiations with a potential supplier is likely to stifle com-
munication and increase costs for the buyer (Bajari et al., 2006; Goldberg, 1977).  
The information asymmetry that is associated with service complexity has been iden-
tified as a reason for high bidding and bid evaluation costs in the case of customised 
IT services. High costs can lead to consequences such as the buyer abandoning his 
auction without choosing a winner (Snir & Hitt, 2003). In another study, information 
asymmetry regarding software development costs in combination with the effect of 
vendors’ learning result in a buyer lock-in effect in sequential auctions (Whang, 1995).  
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Although all of our studies deal with the procurement of services, the characteristics 
of services play an especially important role in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 looks into 
the costly bid evaluation at online marketplaces for IT services and investigates tactics 
that buyers use to reduce these costs. Chapter 4 deals with patterns of reverse auction 
use and the use of repeat vendors in the same marketplaces.  
1.2.3. Buyer-supplier relationships  
Buyer-supplier relationships have been one of the central issues in the studies of 
online reverse auctions in the domains of marketing, procurement, supply chain man-
agement and information systems research (Emiliani & Stec, 2004; James, 2003; Jap, 
2007; Van Tulder & Mol, 2002). Due to their economic impact, online reverse auc-
tions have often been seen as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they optimize 
the procurement process, stimulate competition among suppliers (Carter, Kaufmann, 
Beall, & Carter, 2004; Jap, 2003) and result in lower prices for buyers (Jap, 2002). On 
the other hand, online reverse auctions can not only make suppliers concerned about 
the buyer’s opportunistic behaviour (Jap, 2003) but, allegedly, also produce disruptive 
effects on buyer-supplier relationships (Emiliani, 2004). Below we discuss this in 
more detail. 
A number of early studies argued that reverse auctions endanger or even destroy 
buyer-supplier relationships (Bartezzaghi & Ronchi, 2003) by compromising non-
financial priorities such as quality (Nair, 2005), amplifying the bargaining power ex-
erted on suppliers, conveying orientation on short-term financial gains (Emiliani & 
Stec, 2002), making suppliers suspicious of the buyer’s opportunistic intentions 
(Tassabehji, Taylor, Beach, & Wood, 2006) and willingness to retaliate (Dani, Burns, 
& Backhouse, 2005; Emiliani, 2004). The procurement of commoditized direct and 
indirect inputs that is associated with arm’s-length market relationships has been 
viewed as the primary area appropriate for the use of reverse auctions (Sawhney, 
2003; Van Tulder & Mol, 2002). 
Other researchers have been more optimistic with regard to the use of reverse auc-
tions and their effect on buyer-supplier relationships. They have argued that reverse 
auctions can serve for supplier screening and as a “wake-up call” to existing suppliers 
(Jap, 2002), as a basis for the development and maintenance of long-term relation-
ships (James, 2003), and can be associated with the elements of relational exchange 
such as long-term contracts (Pearcy & Giunipero, 2006), supplier cooperation 
(Pearcy, Giunipero, & Wilson, 2007; Smart & Harrison, 2003) and high levels of trust 
and quality (Radkevitch & van der Valk, 2005). One recent study in the context of the 
high-tech industry has quantified the effect of incumbency in reverse auctions. In-
cumbent suppliers have been found to considerably benefit from their past relation-
ships with the buyer in comparison to new suppliers. Incumbents are three times 
more likely to win a contract than new suppliers and, when selected as winners, they 
provide buyers with less cost savings than new suppliers (Zhong & Wu, 2006). 
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Most previous research efforts have focused on the immediate impact of online auc-
tions on buyer-supplier relationships (e.g. the level of suppliers’ suspicions of buyer’s 
opportunism after an auction event), rather then on the effects that reveal themselves 
over time. However, the effects that reveal themselves over time, during the process 
of project execution, have been barely explored. For instance, Pearcy and Giunipero 
(2006) ask: “Do suppliers (especially incumbents) harbour any feeling of the resent-
ment towards the buying firm for mandatory participation in the electronic reverse 
auction that might impact the potential for the success of the relationship?” (Pearcy 
& Giunipero, 2006: 233). We address this knowledge gap in this dissertation. 
 
Table 1-1. Focus of individual empirical chapters on the three problem areas. 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Service charac-
teristics 
  
 
 
  
Auction con-
text 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Buyer-supplier 
relationships 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The theme of inter-organisational relationships is most extensively addressed in 
Chapter 5, in which we look at the effect of auction outcomes on project stake-
holders during the execution stage of a construction project and on how this trans-
lates into the effect on buyer-supplier relationships and performance in the project. 
This section has briefly summarized the literature and outlined some key research 
issues regarding the use, processes and effects of online reverse auctions. In Table 1-1 
we provide an indication of how aspects of each of the three problem areas are ad-
dressed by the empirical chapters (the relative size of the shaded circle is an indication 
of the extent to which a given theme is a addressed in the chapter). More in-depth 
literature reviews will be presented in the respective empirical chapters. In the next 
section we formulate the research objective and research questions.  
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1.3. Research Objective and Questions  
The overall research objective of this dissertation is to enhance our understanding of the 
procurement of services via online reverse auctions (i.e. by addressing the gaps be-
tween theoretical models of reverse auctions and economic reality), specifically from 
the perspective of service characteristics, auction context and buyer-supplier relation-
ships, and to extend the theoretical and managerial knowledge in this regard.  
This dissertation consists of four empirical studies into the procurement of services 
with reverse auctions. These studies are driven by the discussion of the three problem 
areas above (procurement of services, auction context and buyer-supplier relation-
ships) although these elements in each separate study exist in a unique combination.  
Along with a common foundation, the studies are rooted in various mixes of litera-
ture and pursue independent research questions. The individual questions were for-
mulated on the basis of the literature reviews in relevant areas and address the identi-
fied knowledge gaps. The detailed argumentation behind the research questions is 
provided in the four empirical chapters. 
Chapter 2 uses the contract theory and auction theory to examine the effect of prior 
exchange relationships on the choice between auctions and negotiations in online 
markets for IT services. The research question we ask in Chapter 2 is: What is the effect 
of buyers’ repeat interaction with vendors and vendors’ prior performance on buyers’ choice between 
reverse auctions and negotiations?     
Chapter 3 is rooted in the auction literature and the literature on electronic markets, 
and looks into the tactics buyers use to cope with the costly bid evaluation and the 
effect of these tactics on project allocation on online markets for IT services. The 
research question we ask in this chapter is: What is the effect of evaluation-cost-reducing buyer 
tactics on project allocation on online marketplaces for IT services?  
Chapter 4 is based on the transaction costs literature, and studies the heterogeneity of 
buyers on online markets for IT services. The research question is: How do buyers or-
ganise their exchange relationships with suppliers over multiple transactions involving online reverse 
auctions? 
Chapter 5 studies the effects of reverse auction outcomes on relationships and per-
formance in auctioned service projects during the project execution phase. It is 
rooted in the literature on role theory and organisational boundary spanning. Chapter 
5 answers two research questions: How do reverse auction outcomes affect the execution phase 
of auctioned contracts? What are the key relational competences of the boundary-spanning individuals 
that influence the effect of the reverse auctions on inter-organisational relationships and project per-
formance? 
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1.4. Relevance  
1.4.1. Scientific relevance  
Each of the studies centres on a specific research question and employs a dedicated 
methodology. This makes this dissertation scientifically relevant in several ways. 
First, a general contribution of this thesis consists in advancing the understanding of 
reverse auctions for services across the three problem areas: auction context, service 
characteristics and buyer-supplier relationships. From the perspective of the auction 
context we will contribute to understanding reverse auctions by providing insights 
into how the buyer’s exchange history affects the allocation mechanism choice, and 
how the buyer’s tactics before and during auctions affect auction outcomes. From the 
perspective of service characteristics, we will explore reverse auctions in the IT ser-
vice and construction industries, where factors such as service complexity and infor-
mation asymmetry affect the use of auctions, the actors’ behaviour, as well as the out-
comes of auctions and auctioned projects. From the perspective of buyer-supplier 
relationships, the understanding of reverse auctions for service will be extended 
through the research into how buyers balance conducting repeat business with ven-
dors with using reverse auctions, as well as into how outcomes of reverse auctions in 
the construction industry affect winning contractors. 
Second, the more specific contributions of this thesis are those of the four individual 
empirical chapters, each of which will tackle a specific research problem and deliver 
results that can stand on their own academic merit. In Chapter 2 we address the issue 
of the buyer’s choice between auctions and negotiations in the online markets for IT 
services, and extend the body of knowledge on the allocation mechanism choice 
(Bajari et al., 2006; Bonaccorsi, Lyon, Pammolli, & Turchetti, 2000; Leffler, Rucker, & 
Munn, 2003; Manelli & Vincent, 1995). In Chapter 3 we examine the tactics buyers 
employ to reduce their bid evaluation costs on online marketplaces for IT services 
and contribute to the literature on costly bidding and bid evaluation (Carr, 2003; Snir 
& Hitt, 2003). Chapter 4 addresses the heterogeneity of the buyer’s procurement pat-
terns within the same business context, and adds to the body of knowledge on the 
use of reverse auctions and buyer-supplier relationships (Emiliani & Stec, 2002; Gat-
tiker, Huang, & Schwarz, 2007; Van Tulder & Mol, 2002). Finally, Chapter 5 looks at 
how auctions affect relationships and performance in auctioned service projects dur-
ing the project execution phase in the construction industry, and further extends the 
literature on the effect of auctions on buyer-supplier relationships (Emiliani, 2004; 
Gattiker et al., 2007; Jap, 2002, , 2007; Pearcy et al., 2007) 
1.4.2. Managerial relevance 
The debate about the practical relevance of the research produced in business schools 
has taken place for as long as the business schools themselves have been in existence. 
The practical relevance is often seen as the opposite of another academic virtue – 
research rigour. As a recent article in The Economist puts it, most of the articles pub-
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lished in academic journals are “highly quantitative, hypothesis-driven and esoteric” 
(Economist, 2007). The balance between relevance and rigour, apparently, it is not an 
easy one to maintain.  
One challenge to the practical relevance of our research stems from the fact that 
some of its roots are in auction theory, which, despite all its rigour and academic bril-
liance, does not have a particularly good track record of being close to the practice of 
real-world auctions (Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994). Our answer to this consists in taking 
into account the empirical context of auctions and making use of the field transaction 
data to answer the research questions which bear a high degree of relevance per se.  
We expect to generate practical insights for all auction stakeholders. In particular, for 
market makers/ auction designers we will provide insights into the design of auctions 
and the design of auction-driven online markets for IT services. For buyers there will 
be insights into the use of auctions and negotiations as well as into the tactics used to 
deal with the bid evaluation costs. Suppliers/vendors will benefit from advice on the 
role of project managers’ skills in auctioned projects. 
Our main strategy to ensure managerial relevance when carrying out the studies pre-
sented in this dissertation has been to be constantly in touch with the representatives 
of the industry and learn from their feedback. A considerable part of our data was 
obtained after we had communicated the motives and the purposes of the research to 
individual companies, after which they provided us with data or gave us an opportu-
nity to collect the data. Some of the details of the research design, and sometimes 
even the research questions were amended during the process of interaction with the 
industrial context. Finally, after the data were collected, processed and analysed, we 
communicated and discussed the findings with the practitioners; our findings pro-
voked considerable interest on their side.  
The next sub-section will elaborate on the principles underlying the research meth-
odology in the present dissertation. 
 
1.5. Research Methodology  
1.5.1. Research method selection 
For the research problems in each empirical chapter we selected a particular research 
method, or a combination of methods, based on the state of knowledge in the respec-
tive area, and identified gaps in the literature and the challenges posed by the practice. 
In choosing a research approach, the nature of the problem at hand and its context 
are crucial. Galliers, Markus and Newell (2007) emphasize the need to choose a re-
search approach that can help tackle the research problem at hand in the most effec-
tive way: “…rather than simply choosing approaches with which they [research stu-
dents and researchers] may be the most familiar, they may reflect on the efficacy of 
different approaches in light of their particular focus and subject matter” (Galliers, 
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Markus, & Newell, 2007: xi). Mingers (2001) argues that when the choice of research 
method is concerned, even the methodological paradigms such as positivism and in-
terpretivism are less important than the context in which the research takes place: “In 
any case, it is possible to detach research methods (and perhaps even methodologies) 
from a paradigm and use them, critically and knowledgeably, within a context that 
makes different assumptions” (Mingers, 2001: 243). 
Below we elaborate on the main methodological guidelines of this dissertation – the 
principle of methodological pluralism (Mingers, 2001) – and briefly discuss the meth-
ods employed to answer individual research questions.  
1.5.2. Methodological pluralism  
The term “methodological pluralism” has been coined by John Mingers as a reaction 
to a debate over different research paradigms in information systems research. These 
paradigms, such as positivism and interpretivism, rely on fundamentally different sets 
of assumptions about the nature of the world as well as about the nature of knowl-
edge. The incommensurability of such assumptions (e.g. the belief that the world is 
given as objective and its laws are there to be revealed by the researcher versus the 
belief that the reality is socially constructed and subjective and is therefore subject to 
interpretation by the researcher) often divides researchers into different methodologi-
cal camps. Mingers challenges such status quo by proposing that the different para-
digms are “simply constructs of our thought” (Mingers, 2001: 243). He introduces a 
new paradigm,  “methodological pluralism”, that advocates the use of a combination 
of different research methods, because 1) the world is stratified and multi-
dimensional, and 2) research studies consist of different stages that pose different 
tasks for the researcher (Mingers, 2001). We believe that different research methods 
are necessary at different stages of knowledge development, therefore we subscribe to 
Mingers’ methodological pluralism. 
In fact, methodological pluralism as a paradigm of combining different research 
methods can be conceptualized in different ways. First, as a loose pluralism, which 
allows for the existence of multiple research paradigms and methods within the IS 
discipline but does not prescribe the use of particular methods in particular research 
situation. Second, as complementarism, according to which different paradigms are 
associated with different research contexts, which makes them applicable to particular 
research situations to a varying extent. Third, as a “strong pluralism”, where “all re-
search situations are seen as inherently complex and multidimensional, and would 
thus benefit from a range of methods” (Mingers, 2001: 243). Mingers’ article mostly 
advocates the third type of methodological pluralism. However, the research design 
employed in this dissertation as a whole falls more into the second type. In this dis-
sertation we tackle four different research problems that, although focusing on sev-
eral sequential stages of the procurement process within and around online reverse 
auctions for services, boil down to distinct and different research situations, each re-
quiring an individualized dedicated methodology. 
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In this dissertation we use a number of research methods that are predominantly as-
sociated with either positivistic or interpretive research paradigms. For each of the 
studies a methodology has been designed to provide an answer to the respective re-
search question(s) as well as to cater for the corresponding research context. Details 
of the individual studies and the underlying methodology are presented in sub-section 
1.5.3. An overview of these studies is provided in Table 1-3 (details on the focus, re-
search question, empirical methodology, etc.) and Figure 1-2 (key constructs from the 
chapters and the stages of the procurement process each of the chapters addresses).  
Three out of four studies in this dissertation are embedded in the context of online 
business (the fourth one deals with the building construction industry).  
The next subsection explains the research methods utilized in this dissertation.  
1.5.3. Overview of research methods 
In this sub-section we provide a brief characterization of the specific methods em-
ployed to tackle the research problems in our four empirical chapters. We do this by 
dividing the discussion into three parts based on the main underlying research ap-
proach: deductive quantitative research, inductive quantitative research and longitudi-
nal case study research. 
Deductive quantitative research 
Deductive quantitative research is, perhaps, the most widespread type of empirical 
investigation in the field of IS research as well as in business research in general. The 
reason for this is the traditionally strong orientation of business research towards 
formal theories and deductive types of reasoning, which brings our field into the 
same ontological stream with the natural sciences. Typical of deductive quantitative 
research is formulating hypotheses backed by formal theories and testing them with 
data collected through laboratory or field experiments, surveys, simulations or with 
archival data. Hypothesis testing relies on statistical techniques and is subject to a 
number of limitations, such as assumptions about the structure of the data and sam-
ple sizes.  
Two of our studies are backed by the theoretical background sufficient for formulat-
ing testable hypotheses, and therefore utilize deductive quantitative techniques. These 
studies are presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. In order to answer their respective 
research questions we collect two separate datasets from a leading online market for 
IT services and analyse them using statistical techniques such as OLS and logistic re-
gressions, with a number of modelling nuances.  
Inductive quantitative research  
Deductive or confirmatory approaches dominate business research, including the area 
of information systems research. This status quo, however, is being questioned by 
opinions that consider the bulk of theory-driven business research to be of little rele-
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vance for practice (Economist, 2007), and is challenged by studies that take a differ-
ent, inductive perspective on knowledge generation. 
 
Table 1-2. Overview of the research types and methods of the dissertation. 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Research Confirmatory/ 
Deductive 
Confirmatory/ 
Deductive 
Exploratory/ 
Inductive 
Exploratory/ 
Inductive 
Data Quantitative Quantitative Quantitative & 
qualitative 
Qualitative 
Method Acquisition 
and statistical 
analysis of 
field data 
Acquisition 
and statistical 
analysis of 
field data 
Acquisition 
and statistical 
analysis of 
field data 
Longitudinal 
case study 
 
Both confirmatory and exploratory approaches to empirical research are used in the 
literature on both inter-organisational relationships and information systems research. 
Confirmatory approaches take a taxonomy deduced from the extant literature and 
test for the occurrence of pre-defined constructs and types, whereas exploratory ap-
proaches derive their taxonomy inductively from the data and then relate the resulting 
types back to theory. While traditionally the confirmatory approach has tended to 
dominate, exploratory approaches have been used effectively as well, particularly in 
situations where existing theory is deemed insufficiently detailed to do justice to the 
richness of the field setting. In the studies on inter-organisational relationships the 
exploratory approach has been employed to extract and analyze empirical patterns of 
inter-organisational relationships and sometimes to relate them to their antecedents 
and performance characteristics (Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1995; Cannon & Perreault 
Jr, 1999). In the information systems literature the exploratory approach has been 
used to develop the taxonomy of eBay bidders as well as to relate buyer types to the 
likelihood of-winning auctions and to buyer’s surplus (Bapna, Goes, Gupta, & Jin, 
2004), as well as to develop a taxonomy of industrial bidders at online reverse auc-
tions (Zhong & Wu, 2006). 
The advantage of the exploratory approach over the confirmatory approach is that 
the former allows for uncovering empirical patterns that can depict the limits of exist-
ing theories, while its disadvantage is that often there is little or no theoretical guid-
ance for the selection of variables (Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1995). This disadvan-
tage of the inductive method will be mitigated in our study by drawing on extant 
theories in selecting taxonomy dimensions as well as in explaining the resulting con-
figurations and their properties. 
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By using the exploratory approach in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, we aim at devel-
oping an empirical taxonomy of buyers’ portfolios of exchange relationships with 
suppliers in an online marketplace for IT services. Carrying out the empirical study in 
an online marketplace (specifically, within two categories of services – Web design 
and Web programming) allows us to isolate the context factors that are normally be-
lieved to affect the boundary of a firm, such as market complexity and asset specific-
ity. This enables us to focus on the inherent heterogeneity of buyers’ portfolios of 
supplier relationships.  
Inductive qualitative research 
In order to answer the research questions of Chapter 5 we have chosen a longitudinal 
exploratory case study design for the empirical investigation. A case study allows for 
the gathering of rich data on the phenomenon under investigation, including data on 
the context in which the phenomenon takes place (Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 2002). The 
exploratory, or inductive, type of case study is particularly useful when theory-
building is the goal of a research effort (Yin, 2002). In our case the inductive ap-
proach is appropriate because the body of knowledge on the effect of auctions on 
boundary spanners’ relational exchange competences is not sufficiently developed to 
permit a deductive, hypothesis-testing investigation. In these circumstances, an induc-
tive case study method allows for tracing the nature and workings of the boundary 
spanners’ relational exchange competences in the great depth and detail that is neces-
sary to inductively build up a basis for a theory. 
The investigation of the effect of auction outcomes as well as the role and effect of 
boundary spanners’ competences during the project run requires observation of 
causal relationships within and across a number of situations in which such effects 
manifest themselves. Such investigation is best served by a longitudinal type of study. 
The longitudinal aspect provides a rationale for a single case research design, due to 
its ability to deal with the theory that examines the change of certain conditions over 
time (Yin, 2002). It also improves the measurement validity and provides more space 
for alternative interpretations of data (Franz & Robey, 1984).  
More specific rationales for using a longitudinal case study design deal with the nature 
of the investigated phenomenon. Studying relational exchange competences, i.e. fac-
tors that are connected with the dynamic realm of inter-organisational relationships, 
requires observation of relationships in their development, including changes in envi-
ronmental characteristics and consequences of specific actions. Relationships may 
develop in an incremental way, where “for example, a small investment in the rela-
tionships by one party might increase the trust of the other party. With greater trust, 
the other party makes a larger investment that increases the trust of the first party” 
(Weitz & Jap, 1995: 311). Finally, collecting data on processes as they take place 
helps researchers to avoid reporting bias, which can be an issue when respondents 
have to report on a number of episodes that occurred at different points of time 
along the duration of a project. 
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Further details of the methods employed in the present dissertation will be discussed 
in the corresponding chapters.  
 
1.6. Structure of the Dissertation 
The driving idea behind the design of this dissertation is that each of the four studies 
should be able to stand on its own merit as an independent and self-contained piece 
of research in terms of the research problem, methodology and analysis, as well as the 
practical and theoretical contribution. Such a design facilitates the focus on topics of 
practical significance as well as the production of publications that is necessary for the 
research to be more “consumable” (Robey & Markus, 1998). 
Consequently, the balance in this dissertation is shifted towards individual empirical 
studies, so that the literature reviews and in-depth methodology discussions are con-
tained within Chapters 2 to 5. In this sub-section we present a framework that en-
compasses all four empirical studies.  
The four empirical chapters deal with different stages of the procurement process. 
Figure 1-2 outlines key stages of the sourcing process that is common for transac-
tions involving services such as custom software development or building construc-
tion: exchange initiation, exchange preparation, bidding/negotiation and project exe-
cution. Table 1-3 provides an overview of the key elements of the empirical chapters, 
such as focus, research question(s), methodology, empirical context, and others.  
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Chapter 2.  Choosing between Auctions and 
Negotiations in Online Markets for IT 
Services 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In recent years auctions have received a boost from the rise of internet technologies 
and have become a common tool in corporate procurement, known as “online re-
verse auctions”. However, the discussion relating to which transactions are appropri-
ate for online reverse auctions to be used in as an allocation mechanisms has been 
intense both in the business press and academic literature. While some authors have 
embraced online reverse auctions as a way to optimize procurement, reduce prices, 
and contribute to process improvement (Smart & Harrison, 2002), others have 
warned about the potential negative impact on buyer-supplier relationships and sup-
plier performance (Emiliani & Stec, 2002; Van Tulder & Mol, 2002). 
Choosing the right allocation mechanism is particularly important for transactions 
involving customized products and services (Goldberg, 1977) such as unique manu-
facturing parts and equipment, building construction services or customized software. 
In such transactions buyers and suppliers can rely to a lesser extent on exhaustive 
specifications and ready-to-use industry standards (Snir & Hitt, 2003), and have to 
exchange more information regarding the product and transaction terms (Goldberg, 
1977). Also, many projects such as those in the building construction industry are 
prone to ex post adjustments that are better dealt with by “cost plus” contracts (rather 
than fixed-price contracts), commonly associated with negotiations, rather than with 
reverse auctions (Bajari et al., 2006).  
Past studies on allocation mechanism choice have focused primarily on factors such 
as product complexity (Bajari et al., 2006; Goldberg, 1977), preference for quality 
(Bonaccorsi et al., 2000; Manelli & Vincent, 1995; Tunca & Zenios, 2006), number of 
available bidders (Bajari et al., 2006; Bulow & Klemperer, 1996), costs of conducting 
auctions (Leffler et al., 2003) and non-contractibility (Mithas, Jones, & Mitchell, 
2005). Negotiations are found to better facilitate information exchange when com-
plex contracts are involved and the level of non-contractibility is high; they are also 
used when the  buyer has a high preference for quality (Bajari et al., 2006; Bonaccorsi 
et al., 2000; Mithas et al., 2005). Auctions are favoured when contracts are less com-
plex, the pool of available suppliers is large and costs of conducting auctions are 
lower than those of negotiations (Bajari et al., 2006; Leffler et al., 2003).  
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Past studies of the allocation mechanism choice were limited to isolated transactions.  
There is a concern that such a “discrete” perspective does not allow researchers to 
take into account other important factors that affect actors’ behaviour and transac-
tion outcomes (Elmaghraby, 2007; Pinker et al., 2003; Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994). 
These factors include information exchange (Goldberg, 1977), past relationships be-
tween partners (Jap, 2002), and expectations of future business (Heide & Miner, 
1992). The latter factors are particularly important in procurement as buyers conduct 
transactions that tend to repeat over time between buyers and vendors (Elmaghraby, 
2007; Pinker et al., 2003). 
In this study we address this gap in the literature by studying the role of buyer’s prior 
repeat interaction with vendors for the choice between reverse auctions and bilateral 
negotiations for her next transaction. Based on contracting and agency theory litera-
ture we elaborate on how repeat interaction with vendors is related to the benefits the 
buyer can reap in further transactions. Next, we argue that by choosing an allocation 
mechanism for the next transaction, the buyer also chooses to signal to what extent 
she trusts the repeat vendors, whether the buyer is willing to benefit from what the 
vendors have learned in previous transactions and motivate them to make further 
idiosyncratic investments. This way, we make explicit the link between prior exchange 
interaction and the choice of an allocation mechanism for the next transaction. The 
main question of this study is as follows:  
 
What is the effect of buyers’ repeat interaction with vendors and vendors’ prior performance 
on buyers’ choice between reverse auctions and negotiations?  
 
From the extant literature we identify several mechanisms (such as vendor learning in 
software projects (Whang, 1995), vendor’s specific investments (Richmond, Seid-
mann, & Whinston, 1992) and costly bid evaluation (Snir & Hitt, 2003)), which pro-
vide a connection between the past buyer-supplier exchange interaction and the 
choice of allocation mechanism. Based on these insights we develop our argument 
and hypothesize that repeat interaction with vendors will favour the use of negotia-
tions, while poor performance in the most recent project will lead to auctioning the 
subsequent project. Also, we hypothesize that, since new buyers need to explore the 
marketplace, they are also more likely to prefer reverse auctions as these are an ap-
propriate tool for investigating the supply. 
The testing of the hypotheses is conducted on a dataset collected from a leading 
online marketplace for IT services. Such marketplaces (examples include RentA-
Coder, Elance and, Odesk) have been increasingly popular in recent years for small-
scale IT services and other professional services, from website development to crea-
tive writing. For example, at RentACoder, a leading online marketplace for IT ser-
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vices, over 7,000 IT projects are executed on a monthly basis, of which 95% are 
submitted by returning buyers4. In such marketplaces buyers use open reverse auc-
tions and bilateral negotiations for project allocation, which makes this platform a 
suitable ground for our empirical investigation. The testing of our hypotheses is con-
ducted on a sample of over 2,000 IT projects realized by 91 repeat buyers in the pe-
riod of 1999-2006. The results of the analysis demonstrate that the more intensive 
prior repeat interaction is between buyer and vendors, the more likely the buyer is to 
use negotiation rather than auction to allocate her next contract.  By contrast, auc-
tions are preferred by buyers who want to switch to a different vendor when the per-
formance of incumbents becomes unsatisfactory, or when buyers are new to the mar-
ketplace and need to explore the supply (although the latter effect is small). 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we start by reviewing 
the literature on allocation mechanism choice and contract choice, which is followed 
by hypotheses development, where we also draw on the literature on the economics 
of software development. In Section 2.3, we discuss the methodology of the empirical 
analysis and introduce the empirical setting in more detail. The results of the analysis 
are presented in Section 2.4. A discussion and conclusions follow in Sections 2.5 and 
2.6. 
 
2.2. Literature, Empirical Context and Hypothe-
ses  
2.2.1. Allocation mechanism choice 
The choice of contract allocation mechanism in procurement affects such aspects of 
transactions as information exchange between buyer and supplier, supplier competi-
tion, pricing and, ultimately, performance. Some of the most widely used allocation 
mechanisms in procurement are reverse auctions and negotiations. Negotiations bet-
ter facilitate information exchange when complex contracts are involved and the level 
of non-contractibility is high; they are also used when the buyer has a high preference 
for quality (Bajari et al., 2006; Bonaccorsi et al., 2000; Mithas et al., 2005). Auctions 
are favoured when contracts are less complex, the pool of available suppliers is large 
and the costs of conducting auctions are lower than those of negotiations (Bajari et 
al., 2006; Leffler et al., 2003). 
                                                
4
 www.rentacoder.com visited November 12, 2007 
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An early study by Goldberg (1977) viewed auctions, along with other allocation 
mechanisms, primarily as a means of transmitting information between organisations, 
where product complexity plays an important role: “The properties (and the relative 
efficacy) of competitive bidding mechanisms will depend crucially on the subject mat-
ter of the bidding competition” (Goldberg, 1977: 250-251). Goldberg proposes that 
competitive bidding may not always be appropriate for complex transactions, such as 
the provisioning of public utility services, because the customization requires costly 
information provision at the pre-contract stage that can make this type of allocation 
mechanism too expensive (Goldberg, 1977).  
This reasoning was taken further in Bajari et al. (2006), who focused on the implica-
tions of project complexity for the allocation mechanism choice and identified two 
reasons why higher complexity is better served by negotiation rather than auction.   
The first reason is the poor ability of an auction to facilitate information exchange 
when the input from suppliers is needed. In complex projects such information ex-
change is important, e.g. with regard to “how to deal with adaptation due to unfore-
seen events and problems” (Bajari et al., 2006: 9). Absence of information exchange 
can lead to adverse selection, where suppliers can submit low bids with an intention 
to extract profits from expected changes in the course of the project. 
The second reason is that (in the context of the building construction industry where 
their empirical research was conducted) negotiations have been traditionally associ-
ated with “cost-plus” contracts and auctions are associated with fixed price contracts. 
A cost-plus contract is a more viable option for complex projects, where ex post adap-
tations regularly occur. An empirical test on the dataset of construction projects 
showed a positive association between project complexity and the use of negotiations 
(Bajari et al., 2006). Another finding of Bajari et al (2006) was a positive relationship 
between the number of available suppliers and the use of reverse auctions. 
Similar results regarding the effect of project complexity and the number of available 
buyers were produced in a study of the sales of private timber tracts (Leffler et al., 
2003). In addition, these authors found support for two other predictions grounded 
in the economics literature – that auctions are more likely to be used when the disper-
sion of the valuation of the good among bidders is higher and when using auction is 
cheaper than using negotiations (Leffler et al., 2003).  
Other studies theoretically contrast price and quality as the factors of allocation 
mechanism choice. Manelli and Vincent (1995) consider an environment where the 
quality of goods or services is unknown to the buyer ex-ante and cannot be verified 
by the courts ex post. In their model, when the preference for quality is high the buyer 
is better off choosing sequential negotiations with potential suppliers instead of auc-
tions (Manelli & Vincent, 1995). Tunca and Zenios (2006) consider the procurement 
of manufacturing parts, where high-quality parts can be procured from one supplier 
under a relational contract and low-quality parts are procured from the market via a 
second-price reverse auction. A high preference for quality leads to the procuring of 
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manufacturing parts from the relational contract, and a low preference for quality 
stimulates the use of reverse auctions, while there is also a situation of moderate pref-
erence for quality where the two mechanisms can co-exist and auction-driven compe-
tition can lead to the enhancement of self-enforceability of relational contracts 
(Tunca & Zenios, 2006). The link between the quality concerns and the choice for 
negotiations has been empirically validated in the context of the procurement of 
medical devices in Italian hospitals (Bonaccorsi et al., 2000). Along similar lines, 
Mithas et al (2005) hypothesized that buyers are less likely to use reverse auctions for 
procuring goods that are high on non-contractibility (this includes dimensions such as 
quality, supplier innovativeness, information sharing, responsiveness, trust, and flexi-
bility) and asset-specificity, and confirmed the relationships though the analysis of 
survey data in the US automotive industry (Mithas et al., 2005).  
Finally, an auction-theoretical analysis by Bulow and Klemperer (1996) in the context 
of selling a company showed that in the case when at least one additional bidder is 
expected to bid in the auction, the buyer should choose for an auction instead of ne-
gotiating (Bulow & Klemperer, 1996). The result holds for a case in which bidders’ 
values are independent and, under certain restrictions, holds for affiliated values.  
To our knowledge, no prior research into allocation mechanism choice has explicitly 
addressed the role of repeat contracting, while in the closely-related field of contract-
ing literature it has been recognized as a major determinant of contract choice. We 
review these studies in the next sub-section. 
2.2.2. Effect of repeat interaction on contract choice 
Contract choice literature investigates the factors determining contract design using 
the logic of transaction cost economics and agency theory. This literature is preoccu-
pied with identifying the effect of these and other factors on the preference for a par-
ticular contract form, or with identifying a contract form that maximizes buyer’s value 
in an exchange situation with a given set of characteristics. Factors that affect con-
tract choice include contract (project) complexity (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001), uncertainty 
(Kalnins & Mayer, 2004) measurement costs (Allen & Lueck, 1993), moral hazard 
(Lafontaine, 1992), supervision costs (Alston, Datta, & Nugent, 1984) and enforce-
ment costs (Allen & Lueck, 1992). For instance, it has been found that project com-
plexity is better dealt with by time and materials (in construction: cost-plus) contracts 
rather than fixed fee contracts (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001), the same as ex-ante uncer-
tainty regarding the costs and project specification (Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). 
More often than not, the analysis of contract choice centres on the characteristics of a 
given ex. situation, such as the ones listed above. It is only recently that the research 
attention has started to encompass also the history of interaction between contracting 
parties. There are a number of ways prior interaction can affect contract choice in a 
present exchange situation. Kalnins and Mayer (2004) summarize the factors identi-
fied by sociologists and institutional economists and identify four such mechanisms: 
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1) trust; 2) established pattern of collaboration and norms of interaction; 3) decrease 
of contracting costs due to accumulated contracting expertise; and 4) expectation of 
future business (Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). 
Several recent empirical studies have addressed the effect of repeat interaction on 
contract choice. Gulati (1995) found that repeated alliances between partners are 
more likely to be set up without the use of equity than are first-time alliances. This is 
interpreted as evidence of the positive impact of trust established between the parties 
in prior alliance on the reduction of the suspicion of opportunism in the new alliances 
(Gulati, 1995). By contrast, in a study of the Indian software industry Benerjee and 
Duflo (2000) found no significant effect of prior contracts on the choice between 
fixed-cost, mixed and time-and-material contracts (Banerjee & Duflo, 2000). Despite 
these mixed earlier results, further evidence relating to the effect of repeat interaction 
on contract choice has been provided by two more recent studies. First, Corts and 
Singh (2004) argued that repeat interaction might alleviate the problems of contract-
ing costs and the incentive problems in fixed-price and cost-plus contracts. In their 
empirical study of the offshore oil-drilling industry they found a positive relationship 
between repeat interaction and the use of day-rate contracts (equivalent to time-and-
materials in software development contracting). This allowed them to argue that re-
peat interaction between contacting parties acts as a substitute for high-powered con-
tracts (in offshore oil-drilling these are turnkey contracts) (Corts & Singh, 2004). Sec-
ond, in another study of the software industry Kalnins and Mayer (2004) found a 
positive effect of repeat interaction measured on the site level on the choice for time-
and material contracts, which is in line with the findings of Corts and Singh (2004). 
In summary, most of the empirical studies have found that the presence of relation-
ships affects the costs of monitoring and enforcing contracts and partly alleviates 
agency problems, which in turn has implications for allocation mechanism choice.  As 
the earlier empirical studies into mechanism choice and contract choice showed that 
the empirical context plays an important role in the discussion of actors’ behaviour 
and the implications of the contracts (Bajari et al., 2006; Corts & Singh, 2004; Kalnins 
& Mayer, 2004), we first introduce the empirical context in which this study is con-
ducted before proceeding to the development of hypotheses.  
2.2.3. Context: online marketplace for IT services 
Contracting for software development is a complex endeavour characterized by in-
formation asymmetry with regard to production costs (Whang, 1995), intensive in-
formation exchange and heterogeneity of vendor quality (Snir & Hitt, 2003), high 
costs of preparing and evaluating vendors’ proposals (Carr, 2003; Snir & Hitt, 2003), 
and the need for the vendor’s specific investments to create value (Richmond et al., 
1992). Our empirical investigation is set in a leading online marketplace for IT ser-
vices that also shares these characteristics. Examples of online marketplaces for IT 
services include eWork.com, Elance Online, RentACoder.com, and oDesk. These 
marketplaces provide a platform for value-added exchange processes beyond the con-
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tract allocation, such as payments, risk mitigation and service delivery (Kambil & van 
Heck, 2002; Snir & Hitt, 2003). The sector is growing fast. For example, the number 
of projects posted at Elance Online increased 78% to 150,000 in 2007; the total value 
of these projects reached USD 48 mln (Meyer, 2008). The volume of this market 
segment is projected to increase from around USD 250 million now to USD 2 billon 
by 2015. 
We illustrate the functioning of such marketplaces with the example of Elance 
Online, one of the largest online marketplaces for professional services. One of the 
authors had professional experience in the IT outsourcing industry, as well as experi-
ence of selling and buying services in this type of marketplace. Additional insights 
were obtained from communications with an owner of another major IT service 
marketplace as well as several regular buyers of IT services. 
Established in 1998, Elance now hosts around two thousand projects that are simul-
taneously open for bidding across all service categories at any moment of time. 
Around 60,000 companies regularly use the marketplace to buy services, and about 
half or more of them buy IT services (McDougall, 2005). The online marketplace 
contains a searchable database of vendors and offers reverse auctions and negotia-
tions as allocation mechanisms.  
The range of services available at Elance encompasses IT services and other profes-
sional services such as language translation, creative writing, accounting, financial and 
business strategy consulting and the like. The Buyers are businesses and individuals 
coming predominantly from the US. The Vendors are mostly small and medium IT 
companies and freelancers from India, Eastern Europe and Russia. Some vendors 
have a turnover of more than two million USD within Elance.  
The exchange process in the marketplace is organised as follows (Figure 2-1 provides 
an illustration of the key phases of the exchange process). First, before buyers and 
vendors are able to enter the exchange, they are required to go through a registration 
process. Participation for buyers is free of charge, while a periodic fee applies to ven-
dors. Two allocation mechanisms labelled “open auction” and “invite-only auction” 
are available to the buyer. A key characteristic of an open auction is that any vendor 
registered in the marketplace can submit a bid in response to an RFP posted in an 
open auction. Submitted bids, including all bid attributes, are either visible to all par-
ticipants or, in a modification labelled “sealed auction”, vendors can only see other 
bidders’ identities, without bid details. A Buyer can send invitations to individual bid-
ders to submit bids in auctions. In such case the names of invited bidders are listed 
on the web page with RFP and bidding details. The second type of allocation mecha-
nism used in  the marketplace is “invite-only auction”, a mechanism the buyer nor-
mally utilizes when a project is intended for a particular bidder; no other bidders are 
allowed submit bids in invite-only auctions.  
When posting an RFP as an open or invite-only auction, the buyer specifies proce-
dure parameters, such as start and end time, auction type and the type of suppliers 
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who can bid. After the auction starts, vendors can submit bids. Bids specify price and 
estimated delivery time, contain information on vendor rating and earnings, and a text 
field where the bidder can provide other relevant information. Once a bid has been 
submitted, it becomes visible to the buyer and other vendors (unless it is a sealed auc-
tion). During the auction, the buyer can decline or shortlist bids and communicate 
with individual vendors via a message board.  
 
 
Figure 2-2. List of projects in the category “Application Development” at Elance 
Online. 
 
2.2.4. Development of Hypotheses 
We start with a simple intuition that new buyers in the online marketplace are differ-
ent from experienced buyers in that they need to familiarize themselves with the mar-
ketplace and, especially, with the supply side. A straightforward and inexpensive way 
to explore the marketplace is through comparing vendors’ offers at a reverse auction. 
This kind of intuition is supported by the insights from an analytical model that 
shows that reverse auctions are an important market exploration tool to identify new 
source of coffee beans supply (Donnet, Jeitschko, & Weatherspoon, 2007). There-
fore, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1. New buyers are more likely to use reverse auction than experienced buyers. 
 
In an analytical investigation of the procurement of software development services, 
Whang (1995) developed a model of a vendor’s bidding in a sequence of reverse auc-
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tions for contracts, where the vendor’s cost function incorporates the effects of learn-
ing that occur when a vendor has worked on a buyer’s previous projects. By learning 
about the specificity of the buyer’s request and by being able to modify and re-use 
parts of the source code, the vendor is able to cut the development costs dramatically 
in subsequent projects. The vendor who wins the first auction can create a lock-in 
effect and enjoy a competitive advantage against other bidders in subsequent auctions 
(Whang, 1995). As vendors learn in further projects, the lock-in effect becomes even 
stronger and the buyers become increasingly reluctant to switch vendors.  
Several theoretical investigations have pinpointed the importance of vendor’s idio-
syncratic investments for creation of value. For instance, Bakos and Brynjolffson 
(1993) rely on the theory of incomplete contracts to develop a model, according to 
which suppliers are required to invest in non-contractible characteristics such as in-
novation, quality, flexibility, trust, information exchange and responsiveness in order 
to create value (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993b). Richmond et al (1992), in their study 
of IS development outsourcing contracts, suggest that the value in outsourcing con-
tracts is generated through vendor’s specific investments, which can be stimulated 
though a profit-sharing rule (Richmond et al., 1992).  
In the context of an online marketplace for IT services, it looks plausible that as buy-
ers conduct more projects, learn about reducing development costs and the impor-
tance of specific investments and find ways to use vendors more efficiently, they will 
be increasingly eager to repeatedly use familiar vendors. But why would a buyer’s will-
ingness to stay with such a vendor prevent her from putting up new projects for open 
bidding?    
First, as shown by Bakos and Brynjolffson (1993b), vendors’ willingness to make 
non-contractible relationship-specific investments is subject to their expectation of 
being able to claim a part of the resulting gains in ex post negotiations. This depends 
on the vendor’s ex post bargaining power, which becomes stronger as the buyer 
commits to a small, rather than large, number of vendors (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 
1993b). Using negotiations to allocate the next project allows the vendor to retain 
more bargaining power, which, although by itself negative for the buyer, also signals 
the willingness to give away some of the value created as a result of the vendor’s spe-
cific investments, thus encouraging further relationship-specific investments that may 
ultimately benefit the buyer. Second, when considering allocating her next project via 
auctions or negotiations, the buyer might take into account the costs associated with 
setting up an auction and evaluate the vendors’ bids. As was shown by studies of 
costly bidding and bid evaluation in the  online IT service marketplaces, in such a 
setting the buyer incurs costs when evaluating vendor bids; at some point, the ex-
pected costs of evaluation can even exceed the expected gains from the transaction 
(Carr, 2003; Radkevitch, van Heck, & Koppius, 2007; Snir & Hitt, 2003). In other 
words, auctions might be a more costly procedure in the context of online market-
places compared to bilateral negotiations, which is likely to make auctions a less at-
tractive option compared to lower cost negotiation with a familiar vendor. 
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Third, recent empirical studies of the use of online reverse auctions in industry sug-
gest that, when exposed to a strong competition in reverse auctions, vendors respond 
with an increased suspicion of buyer’s opportunism (Jap, 2003; Jap, 2007). One can 
suggest that being suspicious of the other party’s opportunism does not promote 
trust, willingness to cooperate or idiosyncratic investments, all of which are important 
factors in the success of IT projects.  
Combined, these arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. More repeat interaction with vendors leads to the buyer’s lower preference for 
auctions and higher preference for negotiations. 
 
 
Figure 2-3. Conceptual model of Chapter 2: the choice of allocation mechanism. 
 
Our last hypothesis deals with the effect of the vendor performance in the buyer’s 
previous project on the choice of allocation mechanism for the next transaction. Due 
to their complexity and the involvement of parties that are often distributed across 
the globe, IT outsourcing projects are often prone to failure. According to Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers, as many as 50% of outsourcing deals fail5. A vendor’s failure to 
perform well can arise from a multitude of causes, such as the vendor’s poor qualifi-
cations, project mis-estimation, resource constraints, problems in communication and 
cooperation between the parties during the project (Kern, Willcocks, & van Heck, 
2002).  
                                                
5
 http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article.php?a_id=82203  
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Rather than continue with a vendor who has failed, the buyer is more likely to switch 
vendor. Reverse auctions are an ideal mechanism for performing such a switch, as 
they allow access to many new vendors, using competition to achieve a low price and 
comparing bidders against one anther. Therefore, we hypothesize that in such situa-
tion the buyer will opt for using reverse auctions rather than bilateral negotiations: 
 
Hypothesis 3. When performance in the most recent project has been unsatisfactory the buyer has 
a higher preference for auctions. 
 
The next section describes the methodology employed to test the hypothesized rela-
tionships.  
 
2.3. Methodology and Data 
2.3.1. Data 
In order to test the hypotheses we collected transaction data on accomplished pro-
jects in a leading online marketplace for IT services. One advantage of using a dataset 
from an online marketplace is that it “captures unbiased objective data: what players 
actually did, rather than what they say they did. This is preferable to the kind of sur-
vey data commonly used in other outsourcing studies which tend to be dependent on 
inaccurate memory, post hoc rationalizations, and subjective attitudinal scales.” (Gefen 
& Carmel, 2008: 13). 
There were several stages in data collection and processing. First, we identified buyers 
who had at least 20 awarded projects in the marketplace (this number included pro-
jects awarded in any category of the marketplace, not only IT-related). This resulted 
in a sample of 530 buyers who had allocated 20 to 300 projects each, starting from 
the launch of the marketplace in 1999 until May 2006. 
Second, we selected projects from the overall category Web Development, focusing on 
the four main sub-categories: Web Programming, Web Design and Development, Simple Web-
site and a category labelled Other – Web Design and Development. Other subcategories 
existed within Web Development, but were not numerous enough in our sample to war-
rant inclusion. We excluded projects with incomplete data. We also removed projects 
with incomplete data, e.g. where buyer feedback on supplier performance was absent 
in this marketplace buyers have discretion whether or not to provide feedback to 
vendors on accomplished projects). To ensure a reasonable amount of feedback data 
for each buyer, we only included buyers for whom feedback on at least 70% of pro-
jects was available and for whom at least 10 projects belonged to the Web development 
category.   
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The data collection resulted in a dataset containing the transactions of 91 buyers, with 
data on 2,081 projects worth a total of USD 1,074,315. See Table 2-1 in the Appendix 
for descriptive statistics, and Table 2-3 in the Appendix for correlations between the 
variables.  
2.3.2. Measures  
Below we discuss the measures of the allocation mechanism choice, of complexity, 
buyer experience, repeat interaction and satisfaction with vendor performance.  
Allocation mechanism choice 
As discussed above, in the online marketplace where our empirical investigation is set 
the buyer has a choice of two allocation mechanisms, and we model the allocation 
mechanism choice as a binary variable where “1” is equivalent to the use of auction 
and “0” denotes the use of negotiations (or “invite-only auctions” in the parlance of 
our marketplace). 
Previously-awarded projects 
We use the number of projects awarded by the buyer prior to the current transaction 
as a straightforward measure of how “new” the buyer is to the marketplace. There-
fore, a buyer with 0 previously awarded projects is accomplishing his first project in 
the marketplace.  
Repeat interaction   
We define the number of repeat interaction as the number of transactions the buyer 
had previously had with vendors with whom she had already transacted more than 
once. Although prior exchange interaction technically could stretch back through 
many years and/or projects, we focus on the more recent prior interaction as these 
are more likely to influence buyer behaviour than interaction many projects ago, thus 
providing a more focused test of the effects of the learning and specific investments 
that occur in early projects. We therefore counted repeat interaction with vendors 
within the buyer’s five most recent projects. Therefore, the maximum number of re-
peat interactions for the buyer is 5, the minimum is 0. However, as a robustness 
check, we tested our model with an alternative specification of prior exchange rela-
tionships, where we counted vendor re-uses with the buyer’s ten most recent projects, 
instead of only five. The significance and sign of the regression coefficient were prac-
tically the same as in our main results, but the effect size was even stronger.  
Performance in the most recent project 
After a project has been accomplished the buyer can assign a rating on a 1 to 5 point 
scale assessing the vendor’s performance, and can leave a textual message in the ven-
dor’s public profile. As 91% of projects have a rating of ‘5’, this suggests that 5 is the 
implied standard for any satisfactory project. We therefore modelled dissatisfaction 
with past performance as a binary variable where “0” is equivalent to the highest pos-
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sible performance rating (5) in the previous project and “1” accounts for any rating 
below 5. As a robustness check, we also developed and tested two alternative specifi-
cations with benchmarks for dissatisfaction and 4 and 3, respectively. Testing both 
alternative specifications produced results similar to those of the main specification, 
although the effect of dissatisfaction was even higher. 
Control variable - Project complexity  
Past research has identified project complexity as an important factor that influences 
the choice between auctions and negotiations (Bajari et al., 2006). The data available 
from the online marketplace does not allow us to judge directly about project com-
plexity. The closest proxy for complexity available in our dataset is the project cate-
gory.  
Project category. There are four project categories in the dataset: Simple website, Web 
design and development, Web programming and Other – website development. Using common 
sense it is hard to judge, which category contains more complex projects. For in-
stance, Web programming could contain quite complex programming tasks; at the same 
time Simple website despite its name could be relatively complex if it required the speci-
fication of all elements of a website, such as layout, design and contents. To make 
things worse, the marketplace website does not provide a description of projects that 
are supposed to be posted in each of the categories, which might have made our 
guesswork easier. 
An intuition that allows us to choose a relatively more complex category is that pro-
jects that end up in the category Other – website development may be, in fact, relatively 
more complex than those in other categories as they are less conventional and even 
less standardized than other IT projects. For instance, our examination of projects in 
this sub-category revealed that they span tasks such as screen savers development, 
converting .html files into .pdf format and vice versa, transferring websites to differ-
ent hosting services, development of online games, website bug testing, and so on. 
Although this type of work is not necessarily very voluminous, it might be relatively 
more complex than more conventional tasks due to their one-off and unconventional 
nature. Indeed, descriptive statistics for auctioned projects indicate that projects in 
the category Other – website development have a description length almost twice as long 
as any other category (253 words versus 105, 114 and 123 words in the other three 
categories). The difference in the description length between Other – website development 
and other categories is statistically significant.  
 
2.4. Analysis  
In order to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 we focused on individual transaction as a unit of 
analysis. The descriptive statistics and correlations among key variables are presented 
in Table 2-1 and Table 2-3. Interesting insights emerge from both tables. As can be 
see from Table 2-1, buyers have allocated their projects via negotiations in 62% of 
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cases. This is roughly similar to the split between auction/negotiation use in the other 
studies of allocation mechanism choice (Bajari et al, 2006; Leffer et al, 2004), in both 
of which auctions and negotiations were utilized in approximately equal numbers of 
transactions. Average project price6 in our dataset is around USD 516 while the aver-
age winner’s bid is only USD 354. This is an indication of a certain amount of price 
adjustment during the project execution stage7.  
An average project is realized by an experienced buyer with an average of 14.1 previ-
ously awarded projects. Extant vendors succeed in winning almost 2/3 of projects 
(65%) The data indicates that negotiations serve primarily as a means of allocating 
projects to vendors with whom buyers have done business before – almost 90% of 
negotiations are done with such vendors. By contrast, new suppliers win 75.1% of 
auctions. 
The mean of 4.88 of the vendor performance rating indicates that a bulk of vendors 
receive the highest possible evaluation for their project performance (91%). At least 
part of the explanation here is that awarding a vendor the highest rating serves as a 
reputational reward for good performance, rather than an objective measure thereof.  
Other insights come from the correlation coefficients in Table 2-3. First of all, nego-
tiations are associated with higher project prices as well as with higher winner’s bids. 
A strong association (.66***) is between invite-only auctions and repeat vendors be-
ing selected as winners.  
In line with the findings of some extant studies (Zhong & Wu, 2006), the price ven-
dors are paid at the end of the projects tend to be higher for repeat vendors (.041*), 
and bids with which such vendors win are also higher (.069***). Also, projects involv-
ing repeat vendors have a higher satisfaction rating (.215***).  
2.4.1. Analysis Strategy 
Our dependent variable, allocation mechanism choice, is binary. Therefore, we em-
ploy a logit formulation and develop a statistical model that relates the probability of 
auction choice Pr(Auction=1) to a set of independent variables (ProjectCategoryDummy, 
PreviousProject, RepeatProjects and DisatisfactionDummy).  
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 (1)   
                                                
6 Price actually paid to the vendor after the end of the project. 
7 This is similar to construction projects, in which contracts are inherently incomplete and price ad-
justments are required in order to compensate for the changes in the scope of work and prices of 
construction materials.  
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Dummies for three project categories (“Simple website”, “Other – website development” and 
“Web design and development”) are used as ProjectCategoryDummy; the other dummy vari-
able, “Web programming”, is used as a benchmark. PreviousProjects is the number of pro-
jects awarded by the buyer before the current project; RepeatProjects is the number of 
repeat projects among the buyer’s 5 most recent projects; DisatisfactionDummy is a bi-
nary variable set to “1” when the buyer’s rating of the vendor’s performance in the 
previous project was 5, and set to “0” if the rating was below 5. 
The dataset has a panel structure and this has implications for the logit estimation 
procedures. The main issue with panel data is that the assumption of independent 
distribution of the error may not hold (Kennedy, 2003), which might result in biased 
estimation if a standard logit estimation procedure is used. In order to deal with this 
issue we use three different logistic specifications that together help test the robust-
ness of our results. The first way of testing is by using pooled logistic regression with 
a robust procedure with clustering on buyers as the first way to test the hypothesis. 
This procedure allows us to obtain conservative standard errors and to avoid their 
inflation in the case that they are not independent. 
There are ways, however, to more fully account for the structure of the data by cap-
turing the effect produced by individual buyers on the allocation mechanism choice. 
Two candidate specifications for this are the random effects and fixed effects models. 
These two models differ in their underlying assumptions regarding the nature of the 
error terms resulting from individual buyers. The fixed effects model treats the effect 
of individual buyers as constant, in which case it becomes a part of the intercept. By 
contrast, in a random effects model the buyer-specific effects are assumed to be in-
dependently and identically distributed, coming from a common normal distribution. 
The random effects model produces more efficient estimations than those of the 
fixed effects model, since the former uses more information. The random effects es-
timator accounts for variation both within and between cross-sectional units – it is a 
“matrix-weighted average” of the between and within estimators (Kennedy, 2003: 
307) – while the fixed effects estimator is based exclusively on the variation within 
cross-sectional units. However, for the random effects model to produce consistent 
estimates, the assumption about the independent distribution of buyer-specific effects 
should hold. This limitation greatly constrains the range of situations appropriate for 
the use of the random effects model (Kennedy, 2003).  
One way to make sure whether the random effects model can be applied is by carry-
ing out a Hausman test (Kennedy, 2003). The Hausman test verifies whether the es-
timates produced by the two models are statistically different. The statistical test is of 
0H  that the estimates of the two models are the same versus 1H  that the estimates 
are different. No statistical difference means that the assumption of random effects 
cannot be rejected. Therefore, the random effects model can be used. In our case the 
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results of the Hausman test reported in Table 2-2 show that the random effects 
model cannot be rejected. 
Finally, when estimating the fixed effects we need to account for the fact that our 
panel data is unbalanced, since the number of observations for individual buyers is 
too small to allow for a consistent estimation of individual fixed effects by the usual 
maximum-likelihood approach. A solution is to use approaches based on conditional 
maximum-likelihood. These approaches make possible the estimation of fixed effects 
in a consistent fashion (Greene, 2003). Therefore, we run a clogit procedure in 
STATA 9.0 that allows for consistent estimation of the buyer’s fixed effects on the 
choice of the allocation mechanism, and report the result in column (5) of Table 2-1. 
2.4.2. Results 
In Table 2-1 the results of testing the logit models are presented. We start the discus-
sion of the results with a concise form of the model that includes only proxies for 
project complexity and buyer experience (column 1). The initial test provides support 
for Hypothesis 1. The number of Previously awarded projects (our proxy for buyer ex-
perience) is negatively associated with the use of reverse auctions (-0.0380, p<0.01). 
Its effect is small, however: the marginal effect of an increase in Previously awarded pro-
jects from 0 to 1 is only around 1% of the auction probability decrease. Although 
small, this is in contrast to the results in Bajari et al. (2006). A possible explanation 
may be that in the online marketplace context investigated here, the positive effect of  
buyer experience on the use of negotiations is related to the fact that when buyers 
start their activities in the online marketplace, auctions serve as a tool to explore the 
marketplace, by getting to know vendors and learning about the bidding process. As 
buyers acquire experience, from exploration of the marketplace they switch to exploi-
tation of their knowledge and the relationships they have built with vendors, where 
negotiation is a more appropriate instrument.  
In line with our intuition, the dummy of the Other – website and development category 
negatively and significantly affects the choice for conducting an auction (-1.2075, 
p<0.05). This sign is in line with the results of Bajari et al. (2006), who showed a posi-
tive effect of project complexity on the choice for negotiations. Another category of 
projects that makes auctions significantly less preferred than negotiation is Simple web-
site, although the size of the effect is smaller (-0.6046, p<0.05).  
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The third model presented in column 3 of Table 2-1 regresses the probability of auc-
tion choice on the full set of the independent variables. The number of observations 
in this model is 1,780, since a sub-sample of buyers with at least 5 awarded projects 
has been used for testing. In comparison to the previous model, this model demon-
strates a sharp increase in the explained variance to the level of 25.99% of the varia-
tion.  
The regression coefficient for Repeat projects is significantly and negatively related to 
the choice for the reverse auction (-0.8262, p<0.01), which means that Hypothesis 2 
is supported. As the analysis of the marginal effects reveals in the same column, the 
increase of the number of repeat projects (which the buyer conducts within the five 
latest projects) by one leads to a 12.8% increase in the probability of not choosing to 
auction the next project. By contrast, the coefficient for Buyer dissatisfaction dummy 
loses significance. This is related to the fact that projects undertaken by relatively in-
experienced buyers (with less than five awarded projects) and in which dissatisfaction 
with the vendor’s performance is more likely due to the lack of experience and fit 
with the vendor are now excluded from the analysis. Also, the coefficient for Previ-
ously awarded projects loses its significance, most likely because the effect of buyer’s ex-
perience in the models in columns 3-5 (which was small to begin with) is now ab-
sorbed by the Repeat projects variable. 
Columns (4) and (5) display the results of hypotheses testing using random effects 
and fixed effects logistic models. There are 1,357 observations in the fixed effects 
model compared to 1,780 in the random effects model, as the former model excludes 
buyers that do not have variation in the dependent variable. Qualitatively, the results 
are very similar. The support for Hypothesis 2 has been provided once again. Both 
random effects and fixed effects models demonstrate support for Hypothesis 3, 
which links the buyer’s dissatisfaction with vendor performance in the most recent 
project with the choice for auction in the subsequent project. The coefficients for 
Buyer dissatisfaction dummy in both models are positive and significant (0.7391, p<0.01 
and 0.7640, p<0.01). The analysis of marginal effects shows that when the buyer’s 
rating for supplier performance in the last project is less than 5, the buyer is 15.5% 
(random effects model) and 0.065% (fixed effects model) more likely to use auction 
in the next transaction. 
Overall, the conclusion of the analysis is that Hypothesis 1 (on the negative effect of 
buyer experience on the use of auctions) finds partial support. New buyers are more 
likely to use auctions than experienced buyers, but the effect of marginal increase in 
experience on the decrease of negotiation use is quite weak and seems to be overrid-
den by repeat interaction, when the latter is included in the model. Hypothesis 2 (on 
the relationship between repeat interaction and preference for negotiations in the 
subsequent project) and Hypothesis 3 (on the relationship between dissatisfaction 
with vendor performance in the previous project and preference for auctions in the 
subsequent project) find broad support. In the next section we discuss the implica-
tions of the findings.  
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2.5. Discussion 
The findings of this study have a number of implications for both research and prac-
tice. First, from the research perspective, this study not only extends the body of 
knowledge relating to the use of different allocation mechanisms. It also provides 
further support for an emerging perspective in the research on auction, which argues 
for focusing not only on a discrete transaction when trying to explain participants’ 
behaviour in auction outcomes but also on the business context in which such a 
transaction occurs (Elmaghraby, 2007; Pinker et al., 2003; Rothkopf & Harstad, 
1994). We showed that taking into account a historical perspective of an actor’s ex-
change interaction, more specifically prior repeat exchange interaction, results in gain-
ing valuable insights into the motivation of the behaviour of economic agents.  
Second, these results contribute to the debate on the use of online reverse auctions in 
industrial practice. A viewpoint shared by a number of researchers is that online re-
verse auctions, if implemented “with care”, can be utilized with the incumbent supply 
base without necessarily damaging existing relationships (Jap, 2002). Indeed, previous 
studies have found that incumbent suppliers are more likely to win auctions than new 
suppliers, and toenjoy higher prices (Zhong & Wu, 2006), and that incumbents might 
still be willing to make idiosyncratic investments after reverse auctions even though 
they might start to suspect the buyer of trying to opportunistically decrease prices 
(Jap, 2003). A study in the banking industry revealed that, although the effect of a 
supplier marketing program has a higher effect in terms of buyer’s switching decision, 
personal relationships still do play a role as a counterweight to switching (Wathne, 
Biong, & Heide, 2001). Although these prior findings look very plausible, the broader 
perspective on the use of online reverse auctions taken in our study reveals that buy-
ers do not think reverse auctions to be very appropriate in the context of longer 
buyer-supplier relationships. We identified and quantified a clear pattern of decreas-
ing use of reverse auctions as the exchange relationships between buyers and vendors 
become more extensive, at least in terms of the number of previous exchange interac-
tions. The decrease of the probability of using reverse auction for the next project 
(although somewhat dependent on the model specification employed) could be al-
most 16% per additional past repeat project with a vendor. Apparently, this is a sign 
that buyers do not see reverse auctions commensurable with the trust, vendor’s learn-
ing and idiosyncratic investments amassed during the prior interaction, and rather rely 
on negotiations to reap these benefits. By contrast, buyers turn to reverse auctions 
when they need to sever relationships with their incumbent vendor: being dissatisfied 
with a vendor’s performance can boost the probability of auctioning their next pro-
ject by as much as 27%.  
These results can be useful guidelines for procurement managers who have a full dis-
cretion to use different allocation mechanisms with their incumbent supply base, es-
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pecially in contexts where the knowledge and investments of, as well as the trust in, 
incumbent vendors are important for creating business value.  
At the same time, the results of the present study should be generalized with caution. 
Unlike previous studies on the choice of allocation mechanism and contract choice 
that explored the empirical context in industries such as offshore oil drilling, hospital 
procurement or contracting for large-scale IT services, this study explores small-scale 
IT service projects in an online environment. One implication for the generalizability 
of results here is that larger companies might have formalized rules for the choice of 
allocation mechanisms that might prevent them from easily changing from one 
mechanism to another. For example, several studies have described the procurement 
auctions of electronic components or automotive parts, where buyers would use re-
verse auctions exclusively to choose suppliers (Jap, 2003; Zhong & Wu, 2006). This is 
also true for public procurement, e. g. of construction services, where buyers always 
have to use tenders when certain criteria (e.g. monetary volume of the project) are 
met (Bajari et al., 2006). Another implication is that the transaction costs can be lower 
in the online environment, which can make switching vendors easier. For example, 
these are the costs of a buyer’s searching for new vendors, which are lower in online 
markets (Bakos, 1997). 
In addition to the concerns about generalizability, this study has several other limita-
tions. First, the Web Development section of the online marketplace that we studied 
is but one of the areas of the marketplace. It is not clear whether our findings would 
equally hold for other professional services such as tax consultancy, legal advice or 
language transaction, where the importance of a buyer’s learning, trust and idiosyn-
cratic investments might be lower than in the case of IT services. Second, the size of 
the contracts we studied is much smaller than the size of typical B2B software devel-
opment contracts. As Gefen and Carmel (2008) note in a study that uses data from a 
marketplace similar to ours: “Such contracts span from three to six order of magni-
tude larger than the typical Rent A Coder contract and thus different marketplace 
behaviour is likely” (Gefen & Carmel, 2008: 11). The third limitation comes from the 
fact that it is difficult to compare the effects of prior relationships on the allocation 
mechanism choice with factors identified by prior studies, such as contract complex-
ity (Bajari et al., 2006). The measures for complexity available for our marketplace 
lack the refinement necessary for drawing such conclusions. Finally, our dataset has 
been limited exclusively to projects that have been awarded and executed, and as pre-
vious studies in a similar marketplace have pointed out, as much as 60% of posted 
auctions never result in a contract between the buyer and vendor (Radkevitch et al., 
2007; Snir & Hitt, 2003). The explanations offered by these authors are mainly in 
terms of costly bidding and costly bid evaluation, but both papers also found that 
projects with higher dollar value are slightly more likely not to be awarded. This im-
plies that the auction part of our sample is likely to include somewhat smaller projects 
compared to the overall population of auctioned projects. However, this only pro-
vides a stricter test of our hypotheses, as the risk associated with high-value projects 
would make them theoretically more likely to be allocated through a negotiation 
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rather than an auction (although since data on the value of negotiated projects is not 
available for the marketplace, we cannot test this hypothesis). This does suggest that a 
misfit between project value and allocation mechanism employed might be an addi-
tional explanation for the high percentage of failed auctions, but this is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. 
 
2.6. Conclusions  
Procurement transactions often require a decision on the choice of a mechanism to 
allocate a contract to a vendor to be made at a very early stage. As the prior literature 
has demonstrated, the choice of the allocation mechanism is of crucial importance 
since this mechanism affects a number of critical aspects of transactions such as in-
formation exchange, price and buyer-supplier relationships (Bajari et al., 2006; Jap, 
2002; Jap, 2003). All these factors affect performance in the exchange.  
Previous theoretical and empirical studies on allocation mechanism choice focused on 
transaction attributes such as product complexity, the buyer’s preference for quality, 
availability of suppliers and the cost of conducing auctions as factors determining the 
mechanism choice (Bajari et al., 2006; Bonaccorsi et al., 2000; Leffler et al., 2003; 
Manelli & Vincent, 1995). This means that until now the literature has considered 
only discrete exchange situations, ignoring the historical context in which exchange 
occurs in the real world. This has been a considerable gap for both theory and prac-
tice, as repetition is typical for procurement transactions (Elmaghraby, 2007; Pinker et 
al., 2003). This study aimed to bridge this gap and to extend the literature on the 
choice of allocation mechanisms by studying the effect of the buyer’s repeat interac-
tion with vendors on the choice between reverse auctions and bilateral negotiations.  
This study makes three key contributions. First, we identified and quantified the ef-
fect of the buyer’s repeat exchange interaction with vendors on the choice of alloca-
tion mechanism in the buyer’s next transaction in an online marketplace for IT ser-
vices. We also found that in cases when the buyer needs to explore the supply in the 
marketplace or when she is dissatisfied with the vendor’s performance in the most 
recent project, the use of auctions in the subsequent project becomes more likely. 
These findings extend the body of knowledge relating to allocation mechanism 
choice.  
Our second contribution is linked to the new insights into the use of online reverse 
auctions. Buyers who enjoyed prior repeat interaction with vendors and are satisfied 
with their performance, are very unlikely to start experimenting with reverse auctions. 
By contrast, reverse auctions seem to serve as a tool that new buyers use to explore 
the marketplace; or, alternatively, to compare and switch to new suppliers in the case 
that a vendor’s performance has become unsatisfactory. This finding seems to chal-
lenge the insights of some prior studies that suggested that reverse auctions are likely 
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to be used as a “wake-up call for the extant supply base” (Jap, 2002). However, more 
research is needed to find out to what extent these findings hold in other empirical 
contexts.  
The third contribution consists of exploring an empirical context different from that 
utilized by prior studies of allocation mechanism choice. This has allowed us to ex-
tend the study of allocation mechanism choice into the online environment, which 
has hosted an increasing number of transactions in recent decades. In addition, the 
use of the real transaction data from an online marketplace helped to overcome a 
limitation of previous research that studied the link between reverse auctions and 
buyer-supplier relationships using survey data. In our study, rather than relying on the 
information about actors’ subjective intentions and perceptions, we could operate 
with the objective facts of actual transactions, showing that the increasing availability 
of large, real-world transaction data offers great opportunities for building empirically 
valid theories of B2B market behaviour. 
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Appendix Chapter 2 
Table 2-3. Descriptive statistics. 
  N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Allocation mechanism (Neg. = 0; Auct. 
= 1) 
2,081 0 1 .63844 .4967 
Project Price 
2,081 5 15,150 516.25 1008.91 
Winner’s bid 
2,033 1 8,750 354.18 502.77 
Number of previously awarded projects 
2,081 0 65 14.10 13.07 
Winner is recurrent vendor 
2,081 0 1 .65 .48 
Percentage of previous projects with 
repeat vendors 
1,980 .00 1.00 .3893 .4144 
USD in projects with repeat vendors 
1,980 0 52,660 4,162.19 6,423.18 
Satisfaction 
2,066 1 5 4.88 .53 
Satisfaction with last project < 5 
2,081 0 1 .09 .29 
Satisfaction with last project < 4 
2,081 0 1 .04 .19 
Satisfaction with last project < 3 
2,081 0 1 .03 .16 
Days since the start of the 1st auction 
2,081 0 2,321 548.56 481.09 
Repeat projects within 5 last projects 
1,780 0 5 3.34 1.63 
Category “Web design and develop-
ment” 
2,081 .00 1.00 .4493 .4975 
Category “Simple website” 
2,081 .00 1.00 .2220 .4157 
Category “Web programming” 
2,081 .00 1.00 .2960 .4566 
Category “Other – web design” 
2,081 .00 1.00 .0308 .1727 
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Chapter 3. Coping with Costly Bid Evaluation in 
Online Markets for IT Services
11
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
While the sale of physical products over the Internet has been a mainstay of elec-
tronic commerce, in recent years a number of online marketplaces have sprung up 
that focus on the trading of professional services. They cover services from IT (e.g. 
website design) to construction (e.g. painting) and from tax advice to creative writing. 
One of the more vivid examples is Elance Online, a pioneer professional services 
marketplace that runs around 100,000 reverse auctions for services12 yearly. Another 
example is RentACoder.com, a marketplace specializing in IT services that facilitates 
over 15,000 projects per month and is still growing at the rate of 50% a year13. The 
field is booming, with more newcomers such as oDesk and OnForce joining the 
game (Thibodeau, 2007). 
The growth of these markets has dramatically increased the range of alternatives that 
are available to buyers. For example, when considering sourcing a service at RentA-
Coder.com, a buyer potentially has over 160,000 vendors from close to 200 countries 
to choose from. The exposure to an overwhelming range of suppliers and their offers 
online can require buyers to spend more effort on evaluating their options (Barua, 
Ravindran, & Whinston, 1997), thus increasing the cost of transacting and reducing 
the efficiency of online marketplaces. Bid evaluation is particularly challenging when 
heterogeneous services such as software development are involved, where the ser-
vices are typically idiosyncratic and substantial information asymmetry exists with 
regard to vendor quality and production costs (Snir & Hitt, 2003). In addition, sellers 
have responded to lowered search costs with strategies that make the evaluation more 
complex – by increasing product differentiation (Clemons, Hann, & Hitt, 2002; 
Grover & Ramanlal, 1999), product bundling and multiproduct competition (Ellison 
& Ellison, 2005). Thus, the bid evaluation process is a non-trivial part of the ex-
change process in online marketplaces, yet only a handful of studies have recognized 
its importance. 
                                                
11 A paper based on this chapter is being prepared for the second review round at Information Sys-
tems Research. 
12
 www.elance.com (accessed 25.06.2007) 
13 www.rentacoder.com (accessed 25.06.2007) 
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This importance is demonstrated by a connection between higher evaluation costs 
and the buyer’s tendency to abandon the transaction, i.e. not allocate the project to 
any vendor at all (Carr, 2003; Snir & Hitt, 2003). From a buyer’s perspective, as the 
expected costs of evaluating vendors or their offers go up, at some point they may 
overweigh the benefits of locating an efficient vendor, so that the buyer decides to 
forgo bid evaluation and quits the transaction (Carr, 2003). Empirical tests have sup-
ported this conjecture by showing that as project value and the number of submitted 
bids increase, a buyer becomes less likely to allocate their IT projects through reverse 
auctions (Snir & Hitt, 2003). High evaluation costs at least partially account for the 
fact that as little as 30-40% of requests for proposals in marketplaces such as Elance 
Online go beyond the bidding stage to the project award stage (Snir & Hitt, 2003). 
Thus, understanding evaluation costs and, perhaps more importantly, the ways to 
cope with them, is important in order to harness the complexities and opportunities 
of online marketplaces. As Barua at al. (1997) put it: “Unless buyers have effective 
supplier evaluation strategies, it may not be possible to unlock the full potential of the 
technology” (Barua et al., 1997). 
Evaluation cost reduction is likely to increase efficiency on both the individual and 
market levels. Prior studies have suggested marketplace design improvements and 
automatic evaluation tools to reduce evaluation costs (Barua et al., 1997; Snir & Hitt, 
2003). The present study adds to these institutionally-focused factors another cate-
gory of factors that have an impact on evaluation costs: the behaviour of the buyer in 
the marketplace. Whereas previous studies have regarded the buyer’s behaviour as 
uniform and fixed, we argue that buyers have several tactics at their disposal that they 
can employ to reduce evaluation costs. Hence our main research question is:  
 
What is the effect of evaluation-cost-reducing buyer tactics on project allocation in online 
marketplaces for IT services? 
 
The tactics we address are search, RFP (research for proposal) preparation, budget announce-
ment, negotiation and bid filtering. The discussion of these tactics is inspired by practices 
that exist in custom software development, by empirical observations of online mar-
ketplaces as well as by the literature.  Note, however, that these tactics are not exclu-
sively used for evaluation cost reduction. For example, a preliminary search for quali-
fied vendors in the marketplace is widely used in many procurement settings in order 
to reduce project risk, while providing a clear project specification in an RFP is neces-
sary to ensure the vendors will be able to place better-informed bids (Milgrom & 
Weber, 1982) and to avoid ambiguities during project execution. However, we will 
argue that an important effect of these tactics is to reduce the evaluation costs, an 
effect which has thus far escaped recognition in the literature. Thus, the focus of our 
study is on the implications these tactics have for evaluation costs and their impact on 
project allocation in the context of online IT service marketplaces. Additionally, we 
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take into account the role of buyer experience in order to assess whether the effec-
tiveness of these tactics changes as experience grows. 
In order to answer the research question, we conduct a quantitative examination of 
transactions from a leading online IT services marketplace. The dataset comprises 
approximately 10,000 reverse auctions. The results demonstrate that buyers employ-
ing the aforementioned tactics allocate projects more often than buyers who do not, 
as each separate tactic contributes significantly to project allocation. Buyer experience 
moderates the effectiveness of some of the tactics: as experience grows, budget an-
nouncement becomes more effective in increasing the likelihood of allocation, while 
RFP preparation becomes less effective.  
The results of the analysis show that buyer tactics are an effective means for coping 
with evaluation costs. We extended and tested the theory on the effects of evaluation 
costs on the transaction outcomes in an online environment. While previous studies 
focused on theoretical models of buyer behaviour in which evaluation costs were 
completely or partially exogenous, in the present study we have extended the theory 
by treating evaluation costs as an endogenous factor. These findings contribute to the 
bodies of literature on online marketplaces and auction theory by increasing our un-
derstanding of the relationship between buyer behaviour, evaluation costs and con-
tracting decisions at reverse auctions within online marketplaces for IT services.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 contains a review of the literature on 
online markets and reverse auctions. Section 3.3 presents the conceptual set-up and 
hypotheses. In Section 3.4 we describe the empirical setting of an online marketplace 
for IT services, introduce measures and present the results of our empirical tests. Sec-
tions 3.5 and 3.6 contain the discussion and conclusions. 
 
3.2. Literature  
3.2.1. Context: the online marketplace for IT services 
An online market is defined as “an inter-organisational information system through 
which multiple buyers and sellers interact to accomplish one or more of the following 
market-making activities: identifying potential trading partners; selecting a specific 
partner, and executing the transaction” (Choudhury, Hartzel, & Konsynski, 1998). 
Since the early days, the costs borne by actors in economic transactions have been 
central to the literature on online markets. Information and communication tech-
nologies were predicted to have drastic transaction cost-reducing effects, resulting in 
numerous implications for organisational forms, market efficiency and buyer and 
supplier behaviour (Bakos, 1991; Malone & Laubacher, 1998; Malone, Yates, & Ben-
jamin, 1987). Specifically, at the level of buyers’ and sellers’ strategies the implications 
of search costs (Bakos, 1997), bidding costs (Snir & Hitt, 2003) and evaluation costs 
(Barua et al., 1997; Carr, 2003) have been analyzed.  
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The literature on evaluation costs, which is the focus of our study, is represented by a 
limited number of studies. Barua et al. (1997) were the first to address the evaluation 
cost issue in online markets, where the range of purchasing options for heterogene-
ous goods and services is greatly increased. They compared two buyer strategies that 
are both aimed at reducing total costs of selection of a vendor of a non-standard 
product, namely a sequential evaluation strategy and a competitive bidding strategy 
(i.e. simultaneous evaluation). The authors show analytically that the buyer’s expected 
total cost under a sequential strategy is always equal to or lower than that under the 
bidding strategy (Barua et al., 1997). An alternative way to approach evaluation costs 
was proposed by Snir and Hitt (2003), who focused on bidder behaviour in online 
markets and showed that higher value projects attract more bidders, and that these 
bidders are of lower average quality (Snir & Hitt, 2003). In response, Carr (2003) de-
veloped an analytical model in which bid evaluation costs are a function of the num-
ber of submitted bids and their average quality. As the number of bids increases, 
evaluation costs can become prohibitively high, so that the buyer may decide to 
forego bid evaluation and withdraw from the auction altogether (Carr, 2003). This 
observation that evaluation costs impact project allocation is the starting point for 
this chapter, and our first contribution is that we show that buyers can and do use 
tactics to reduce these evaluation costs, thus increasing project allocation rates and 
improving market performance. Our second contribution is to provide further sup-
port for the recently-emerging stream of empirical literature on online auctions that 
takes into account the heterogeneity of market participants (Bapna et al., 2004; Jap, 
2007; Radkevitch, van Heck, & Koppius, 2006c; Zhong & Wu, 2006). 
  
3.3. Conceptual Development 
3.3.1. Context: the online marketplace for IT services 
Since our hypotheses are to some extent contextualized within the specific online 
marketplace we study (an issue which we will address at the end of the paper in the 
discussion of the generalizability of the results), we first introduce the research con-
text – an online marketplace for IT services. Such a marketplace is an ideal environ-
ment for our research. IT services, such as custom software development, are typi-
cally idiosyncratic, customizable and characterized by high information asymmetry 
with regard to vendor quality (Snir & Hitt, 2003) and production costs (Whang, 
1995); therefore, these services are likely to entail substantial bidding and bid evalua-
tion costs for the exchange counterparts (Snir & Hitt, 2003). Snir and Hitt (2003) 
provide a clear summary of the exchange characteristics of IT services: 
The RFP and bidding process must result in the exchange of much more information 
because projects and qualifications are not standardized. Unlike the trade of physical 
commodities where a part number, industry standard (e.g., MIS-SPEC, ANSI, 
ISO, etc.) or short description can be sufficient to fully describe a good required, IT 
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services are highly customized, and idiosyncratic. Moreover, unlike many physical 
commodities that have objective tests of quality (e.g., composition, strength, reliability, 
etc.), IT services face subjective evaluation of the work product. As such, the range of 
possible characteristics and quality levels of services is virtually unlimited (Snir & 
Hitt, 2003).  
Examples of online marketplaces that are now seeing an increasing number of con-
tracts for IT services include eWork.com, Elance Online, RentACoder.com and 
oDesk. Contracts on these marketplaces are normally allocated via reverse auctions or 
bilateral negotiations (Jap, 2002; Kaufmann & Carter, 2004). These marketplaces also 
provide a platform for value-added exchange processes beyond the auction, such as 
payments, risk mitigation and service delivery (Kambil & van Heck, 2002; Snir & 
Hitt, 2003). Due to a considerable number of small businesses and individuals out-
sourcing their work to low-cost countries through these marketplaces, this segment is 
sometimes referred to as “person to person offshoring”. The volume of this market 
segment is projected to increase from around USD 250 million now to USD 2 billon 
by 2015 (Aggarwal, 2007). 
We illustrate the functioning of such marketplaces with the example of Elance 
Online, a leading online marketplace for professional services. Established in 1998, 
Elance now hosts around two thousand projects that are simultaneously open for 
bidding across all service categories at any moment of time. Around 60,000 compa-
nies regularly use the marketplace to buy services and about half or more of them buy 
IT services14. The online market contains a searchable database of vendors and offers 
reverse auctions and negotiations as allocation mechanisms.  
The range of services available at Elance encompasses IT services, as well as other 
professional services such as translation, creative writing, accounting, financial and 
business strategy consulting and the like. The Buyers are businesses and individuals 
coming predominantly from the US. The Vendors are mostly freelancers, small and 
medium IT companies from India, Eastern Europe and Russia. Some vendors have a 
turnover of more than USD two million within Elance.  
The exchange process is organised as follows. Before buyers and vendors can enter 
the exchange, they should go through a registration process. Every participant 
chooses a marketplace ID under which it can be identified in any transaction. Partici-
pation for buyers is free of charge, while a periodic fee applies to vendors. The buyer 
starts an auction by posting an RFP. The buyer specifies auction parameters, such as 
start and end time, auction type, and the type of suppliers who can bid.  
After the auction starts, vendors can bid. Bids specify price and estimated delivery 
time, contain information on vendor rating and earnings and a text field where the 
bidder can provide other relevant information. Once a bid has been submitted, it be-
                                                
14
 http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=166401742  
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comes visible to the buyer and other vendors. During the auction, the buyer can de-
cline or shortlist bids and communicate with vendors via message boards.  
There is no obligation for the buyer to allocate the project to any of the vendors, 
which results in quite a low project allocation rate of 30-40% (Snir & Hitt, 2003). 
When a project is allocated, the parties can use a virtual “working space” to commu-
nicate, exchange documents, track milestones, and settle payments via an escrow ac-
count. Upon project completion, the buyer can assign a rating to the vendor. 
3.3.2. Costly bid evaluation in the market for IT ser-
vices 
As discussed above, the exchange of IT services is likely to entail substantial evalua-
tion costs. Evaluation costs are defined as “the cost of resources used to scrutinize 
possible voluminous bid documentation or proposals from sellers, to assess the capa-
bility of each seller, and to compare prices and other aspects of the proposals” (Barua 
et al., 1997). The level of evaluation costs depends on the products or services in-
volved: it goes up when they are nonstandard, customizable and idiosyncratic (Barua 
et al., 1997; Snir & Hitt, 2003). Additionally, as the number of inefficient suppliers in 
the pool increases, the buyer’s total evaluation costs also go up. These high evaluation 
costs in turn burden the exchange process with inefficiencies. Evaluation costs can 
grow so high as to “offset any gains from the reduced cost of search and communica-
tion” (Barua et al., 1997) and “perfectly acceptable bids” can be neglected by the 
buyer due to high expected evaluation costs (Carr, 2003). Carr’s (2003) model specifi-
cally addresses the exchange on online marketplaces for IT services. In this model the 
buyer starts a reverse auction by posting a request for proposals (RFP) to an auction 
site. Heterogeneous (in quality) vendors evaluate the RFP and decide whether or not 
to submit their bids. When the auction ends, the buyer decides whether or not to un-
dertake costly bid evaluation, which is necessary to determine the best vendor. The 
evaluation costs are incurred to assess vendor quality, which is private information. 
The model assumes that the buyer evaluates all bids or none. The buyer’s decision 
whether or not to evaluate bids is a function of the number of submitted bids and the 
distribution of the vector of bids. With this information, the buyer can estimate the 
conditional probability distribution of the lowest bid and calculate his expected post-
evaluation surplus, which determines the optimal evaluation decision. The implica-
tions of this model have to be considered in the context of the insights from the 
model of costly bidding (Snir & Hitt, 2003). In this model, higher value projects at-
tract more bidders, and the average quality of these bidders becomes lower. As the 
buyer faces more bids, which are of lower average quality, he is likely to forego the 
evaluation due to high expected costs (Carr, 2003).  
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3.3.3. Coping with evaluation costs  
The previous paragraph highlighted the effect of evaluation costs on buyers, but there 
are several tactics that buyers can employ to reduce their evaluation costs. The discus-
sion of these tactics is inspired by practices in custom software development, by em-
pirical observations of online marketplaces as well as by the literature (Elmaghraby, 
2007; Kaufmann & Carter, 2004). We assume that in procurement situations reverse 
auctions are embedded into a sourcing context that encompasses activities such as 
search for vendors, short-listing suppliers, post-auction negotiations, etc (Kaufmann 
& Carter, 2004). The tactics we consider are search (for vendors), RFP preparation, 
budget announcement, bid filtering and negotiation with vendors. Figure 3-1 depicts 
these tactics placed along the timeline of a typical reverse auction event on an online 
IT service marketplace. The displayed sequence is rather indicative, as in a real situa-
tion the buyer can decide to search for more vendors after the auction start or award 
his contract prior to the scheduled auction end.  
Such tactics are widely used in procurement (Elmaghraby, 2007; Nam, Rajagopalan, 
Rao, & Chaudhury, 1996) and do not exclusively serve for the reduction of evaluation 
cost reduction15. Indeed, preparing a clear project description in an RFP is necessary 
to make sure the vendors will be submitting bids for the right project. In B2B trans-
actions identifying qualified suppliers in advance is important, as the scale of transac-
tions greatly exceeds that of the retail transactions (Barua et al., 1997; Pinker et al., 
2003), therefore search is commonly used in many procurement settings (Pinker et al., 
2003). Budget announcement usually takes the form of an auction reservation price 
(Bakos, 1997). Screening vendor and/or their offers (which we denote bid filtering) as 
well as negotiations are necessary steps in tenders to ensure the fit between the pro-
ject and selected vendors (Mithas & Jones, 2007).  
In order to facilitate the theoretical discussion, we draw a distinction between two 
aspects of evaluation costs: the cumulative cost and the unit cost. The cumulative cost of 
evaluation goes up with assessment of every additional vendor or bid. This is the 
overall cost the buyer incurs for evaluating all bids in the auction in the models by 
Barua et al (1997) and Carr (2003) and in the sequential strategy in Barua et al (1997). 
The unit cost of evaluation is the amount of resources and efforts invested by the 
buyer to evaluate a fixed amount of information, e.g. quality of a single vendor or bid. 
By increasing evaluation efficiency the buyer can reduce the unit cost of evaluation. 
In Carr’s and Barua et al.’s analytical models, the unit cost of evaluation is strictly ex-
ogenous, while in the present study we hold both aspects of evaluation costs endoge-
nous, so in our setting the buyer can influence both aspects of evaluation costs 
through the use of several tactics, which influences the total costs he incurs at the 
evaluation stage. 
                                                
15
 This raises the issue of alternative explanations of the effects of these tactics. These are addressed 
in the Discussion section. 
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Below we discuss the effects of the five buyer tactics on two aspects of evaluation 
costs within the context of an online auction for IT services. Through their impact on 
evaluation costs, the tactics and experiences affect the contracting decision, i.e. 
whether to allocate a contract to a vendor or not. As it is difficult to observe actual 
evaluation costs empirically outside a laboratory setting, we therefore focus on the 
direct implications of evaluations costs as described in the previous literature (Barua 
et al., 1997; Carr, 2003; Snir & Hitt, 2003): the relationship between the use of tactics 
(potentially moderated by experience) and the likelihood of project allocation.  
3.3.4. Hypotheses  
Search for vendors  
The functionality of an online marketplace often allows for leveraging search in an 
extremely cost-effective fashion. The buyer can browse the database of accomplished 
projects or search through a catalogue of vendor profiles in order to locate the neces-
sary skills or vendors with the highest ranking. Once located, vendors can be person-
ally invited to bid.  
The motivation to perform search before the auction is as follows. The buyer is run-
ning a risk that efficient vendors may choose not to bid due to high expected bidding 
costs (Michell & Fitzgerald, 1997) or simply will not be aware of the opportunity. 
When invited personally, the vendors are likely to have a higher estimation of their 
own probability to win and would be more likely to bid.  
There are two ways in which search can reduce the buyer’s cumulative evaluation 
costs. First, when inefficient suppliers are deciding whether to submit their bids, the 
presence of already submitted bids from their more efficient (and invited) counter-
parts may prevent them from doing so (Snir & Hitt, 2003). Second, in the case that 
invited suppliers accept the buyer’s invitation and submit their bids, the buyer might 
subsequently focus on bids from these vendors (and ignore other bids) as the invited 
vendors have already been favourably assessed at the search stage.  
As evaluation costs decrease, the likelihood of the buyer deciding to forego evalua-
tion also decreases. Therefore, we formulate our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. More search for vendors will increase project allocation likelihood. 
 
Budget announcement 
The use of the announcement mechanism was suggested by (Carr, 2003), to enable 
the buyer to minimize evaluation costs when using the bidding mechanism. By the 
means of an announcement mechanism the buyer “sets a minimum acceptable level 
of attributes such as delivery time, service backup and maintenance requirements, 
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coupled with a maximum acceptable price” (Barua et al., 1997). It is expected that 
inefficient suppliers will refrain from submitting their bids once high quality/price 
requirements are announced. The announcement mechanism “can induce a separa-
tion between “efficient” and “inefficient” suppliers” (Barua et al., 1997). Reducing 
bidding from inefficient vendors results in lower cumulative evaluation costs for the 
buyer.  
Online service marketplaces use a particular instance of announcement mechanism – 
they provide buyers with an option to specify the range of budget they expect to 
spend on the project. Linking this to the buyer’s contracting decision, the hypothesis 
is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Budget announcement increases project allocation likelihood. 
 
RFP preparation  
We define RFP preparation as efforts undertaken by the buyer to describe his project. 
Before starting an auction, the buyer typically needs to invest some effort in order to 
describe the project in an RFP. As IT projects can be idiosyncratic, customizable and 
codifiable to a high extent, the lack of preparation efforts can result in ambiguities 
with regard to project scope and contents. As a result, suppliers might submit am-
biguous bids or propose their own approaches to the project. Such bids are likely to 
be more costly to evaluate. By contrast, a complete, clear and comprehensive project 
description is likely to produce more structured bids that are less costly to evaluate. 
Therefore, we argue that better-prepared RFPs bring down the cost of a unit of 
evaluation. 
In addition, an RFP can contain requirements to vendor qualification or maximum 
price, similar to the announcement mechanism above. This reduces the cumulative 
costs of evaluation. 
As decreasing evaluation costs make it more likely that the buyer decides to evaluate 
the bids, our hypothesis is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 3. More intensive RFP preparation will increase project allocation likelihood. 
 
Negotiation   
In the case of idiosyncratic IT projects with low codifiability, the buyer might need an 
input from the vendor (Barua et al., 1997; Lovelock, 1983) to make the project speci-
fication more complete (Banerjee & Duflo, 2000; Lovelock, 1983). Negotiation be-
tween the parties about the project may result in mutual adaptation – the buyer adapt-
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ing his project description in accordance with the vendor’s input and the vendor 
adapting his bid to the updated project description.  
A result of such communication may be foregoing the evaluation of other submitted 
bids and focusing on vendors with whom the buyer has communicated, leading to a 
decrease of cumulative evaluation costs. The hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Negotiation with bidders will increase project allocation likelihood  
 
Bid Filtering 
As opposed to bid evaluation, bid filtering is a tactic of excluding bids from the con-
sideration set. The buyer does not have to thoroughly assess bids to decide which one 
needs to be excluded. Similar to search, the buyer can focus on just one parameter, 
such as vendor’s rating, proposed delivery time or price. By utilizing bid filtering in 
order to exclude bids from inefficient vendors from the consideration set, the buyer 
is able to reduce his subsequent cumulative evaluation costs. Our hypothesis, there-
fore, is formulated in the following way: 
 
Hypothesis 5. More bid filtering will increase project allocation likelihood. 
 
The impact of buyer experience on the effectiveness of tactics 
Apart from the tactics, another aspect of buyer behaviour is experience. The broad 
reach of the Internet makes heterogeneity of auction participants very likely, in par-
ticular with regard to the level of their expertise (Bapna et al., 2004). Such heterogene-
ity potentially has an effect on auction outcomes, as the knowledge about product 
valuation and bidding process may differ across participants. Therefore, we incorpo-
rate the discussion of experience into our analysis. 
Buyer experience represents the outcome of learning from previous transactions on 
the online marketplace. This learning is likely to lead to the formation of efficient 
patterns or approaches to evaluation and to familiarity with some vendors (e.g. the 
buyer might be able to recognize early inefficient vendors whose bids can be ig-
nored). In addition, an experienced buyer is likely to have higher technical and com-
mercial expertise than his less experienced counterparts. It is quite straightforward to 
suggest that, as the buyer learns over the course of transactions, the effectiveness of 
the cost-reducing tactics should increase. With more experience, the buyer should be 
able to locate more appropriate vendors as a result of search, to prepare more com-
plete and professional RFPs, to obtain a more precise estimation of the budget and 
estimate the price/quality trade-off, and to become more effective in negotiating with 
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suppliers and filtering bids. Therefore, we hypothesize that the effect of tactics on 
evaluation costs and project allocation goes up as buyer experience increases.  
 
 
Figure 3-2. Conceptual model of Chapter 3. The impact of the buyer’s evalua-
tion cost-reduction tactics on project allocation, moderated by buyer’s experi-
ence 
 
Hypotheses 6. More buyer experience will increase the effectiveness of the five buyer’s evaluation 
cost-reducing tactics.  
 
The hypotheses are summarized in Figure 3-2. In the next section we discuss data and 
measures employed for empirical testing as well as the results of the analysis.  
 
3.4. Data and Analysis 
3.4.1. Data 
The data for the empirical analysis was collected from a leading online marketplace 
for professional services, similar to the one discussed in Section 3.3.1. This site was 
chosen for several reasons. First, it was one of the first entrants into this new industry 
in the late 1990s and by now has accumulated a large pool of buyers and vendors, 
which results in around 100,000 RFPs posted yearly across all service categories. Sec-
ond, IT services represent the most active and populated area of the marketplace. 
Third, the way exchange is organised on the marketplace is typical for the industry, as 
74
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
60
described in Section 3.3.1, which allows for greater generalizability to the industry 
level.  
We focused on transactions from one subcategory – Web Development - which is the 
most populated and active in the marketplace. This category includes 13 sub-
categories: Web Design & Development, Other - Website Development, Web Pro-
gramming, Online Forms & Database Integration, Ecommerce Website, Simple 
Website, Search Engine Optimization, HTML Email Design, Web Hosting, Internet 
Marketing, Flash MX, Usability & Interface Design, Flash Animation. We obtained 
data on auctions that started between March and September 2005 and finished not 
later than September, 14, 2005. The data collection was carried out with the help of a 
software tool, Kapow Robosuite, which allowed the programming of an intelligent 
agent to collect information about individual auction events, process exceptions in 
the data and store information in a format appropriate for analysis. The initial dataset 
contained 16,597 observations. 
From this starting set, we excluded auctions that had missing data on project value. 
This left us with 13,165 auctions in the dataset. Next, we removed observations with 
extreme project values – below USD 100 (342 auctions) or above USD 20,000 (8 auc-
tions). After that, projects with very short project descriptions (below 5 words) were 
removed. Descriptions of this kind mostly refered to discussions between buyer and 
vendor and occurred before starting the auction (e.g. “As per our discussion”). There 
were 1,078 projects like this. We also removed invite-only auctions, as these are, in fact, 
negotiations where normally only one vendor is invited. Finally, after removing a 
number of exact duplicate auctions (which were an unexpected outcome of the data 
collection procedure), we were left with 9,863 auctions in the final dataset.  
3.4.2. Measures  
In this section we present the measures for independent, dependent and control vari-
ables. 
Contract allocation 
Contract award. Our dependent variable is whether or not the buyer awarded a con-
tract as a result of an auction,, i.e. selected an auction winner. This was determined by 
the presence of a sign “Winner” next to the bid description in a finished auction. In 
some cases, more than one vendor can be selected as winner in one auction (e.g. 
when the buyer wants to split the work between several vendors). When this is the 
case we still count this as one award per buyer. 
Search for vendors 
Invited suppliers. When a buyer searches for a potentially suitable vendor and finds 
one or more, these vendors are sent an electronic invitation to bid, which they may or 
may not accept. If one or more of the invited vendors accepts and places a bid, their 
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presence is indicated on the web pages with a special “Invited”-tag. We model the 
number of invited vendors as a proxy that reflects the effort spent on search.  
RFP preparation 
The use of RFP preparation tactic is captured by two proxies – the length of project 
description and the presence of files attached to project description, reflecting the 
RFP format that is used in the marketplace. 
Length of project description in RFP. We use the length of project description in 
words as a proxy for buyer efforts to specify her request. A similar measure, the 
length of statement of work in pages, has been used as an indication of project value 
and for IT project value and complexity before, in (Mayer & Argyres, 2004). We 
model it as a continuous variable. 
Attached files. A buyer can supply additional project details in files attached to the 
RFP. Manual examination of around two hundred auctions revealed that attached 
files tend to contain mostly extended text descriptions, samples of programming 
code, drawings, etc. This indicates additional efforts invested by the buyer in detailing 
the project. We consider attached files as evidence of efforts invested in the project 
specification, and model it as a dummy variable. 
Budget announcement  
Budget announcement. On the marketplace that we investigated, the only attribute 
the buyer can explicitly specify outside the RFP text as a benchmark is price. In par-
ticular, the buyer can specify the budget within which he expects bids by choosing it 
from a scroll-down menu, e.g. “below 250”, “between 250 and 500”, “between 5,000 
and 7,500”, etc. The use of the budget announcement is modelled as a dummy vari-
able, indicating the presence of a budget estimate.  
Negotiation  
Negotiation. During the auction, negotiation between buyers and vendors is enabled 
via a message board. As discussed in the Hypotheses section, negotiation may result 
in vendors updating their bids in response to new information. By manually examin-
ing nearly two hundred auctions we identified five phrases that are most widely used 
to refer to bilateral message board discussions in the bid text. These are phrases, “as 
per PMB”, “as agreed”, “thank you for your answer”, “as per discussion”, or “as dis-
cussed”. The use of negotiation tactic is modelled through a dummy variable, based 
on whether one or more of the bids in a given auction contain any of these phrases in 
the bid text field. 
Bid Filtering  
Declined bids. When reviewing submitted bids the buyer has an option to “decline” 
some of the bids, which means that they are removed from the list of bids. This 
measure is modelled as the total number of declined bids.  
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Experience 
Finally, buyer experience is modelled via the number of previously awarded projects 
in the marketplace, since this indicates that the buyer has gone through the whole 
cycle of awarding and completing the project, which represents the best opportunity 
for learning.  
Previously awarded projects. The page with auction details indicates the number of 
projects that the buyer has allocated at the marketplace prior to the current auction. 
One potential inaccuracy in this measure is that a buyer who has allocated four pro-
jects at four different auction events will have the same level of experience as a buyer 
who has allocated four projects in a single auction and has left other three auctions 
without awarding and thus would have somewhat less opportunity for learning from 
the experience of the auction phase of the project compared to the buyer with four 
separate awarded auctions. However, the correlation of the number of awarded pro-
jects with the number of posted projects is very high, 0.923*** at p<0.01, which 
means that any potential bias should not be substantial.  
Control variables  
Project value. To estimate the project value we relied primarily on average bid, in line 
with one of the measures Snir and Hitt (2003) used. In the case that auctions had a 
“sealed” status, i.e. the value of the average bid was not disclosed, we used the win-
ner’s bid as a proxy for project value16. When neither average bid nor winner bid was 
available, occasionally information on the actual price paid by the buyer for the ac-
complished project was available and used as the proxy for project value.  
Auction duration. Time (in days) from the start until end of the auction. In cases in 
which  the project is allocated to a vendor before the specified auction end, the end 
date is updated automatically.  
3.4.3. Data analysis and results 
Table 3-1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables. The analysis of this table 
provides interesting insights. There is evidence that the marketplace is highly com-
petitive, which can be seen from the average number of bids submitted in an auction 
(14.4; the median is 11) as well as from the fact that the mean winning bid (USD 452) 
is 39% lower than the average bid (USD 740).  
The mean project value of USD 740 is on the small side of typical projects in the 
software development industry (which is understandable if we remember that the 
majority of buyers and sellers in the marketplace represent small business and free-
                                                
16
 In fact, in the whole dataset there were just 16 sealed projects where details on the winner’s bid 
were available. Perhaps this represents an irregularity in the marketplace design, as usually in sealed 
auction neither winner’s bid nor other bids can be seen. 
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lancers17). It seems intuitively plausible that for a buyer of such a project, committing 
time (and other resources, if applicable) to evaluate around 14 bids in depth (for an 
average project) as well as the quality and experience of the vendors behind these bids 
might be uneconomical. It is not surprising, therefore, that only slightly less than half 
of auctions in our dataset (48%) end up with a/the buyer allocating the project to a 
vendor.  
 
Table 3-1. Descriptive statistics for the dataset (9,863 reverse auctions) 
 Mean Std. devia-
tion 
Median 
Number of bids 14.4 11.9 11 
Project value, USD 740 1,193 401 
Auction length, hours 150 253 95 
Average rating (scale 0-5) 4.59 0.66 4.7 
Contract awarded  0.48 0.50 0 
Winning bid, USD 452 803 225 
Invited suppliers (1 if util-
ized) 
0.33 0.47 0 
Invited suppliers 1.8 4.1 0 
Length of project descrip-
tion, words 
139 116 105 
Attached files 0.17 0.38 0 
Budget announcement  0.5 0.5 1 
Declined bids (1 if utilized) 0.25 0.43 0 
Declined bids, number  1.5 4.6 0 
Negotiation  0.12 0.37 0 
Previously posted projects 15.4 27.5 6 
Previously awarded projects  9.2 18.3 3 
 
                                                
17 An additional reason for the modest value of the projects could be that most bidders come from 
low-cost countries such as India, China or Russia. The hourly cost of the IT workforce may be as low 
as USD 5-15/ hour – several times lower than in developed countries. Therefore, the cost of similar 
projects executed between customers and vendors in developed countries can be several times higher 
than the price on the online marketplace.  
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Budget announcement is by far the most popular tactic. It is used in 50% of auctions, 
compared to search (33%), bid filtering (25%), attached files (17%) and negotiation 
(12%). The average project description length is around 140 words. Around 17% of 
RFPs contain attached files with additional information about the request.  
   
Table 3-2. The effect of buyer tactics on the increase of award probability: 
logit regressions and the marginal effect of changes in independent variables 
Variable 
(1) 
 
(2) 
∆ Independent vari-
able 
(3) 
∆ Award 
probability 
(4) 
Constant 4.168*** (0.206) 3.295***  (0.257)   
ln(project value)  -0.301*** (0.026) -0.246*** (0.026)    
ln(auction duration) -0.647*** (0.023) -0.624*** (0.023)   
ln(invited suppliers) 0.052* (0.027) 0.044 (0.038) (M – st. dev.) to M 
M to (M + st dev.) 
1.1% 
1.1% 
ln(description length) 0.016 (0.028) 0.018 (0.041) (M - st. dev.) to M 
M to (M + st dev.) 
1.8% 
1.8% 
Attached files 0.424*** (0.059) 0.492*** (0.087) 0 to 1 10.5% 
Budget announcement  0.087* (0.046) 0.069 (0.067) 0 to 1 2.1% 
Negotiation 0.875*** (0.065) 0.898*** (0.092) 0 to 1 21.4% 
ln(declined ) 0.436*** (0.031) 0.484*** (0.042) (M - st. dev.) to M 
M to (M + st dev.) 
7.7% 
8.0% 
ln(awarded projects)  0.293*** (0.108)   
ln(invited suppliers) X 
ln(awarded projects) 
 
0.037 (0.024) 
  
ln(description length) 
X ln(awarded pro-
jects) 
 -0.002 (0.023)   
Attached files X 
ln(awarded projects) 
 -0.082* (0.048) (M - st. dev.) to M 
M to (M + st dev.) 
6.6% 
6.6% 
Budget announcement 
X ln(awarded pro-
jects)  
 0.085** (0.036) (M - st. dev.) to M 
M to (m + st dev.) 
11.5% 
11.9% 
Negotation X 
ln(awarded projects) 
 -0.026 (0.054)   
ln(declined ) X 
ln(awarded projects) 
 -0.023 (0.028)   
N  9,863 9,863   
-2Log L  11,848 11,531   
Nagelkerke R2  0.224 0.259   
Notes:  Dependent variable – probability of a project allocation. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. The changes in the independent variables provided in columns “∆ Independent vari-
able” and “∆ award probability” are based on the coefficients of the full model, i.e. model 
(2), including those for the insignificant direct effects for illustrative purposes.  
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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When looking at the median statistics of previously posted (6) and awarded projects 
(3) we can see that the majority of buyers in the marketplace have posted and carried 
out multiple projects, giving them opportunity to build up experience and potentially 
learn how to use the tactics effectively. Table 3-3 shows the cross-correlations be-
tween the variables in the models, which exhibit no signs of potential multicollinearity 
problems.  
We test our hypotheses with a logit regression model, similar to the one used by Snir 
et al., 200318, and following their analytical results we omit the number of bids and 
average rating from the regression as these are dependent on project value, which is 
accounted for. Thus, our base model with all the measures and proxies for buyer tac-
tics has the following form:  
 
++++= )_suppliersln()_ln()_ln()Pr( 3210 inviteddurationprojectvalueprojectAi ββββ
+++++ ionCommunicatntannouncemeBudgetAttachedlengthndescriptio 7654 _)_ln( ββββ  
εβ ++ )_ln(8 bidsDeclinedi                                                                                               (1) 
 
In the regression model we used natural logs of the continuous variables to ensure a 
normalized distribution. The second model adds the interaction effects of the tactics 
with experience to model (1). The results of both regression analyses are presented in  
Table 3-2, with the Nagelkerke R2 of both models suggesting that a reasonable 
amount of variation is explained by the base model, as well as the addition of the in-
teraction effects with experience. The two control variables, project value and auction 
duration, both have a negative, significant effect on project allocation (-0.246 and -
0.624, both at p<.01), in accordance with previous results (Snir & Hitt, 2003).  
The coefficient for ln(invited suppliers) is positive and weakly significant (β=0.052 at 
p<0.1) in the base model, and although the positive direction remains when the inter-
action effects are added, the effect becomes insignificant in model (2), leading us to 
conclude that any positive impact of search for vendors on project allocation (Hy-
pothesis 1) is marginal at best.  
To further assess the practical effect of the independent variables on project alloca-
tion, we evaluate the effect of the marginal increase in each variable on the award 
probability, reported in columns (3) and (4). As pointed out in Hoetker (2007), a 
common approach for the estimation of such an effect is to calculate the effect for a 
                                                
18
 In order to additionally validate our dataset and results, we have replicated the analysis in Table 4 
of Snir and Hitt (2003) and found similar results. The details are available from the authors upon 
request.  
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number of sets of “theoretically interesting and empirically relevant values of the 
variables” (Hoetker, 2007). For continuous variables one of the widely used ap-
proaches is to fix their values at the levels of one standard deviation below and above 
the mean. Therefore, we calculate the effect of the increase of ln(invited suppliers) 
from the mean minus one standard deviation (M – St. Dev.) to the mean and from 
the to the mean plus one standard deviation (M + St. Dev.). To carry out this estima-
tion, all dummy variables in the model were fixed to zero, while all other continuous 
variables were set to their means19. The increase in ln(invited suppliers) by one stan-
dard deviation as per Model 2, Table 3-2 results in a 1.1% increase of award probabil-
ity in each of the two intervals (Table 3-2, columns 3 and 4). In terms of the number 
of vendors, this would be equivalent to inviting an additional 0.64, 1.47 and 3.39 ven-
dors to the auction respectively. Although obviously in real world auctions only an 
integer number of bidders can be invited, these figures are helpful in illustrating the 
practical implications of the results.  
Hypothesis 2 (request for proposal preparation) finds partial support by the data in 
column 2 of Table 3-2. The coefficient for the dummy Attached files is significant 
and has the expected sign, indicating a positive effect on project allocation. Attaching 
a file to the RFP description results in an increase of award probability by 10.5% 
(Table 3-2, columns 3 and 4). However, the coefficient for description length is not 
significant. In a follow-up investigation, we observed that a substantial number of 
project descriptions on the lower end of the range, although longer than our initial 
conservative cut-off of 5 words, still do not provide any detailed description per se; 
instead, they may contain a link to a website which the buyer wishes to clone or a 
reference to a software product or a discussion between the buyer and the vendor. To 
further investigate this, we re-ran the model on a sub-sample with an increased RFP 
description cut-off length of 10 words instead of 5. The coefficient for description 
length is positive and significant (β=0.052 at p<0.001), without substantially changing 
the other coefficients. Although admittedly a slightly ad hoc test, it does provide sup-
port to the hypothesis that investing effort in RFP preparation increases project allo-
cation likelihood by decreasing evaluation costs. The marginal effect of the increase 
of ln(description length) from one St. Dev. below mean to mean is 0.018, as is the 
effect from mean to one St. Dev., which means an 1.8% decrease/increase in award 
probability. In terms of the number of words, this is equivalent to extending the de-
scription from approximately 44 words to 101 to 234 words. 
Hypothesis 3 (budget announcement) also finds marginal support from the test re-
sults: budget announcement has a weak influence on the auction outcome as a main 
effect (β=0.087 at p<0.1), but this becomes insignificant once the interaction effects 
are added. The effect of budget announcement on award probability shows that a 
                                                
19 The same approach was used in all other subsequent assessments of the effects of (marginal) pa-
rameter changes on the award probability in the paper. 
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buyer who specifies his budget level would be 2.1% more likely to award the project 
than a buyer who does not). 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 on bid filtering and negotiation both find strong support from 
the results of the regression analysis (β=0.484 and β=0.898, both p<0.001). Buyers 
utilizing bid filtering and negotiating with the vendors during the auction are more 
likely to award projects than those who do not. The effect of using negotiation corre-
sponds to a 21.4% increase in project allocation probability. Since bid filtering is op-
erationalized by a continuous variable, we measure its effect from the mean minus 
one standard deviation to the mean as well as from the mean to the mean plus one 
standard deviation. In terms of the number of declined bids, this is equivalent to an 
increase from 0.64 to 1.35 to 2.83, which increases award probability by 7.7% and 8% 
respectively. 
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Figure 3-3. The effect of the interaction between buyer experience and indi-
vidual tactics on project award likelihood20.  
 
                                                
20 “Experience only” means that dummy variables are set to 0, while other variables are set to their 
means. 
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Finally, we test Hypothesis 6 (the effect of buyer experience on the effectiveness of 
cost-reducing tactics). As model (2) shows, experience moderates the effectiveness of 
two of the five tactics. The effect for budget announcement is positive (β=0.085 at 
p<0.05) but the effect for RFP preparation (more precisely, for Attached files) is 
negative (-0.082 at p<0.1), which is contrary to expectations. 
We again calculate the effects of the marginal increase of experience on the probabil-
ity of award at several theoretically meaningful sets of values (Hoetker, 2007; Jaccard, 
2001). Using RFP preparation with increased experience results in decreasing effec-
tiveness, as the positive effect of RFP preparation on award likelihood goes down 
from 10.5% to approximately 6.6% as ln(awarded) goes up from the mean minus one 
St. Dev. to mean and from the mean to the mean plus one St. Dev. By contrast, as 
experience increases, the positive effect of budget announcement grows from 2.1% 
to an 11.5% increase in award likelihood at the first St. Dev. of ln(awarded projects) 
increase and 11.9% at the second St. Dev. of increase. These results are illustrated 
graphically in Figure 3-321. We conclude that buyer experience increases the effective-
ness of budget announcement, while at the same time it decreases the effectiveness of 
RFP preparation, although the combined effect remains positive, as experience by 
itself has a strong positive main effect on project allocation. The experience that buy-
ers accumulate thus translates into a better judgment of the expected project costs, 
reducing the need to extensively evaluate bids outside this cost range, and leading to 
increased project allocation.  
 
3.5. Discussion  
3.5.1. Discussion of the findings  
In the present study we have extended the body of knowledge on an important factor 
in online transactions – the costs buyers incur to evaluate purchasing alternatives, 
which encompasses the evaluation of vendors (e.g. vendor quality) and their offers 
(bids). We treated evaluation costs as an endogenous factor of buyer behaviour and 
discussed several tactics that are likely to affect the buyer’s project allocation decision 
via the reduction of associated evaluation costs.  
The empirical testing with the transaction data from a leading marketplace for IT ser-
vices produced substantial evidence in support of the hypothesized effects. The hy-
potheses on the positive impact of search, budget announcement, negotiation and bid 
filtering were unambiguously supported. The support for the positive effect of RFP 
preparation on project allocation likelihood is more nuanced: while the presence of 
attached files is positively associated with allocation likelihood, the description length 
becomes positive and significant only for description lengths above a minimal 
                                                
21
 In case of ln(awarded projects), mean – 1 St.Dev, mean and mean + 1 St. Dev. are equivalent to 
awarding 0.04, 3.56 and 7.01 projects.  
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threshold of 10 words. The findings on the effect of buyer experience on the effec-
tiveness of buyer tactics have confirmed only part of our expectations. In addition to 
a positive main effect, experience increases the effectiveness of Budget announce-
ment, but reduces the effect of attaching files to the RFP. A possible explanation for 
this unexpected result might be that with experience, relationships develop with a 
subset of suppliers, which could lessen the need for extensive a priori project docu-
mentation for those suppliers. Given the somewhat more complicated effects of ex-
perience, an alternative option for examining the relationship between buyer experi-
ence and the tactics would be to assess the effect of buyer experience on the use of 
tactics, rather than on their effectiveness with regard to increasing allocation likelihood. 
However, we found that the use of tactics does not vary substantially between experi-
enced and inexperienced buyers22.  
However, there are a few potential alternative explanations for our results that need 
to be ruled out. We operationalized search through the presence of invited suppliers. 
However, an invitation to bid can be a result of the buyer’s previous experience with 
the vendor, i.e. more out of habit than specific search. In order to rule out this op-
tion, we tested our model on a subset of projects where none of the bidders had pre-
viously won a project from the buyer who posted that project. The regression coeffi-
cient for ln(invited suppliers) was again positive and significant (β=0.056 at p<0.05; 
full details of the regression are available from the authors), thus providing evidence 
that the observed positive effect for search does not result from the existence of prior 
ties between buyer and supplier (the winner), but rather from an active a priori search 
for appropriate suppliers. 
Also, we need to ensure that the observed effects are indeed the result of decreasing 
buyer’s evaluation costs, rather than some other consequence of the tactics use, be-
cause as noted in the introduction, most of the tactics also serve additional purposes. 
At this point it is useful to make a distinction between ex-ante buyer tactics, such as 
search, RFP preparation and budget announcement that are used prior to project 
posting, and ex post tactics, such as negotiations and bid filtering that are employed 
after the auction is started (see also Fig.1). If, as we claim, one of the goals of the tac-
tics is to reduce the evaluation costs, we should expect to see a negative effect of 
most ex ante tactics on the number of bids submitted by suppliers (the exception be-
ing search, since inviting a supplier to bid in the auction will increase the likelihood 
that this supplier will bid and hence increase the number of bids, ceteris paribus). At 
the same time, the number of submitted bids during the auction should influence the 
use of the ex post tactics, as the buyer will be inclined to reduce the evaluation costs 
when many bids are received. If we look at the correlation table in the Appendix, we 
                                                
22 For instance, buyers with less than 1, less than 5 and more than 5 awarded projects have, respec-
tively, the following means of tactics use: 0.16, 0.17 and 0.19 for attached files; 4.65, 4.64 and 4.57 
for ln(description length) ; 0.11, 0.12 and 0.14 for negotiations; 0.53, 0.53 and 0.48 for budget an-
nouncement; 0.32, 0.33 and 0.32 for search; 0.26, 0.26 and 0.22 for declined bids. 
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find a small negative correlation between the number of bids and project description 
length, whereas attached files and budget announcement are uncorrelated with the 
number of bids, thus providing partial support for our interpretation. With regard to 
the employment of ex post tactics, the correlations in Table 2-4 show that the use of 
Negotiation and Declined bids is positively correlated with the number of submitted 
bids. Together, these results provide some, although not entirely conclusive, evidence 
for our interpretation of the tactics including a component aimed at reducing evalua-
tion costs. 
3.5.2. Limitations  
Several issues need to be addressed that concern the assumptions underlying the 
theoretical discussion, the use of measurement proxies, and alternative explanations.  
In line with the previous literature on evaluation costs (Barua et al., (1997) and Snir 
and Hitt (2003)), the hypotheses of this study rely on an assumption that the use of 
cost-reducing tactics has negligible costs compared to the costs of bid evaluation. As 
our empirical investigation did not produce any evidence that extensively describing 
RFPs and negotiating with vendors results in a lower project allocation likelihood, 
which would signal increased total costs, this assumption seems plausible.  
Another issue relates to empirical validation of the theoretical model and its underly-
ing logic. We were able to empirically test the predictions about the consequences of 
buyer tactics for project allocation resulting from evaluation costs reduction, rather 
than measure the evaluation costs per se. This is, however, a common method of 
theory validation in economics, due to the fact that actually measuring attributes such 
as evaluation costs is very challenging outside laboratory settings. As Lucking-Reiley 
puts it: “Field tests assess the practical predictive power of a theory, since most theo-
retical assumptions in economic models are intrinsically unobservable in prac-
tice”(1999: 1075). 
The inability to directly test the effect on evaluation costs leaves us with a necessity to 
tackle alternative explanations for the obtained results. One alternative explanation 
has to do with buyer opportunism. The incentive behind buyer opportunism in such 
an environment could be that instead of attempting to allocate their projects with an 
efficient vendor at an auction, buyers can instead try to obtain price information 
and/or get free professional advice from vendors on the best way to develop their 
project. After obtaining such information, the buyer can resort to off-market vendors 
and use this as a leverage to obtain favourable conditions for the off-market deal. 
One could suggest that investing effort in the sourcing process by applying the identi-
fied tactics can be a sign of the buyer’s commitment to transact on the marketplace, 
while an opportunistic buyer would try to avoid additional effort and costs if he treats 
an auction merely as an information gathering exercise. 
To address this alternative explanation, we tested our hypotheses on a sub-sample of 
first-time buyers, where one might expect the level of opportunism to be the highest, 
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as these buyers do not yet have a reputation to sacrifice. One could expect that in the 
sub-sample of first-time buyers the effect of the tactics would be higher, as new buy-
ers are trying to signal their commitment to suppliers. A test, however, showed that 
the magnitudes of the coefficients for first-time buyers are not significantly different 
from the full dataset23. This is an indication that different levels of buyer opportunism 
are not a critical differentiator for the use of the tactics.  
Another issue worth discussing is the metrics used to account for the use of some of 
the tactics. For instance, the measurements used to capture negotiation and search 
might not fully account for the relevant buyer efforts to negotiate and search on the 
online marketplace. Indeed, we only trace the presence of invited vendors at an auc-
tion and references to message board discussions in bids instead of directly measuring 
relevant efforts (e.g. time spent on searching the vendor database and number of 
messages exchanged between parties). However, this only implies a stricter test of the 
underlying theoretical effects, and the actual impact of the tactics can be expected to 
be stronger, rather than weaker. To provide a more comprehensive account of the 
use of additional buyer tactics, subsequent research might use questionnaires to di-
rectly survey the buyers about the tactics they employed.  
Finally, our findings were obtained from a marketplace that consists mostly of small 
and medium companies as well as freelancers. It is not certain to what extent these 
findings can be generalized to different procurement settings and buyer categories. 
For example, one can expect that the sourcing behaviour of larger companies would 
be more sophisticated than that of small companies. Also, further testing is required 
to find out whether these findings would be applicable across other categories of pro-
fessional services, such as creative writing or marketing consulting. 
 
3.6. Conclusions  
The evaluation costs buyers incur when assessing purchasing alternatives on online 
markets, especially for complex and idiosyncratic products and services, are a key fac-
tor for the outcomes and efficiency of transactions (Snir & Hitt, 2003). This study 
contributes to the literature on electronic markets by providing empirical support to 
theoretical reasoning on costly bid evaluation by testing the direct implications of 
existing models. This is important because the “record of direct application” of many 
key models is typically weak (Barua et al., 1997). By confirming some of the direct 
insights of the models into evaluation costs this paper helps to further connect ana-
lytical models of auction theory and electronic markets theory with business practice.  
We extended and tested the theory relating to the effects of evaluation costs on the 
outcomes of transactions in an online environment. While previous studies mostly 
focused on theoretical models of buyer behaviour in which evaluation costs were 
                                                
23
 The detailed results are available from the authors upon request.   
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completely or partially exogenous, in the present study we have extended the theory 
by treating evaluation costs as an endogenous factor. We identify several tactics that 
help buyers reduce their evaluation costs at online markets for IT services, elaborate 
on the hypothesized effects of these tactics on project allocation, and carry out em-
pirical tests on real transaction data. Our findings can be grouped around two themes.  
First, we identified five distinct tactics that buyers can use to manipulate the level of 
costs incurred when evaluating vendors and vendor bids in online auctions for IT 
services, namely search (for vendor), RFP preparation, budget announcement, nego-
tiation and bid filtering. Extensive empirical testing confirmed our hypotheses that 
the use of these tactics leads to a higher likelihood of project allocation, which implies 
a reduction of underlying bid evaluation costs. The results are somewhat more nu-
anced for the effect of RFP description length, which is one of the proxies for RFP 
preparation. The length of RFP description becomes an effective means for increas-
ing project allocation likelihood only above certain length threshold (10 words, in our 
case).  
Second, we studied how the effectiveness of cost-reducing tactics changes as buyers 
gain experience in transactions on the online marketplace. We found that buyer ex-
perience significantly interacts with two tactics – Budget announcement and RFP 
preparation. Interestingly, while buyer experience increases the effectiveness of 
budget announcement, leading to a sharper increase of allocation likelihood, at the 
same time it decreases the effectiveness of RFP preparation.  
There are several ways to extend and capitalize on the present research. This should 
be done by separately or jointly applying a number of approaches and methods, such 
as analytical modelling, laboratory experiments and field research. First, further test-
ing of the hypothesized relationships and, especially, of the underlying evaluation cost 
reduction mechanisms, should be carried out. This can be done in a laboratory setting 
that provides a proper environment to measure actors’ hidden attributes, such as the 
level of evaluation costs, and also enables researchers to extend the generalizability by 
ensuring control over interfering factors. Second, analytical modelling using auction 
theory can be applied to model buyer equilibrium behaviour with regard to the use of 
evaluation cost-reducing tactics. A third avenue to extend the research should involve 
conducting further field studies to test our findings in different online marketplaces 
and with other services areas. This will help to account for the differences in the mar-
ketplace design, and control for the effect of service complexity on the role of evalua-
tion costs. 
The results of the study have substantial practical implications for all stakeholders in 
online marketplaces. For buyers of complex and idiosyncratic IT services the discus-
sion of the five tactics provides a guide to a more efficient purchasing behaviour. By 
applying the tactics discussed above, buyers gain more control over the level of the 
evaluation costs involved in the selection process and increase the chances to select 
an efficient vendor. Increased buyer ability to cope with evaluation costs and take 
contracting decisions is beneficial for vendors, too. As the evaluation costs decrease, 
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there is less chance for “perfectly acceptable bids” to be ignored just because of the 
high expected level of evaluation costs. This leads to smaller overall efficiency loss in 
the sourcing process. The market makers also benefit from the buyer’s ability to de-
crease evaluation costs as market makers earn more commission from realized pro-
jects. Therefore, market-makers should encourage the growth of buyer awareness of 
the cost-reducing tactics, e.g. by promoting “best practices” for sourcing among buy-
ers, making available case studies and making the use of tactics more intuitive, espe-
cially for buyers who lack experience. Besides, market makers should try to retain 
repeat buyers, as such buyers accumulate experience in online transactions, thereby 
increasing their own evaluation efficiency and contributing to the overall efficiency of 
the marketplace. To conclude, the information on the behaviour of market partici-
pants in online reverse auctions not only leads to more refined theory, it also “can be 
used to design better future auctions, and in and of itself may have commercial value” 
(Pinker et al., 2003).   
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Chapter 4. Heterogeneity of Buyer-Supplier Ex-
change Relationships in Online Mar-
kets for IT Services
24
  
 
When a project needs to be undertaken, requests for 
proposals will be transmitted or electronic want ad 
posted, individuals or small teams will respond, a 
network will be formed, and new workers will be 
brought on as their particular skills are needed. Once 
the project is done, the network will disband. Follow-
ing the steps of young Linus Torvalds, we will enter 
the age of the temporary company. Malone and 
Laubacher (1998: 148). 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The proliferation of Information Technology (IT) throughout the world economy 
has inspired a number of perspectives on the changes in the role and place of suppli-
ers in economic exchange. These perspectives cover an entire spectrum of buyer-
supplier relationships, from distant and arms-length to closely intertwined and col-
laborative (Clemons, Reddi, & Row, 1993; Kumar & Christiaanse, 1999; Malone et al., 
1987). 
Early transaction costs analysis of electronic markets and hierarchies saw the main 
effect of IT in reducing coordination costs of exchange by decreasing asset specificity 
and the complexity of product description (Malone et al., 1987). In a number of ex-
change situations, IT was predicted to initiate a shift from the hierarchical governance 
of transactions towards market procurement of goods from independent suppliers.  
A different set of arguments focused on explicit coordination of market transactions, 
which is costly due to the efforts needed to control transaction risks (Clemons et al., 
1993). IT lowers the costs of explicit coordination by decreasing the specificity of 
assets required for explicit coordination and diminishing the costs of monitoring. The 
                                                
24 An early version of this chapter was presented at the International Conference for Information 
Systems 2006 in Milwaukee. A later version has been conditionally accepted for publication in the 
journal of Decision Support Systems.  
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result is a trend towards long-term outsourcing relationships with a limited number of 
suppliers, rather than arms-length or hierarchical governance (Clemons et al., 1993).  
A complementary approach stressed the importance of suppliers’ investments in non-
contractible attributes of exchange, such as quality, supplier responsiveness, informa-
tion sharing and innovation that are needed to create value in many exchange situa-
tions (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993b). The supplier is 
likely to make such investments only when it can expect to appropriate part of the 
resulting value, which is less likely to happen when a buyer plays a large number of 
suppliers against one another. As a result, in situations where the effect of non-
contractible attributes is important for value creation, limiting the number of suppli-
ers to few “partners” is the best strategy (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Bakos & 
Brynjolfsson, 1993b). 
Yet another relevant insight has been provided by Holland and Lockett (Holland & 
Lockett, 1997). In an empirical study of multi-mode network structures they found 
that, rather than sticking exclusively to market or hierarchical governance, firms use 
both modes in parallel with several exchange partners, and the degree to which one 
mode prevails depends on market complexity and the asset specificity involved 
(Holland & Lockett, 1997). Close, integrated buyer-supplier relationships were found 
to be present in most cases.  
In summary, most studies argue (although by presenting different sets of arguments) 
that in a wide range of exchange situations buyers would prefer to establish close, 
long-term exchange relationships with suppliers to maximize economic benefits. The 
question is whether practice corresponds to the theory. 
A fresh impulse to the discussion on the role of suppliers in exchange relationships 
has come from the recent widespread adoption of online reverse auctions in corpo-
rate procurement. A reverse auction is an auction in which suppliers bid to fulfil a 
buyer’s contract (Jap 2003). Reverse auctions enable buyers to boost competition 
among suppliers and cut contract prices considerably as a result (Beall et al., 2003). 
Not surprisingly, the party that suffers from the new procurement practice is incum-
bent suppliers. A number of studies report incumbent suppliers losing their buyer 
accounts to aggressive new suppliers (Emiliani, 2004; Jap, 2003). Reverse auctions do 
not seem to contribute to good buyer-supplier relationships, either with incumbent 
suppliers or with the new ones – both types report increased suspicion of buyer op-
portunism after taking part in reverse auctions (Jap, 2003). For the buyer, instead of 
savings, switching to a new, barely-known supplier may result in problems with con-
tract execution, e.g. low quality level (Emiliani & Stec, 2002; Van Tulder & Mol, 
2002). 
At the same time, there is evidence of strategic use of reverse auctions by buyers as a 
part of sourcing strategy that involves other considerations beyond purchasing price 
reduction. Jap (2002) finds that buyers often use reverse auctions as a “wake-up call 
to the complacent supplier base” rather than to obtain a lower price (Jap, 2002), and 
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can allocate long-term contracts via reverse auctions (Elmaghraby, 2007). According 
to recent studies, incumbent suppliers are much more likely to win contracts than 
new suppliers and also enjoy price premiums over the latter (Elmaghraby, 2007; 
Zhong & Wu, 2006). 
The diverse results of the studies on the effect of reverse auctions on buyer-supplier 
exchange relationships highlight the lack of a comprehensive picture. In particular, 
systematic evidence is needed on how buyers use reverse auctions over multiple 
transactions. The literature calls for more research in similar directions. For instance, 
Pinker, Shiedmann and Vakrat (2003) ask: “How does that option of saving through 
auctions compare to the option of building a relationship with a supplier and achiev-
ing cost reduction through integration?” (Pinker et al., 2003: 1478). A similar question 
comes from Elmaghraby (2007): “…if a buyer has used an auction once with success, 
should she continue to use it regularly, or should auctions be used infrequently and in 
combination with other procurement mechanisms?” (Elmaghraby, 2007: 19-20). 
In this study we take an exploratory approach to theory building. We aim to develop 
a taxonomy of buyer-supplier exchange relationships and the accompanying use of 
online reverse auctions by investigating patterns of exchange relationships that form 
in practice. The research question of this study is:  
  
How do buyers organise their exchange relationships with suppliers over multiple 
transactions involving online reverse auctions?   
 
Both confirmatory and exploratory approaches to empirical research are used in the 
literature on inter-organisational relationships and on information systems research. 
Confirmatory approaches take a taxonomy deduced from the extant literature and 
test for the occurrence of pre-defined constructs and types, whereas exploratory ap-
proaches derive the taxonomy inductively from the data and then relate the resulting 
types back to theory. While traditionally the confirmatory approach has tended to 
dominate, exploratory approaches have been used effectively as well, particularly in 
situations where existing theory was deemed insufficiently detailed to do justice to the 
richness of the field setting. In the studies of inter-organisational relationships the 
exploratory approach has been employed to extract and analyze empirical patterns of 
inter-organisational relationships and sometimes to relate them to their antecedents 
and performance characteristics (Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1995; Cannon & Perreault 
Jr, 1999). In the information systems literature the exploratory approach has been 
used to develop the taxonomy of eBay bidders and relate buyer types to auction win-
ning likelihood and surplus (Bapna et al., 2004), as well as to develop a taxonomy of 
industrial bidders in online reverse auctions (Zhong & Wu, 2006). 
The advantage of the exploratory approach over the confirmatory approach is that 
the former allows for uncovering empirical patterns that can depict the limits of exist-
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ing theories, while its disadvantage is that often there is little or no theoretical guid-
ance for the selection of variables (Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1995). This disadvan-
tage of the inductive method will be mitigated in our study by drawing on extant 
theories in selecting taxonomy dimensions, as well as in explaining the resulting con-
figurations and their properties. 
By using the exploratory approach in this study we aim at developing an empirical 
taxonomy of buyers’ portfolios of exchange relationships with suppliers in an online 
marketplace for IT services. Carrying out the empirical study in an online marketplace 
(specifically, within two categories of services – Web design and Web programming) 
allows us to isolate contextual factors that are normally believed to affect the bound-
ary of a firm, such as market complexity and asset specificity. This enables us to focus 
on the inherent heterogeneity of buyers’ portfolios of supplier relationships.  
The scientific contribution of this study is that it reveals considerable heterogeneity of 
buyer-supplier exchange relationships, and explains the empirical types of relation-
ships portfolios and the role of online reverse auctions. This provides a valuable addi-
tion to the literature on exchange relationships and exchange governance, as most 
previous studies predicted exchange relationships to be homogenous under a fixed 
set of exchange attributes. We also find that online reverse auctions are primarily an 
attribute of arms-length exchange relationships, in which the buyer stimulates sup-
plier competition and switches suppliers often. In portfolios with closer exchange 
relationships that endure through recurrent transactions and where one supplier gets 
a considerable proportion of a buyer’s business, non-competitive negotiations are 
preferred to auctions. However, our findings do not contradict previous studies that 
suggested that reverse auctions can be used for supplier screening in long-term rela-
tionships and for allocation of long-term contracts.  
From a managerial perspective, we provide insights into how online markets for IT 
services could serve exchange relationships that rely on longer-term considerations.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we start by discussing previous 
research on portfolios of buyer-supplier relationships. Then, we discuss taxonomy 
dimensions as well as antecedents and outcomes of portfolio configurations. This is 
followed by a discussion of the methodology, data, analytical procedures, and empiri-
cal results. Finally, we discuss findings and formulate conclusions and contributions. 
 
4.2. Portfolios of Exchange Relationships 
The concept of a relationships portfolio has been used in marketing for a compre-
hensive analysis of the supplier or customer base of a firm. The portfolio of relation-
ships “captures the fact that relationships, like products, vary in their intensity and in 
the role that a firm plays relative to its stakeholders in the relationship.” (Sawhney & 
Zabin, 2002) p. 316. 
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Some of the notable applications of the concept of relationships portfolio (and simi-
lar approaches) have been to analyze buyer-supplier relationships from the viewpoint 
of their strategic importance, supplier attractiveness and the strength of supplier rela-
tionships (Olsen & Ellram, 1997), the costs and benefits of the firm’s customers 
(Johnson & Selnes, 2004; Turnbull, Ford, & Cunningham, 1996), the management of 
supplier relationships over time, as well as associated processes and technology 
(Sawhney & Zabin, 2002), the maximization of the value from supplier relationships 
through supplier investments in non-contractible exchange attributes (Bakos & Bryn-
jolfsson, 1993a; Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993b), as well as to develop a typology of 
buyer-supplier relationships based on contextual factors and analyze portfolio proper-
ties and performance implications (Bensaou, 1999).  
The objective of this paper is to explore empirical configurations of buyer-supplier 
relationships and buyers’ use of exchange mechanisms. Therefore, focusing on the 
buyer’s portfolio of supplier relationships as a unit of analysis is a logical option. Us-
ing this concept will enable us to capture key dimensions of interest in the develop-
ment of a taxonomy. 
The portfolio properties we intend to analyze need to reflect the characteristics of 
exchange relationships, the exchange mechanism and underlying business transac-
tions. Reliance on these properties makes the taxonomy dimensions theoretically mo-
tivated in the light of the literature reviewed above (Bapna et al., 2004).  
Below, we present an overview of the portfolio characteristics used as taxonomy di-
mensions and elaborate on their theoretical underpinning. We also identify several 
antecedents of portfolio configurations that are likely to influence portfolio formation 
and discuss portfolio performance.  
4.2.1. Taxonomy Dimensions 
Buyer-supplier exchange relationships 
Our conceptualization of buyer-supplier exchange relationships is rooted in the stud-
ies of the effect of IT on the governance and organisation of exchange transactions 
(Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993b; Clemons et al., 1993; 
Holland & Lockett, 1997). One-time exchange transactions with independent suppli-
ers in a market setting represent the case of distant, arms-length exchange relation-
ships. Such transactions are characterized by the search for, and competition among, 
suppliers, low costs of procurement (due to low production costs of market suppli-
ers) and high costs of coordination. Market exchange is opposite in nature to transac-
tions that take place in hierarchies, i.e. within organisational boundaries or closely-
coupled bilateral relationships. A hierarchal form of exchange governance is charac-
terized by low coordination costs that come at the expense of high costs of produc-
tion. 
Other empirically-motivated investigations have identified a multitude of intermediate 
governance forms and structures beyond pure market or hierarchies, where different 
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governance mechanisms can be used in parallel or together (Daly & Nath, 2005; Hol-
land & Lockett, 1997; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). A number of studies have addressed 
governance forms referred to as “partnerships”, “networks” or “close and long-term 
buyer-supplier relationships” (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Clemons et al., 1993). 
On the surface, such relationships are characterized by the buyer working with a lim-
ited number of stable suppliers for a longer period of time. The “blood” of such rela-
tionships, though, is cooperation and coordination as well as parties’ investments in 
non-contractible attributes of exchange such as quality, responsiveness, information 
sharing, trust, and innovation (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 
1993b; Clemons et al., 1993). 
Exchange mechanism  
Auctions and bilateral negotiations are key mechanisms used in economic exchange 
that are often contrasted in the literature (Bajari et al., 2006; Engelbrecht-Wiggans & 
Katok, 2006). An auction is defined as “a market institution with an explicit set of 
rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from partici-
pants” (McAfee & McMillan, 1987). In reverse auctions suppliers compete online for 
a contract to supply goods or services to the buyer and the prices go down. On one 
hand, reverse auctions stimulate competition among suppliers (Carter et al., 2004; Jap, 
2003) and make them concerned about buyer’s opportunistic behaviour (Jap, 2003). 
On the other hand, reverse auctions are believed to be compatible with several di-
mensions of relational exchange and can be used to source long-term contracts 
(Elmaghraby, 2007; Radkevitch & van der Valk, 2005) in which collaboration can take 
place (Smart & Harrison, 2003). Therefore, the extent of the use of reverse auctions 
(as opposed to bilateral negotiations) by buyers is the second dimension of our tax-
onomy. 
Transaction characteristics 
Transaction cost economics regards transaction characteristics as a determinant of 
exchange governance (Williamson, 1985). A high level of transaction attributes such 
as frequency of transactions, asset specificity and technological uncertainty requires 
hierarchical governance to minimize the transaction costs. While hierarchies are effi-
cient in keeping down the costs of coordinating complex transactions, market gov-
ernance is advantageous when transactions are less complex and exchange efficiency 
is achieved due to low costs of production (Williamson, 1985). In a similar fashion, 
transaction attributes become important in the choice of an exchange mechanism. 
For instance, more complex construction projects, where ex post negotiations are 
likely, are found to be more appropriate for negotiations, while less complex con-
tracts with no ex post negotiations can be subject to competitive bidding (Bajari & 
Tadelis, 2001). Therefore, our third dimension is related to the complexity of IT pro-
jects. 
Antecedents and outcomes of portfolio taxonomy  
95
 
 
 
 
Heterogeneity of Buyer-Supplier Relationships 
 
81 
We rely on several other theoretically relevant constructs as antecedents of the taxon-
omy of buyers’ portfolios of supplier relationships. These constructs are buyer oppor-
tunism, buyer experience and portfolio performance. We draw on these constructs to 
shed more light on the emergence of buyer portfolios of supplier relationships, and 
explain their configurations.  
At the same time, it should be understood that with the exploratory approach, it is 
not possible to formulate a priori hypotheses regarding the effects of these antece-
dents or how different clusters will affect the outcomes, since the number and prop-
erties of clusters are not known a priori. 
Buyer opportunism 
Buyer commitment and opportunism in online markets for IT services have been 
discussed in (Radkevitch, van Heck, & Koppius, 2006a), where the authors suggested 
that opportunism in online auctions is one of the reasons behind the relatively low 
project award rate in this type of marketplace. In their study, opportunism was ex-
plored on the level of individual transaction and shown to influence the likelihood 
that a contract will be awarded. In the present study we extend the use of this con-
struct to the level of portfolio of relationships in order to explore its relationship to 
the way portfolios are organised. 
Buyer experience 
Taking into account the buyer’s experience in the marketplace is important as more 
experience means, ceteris paribus, that a buyer has worked on more projects and with 
larger overall budgets. More experience and the time associated with it provides room 
for the development of close exchange relationships with suppliers. 
Portfolio performance 
Previous studies have found a connection between buyer-supplier exchange relation-
ships attributes and exchange performance (Griffith, Harvey, & Lusch, 2006; Poppo 
& Zenger, 2002). Similarly, in the present study we intend to investigate how different 
configurations of exchange relationships are related to exchange performance. 
The conceptual model in Table 4-1 summarizes the relationships between portfolio 
taxonomy dimensions (in the centre of the model), cluster antecedents and perform-
ance. 
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4.3. Methodology 
4.3.1. Empirical setting 
According to Elmaghraby, “enterprising adoption of auctions for the procurement of 
services” is one of the key characteristics of today’s landscape of online reverse auc-
tions (Elmaghraby, 2007). In response to this trend, our investigation focuses on a 
leading online marketplace for IT services. Such an empirical setting is attractive as it 
is likely to contain both arms-length and close exchange relationships. On one hand, 
due to the development of Internet and IT outsourcing practices, especially to low-
cost locations, many suppliers with similar sets of IT skills are available in the mar-
ketplace, which makes it highly competitive (Carr, 2003). Therefore, buyers should be 
able to choose between suppliers on the basis of price rather than other properties. 
On the other hand, IT services are highly idiosyncratic, the quality of suppliers is hard 
to assess ex ante (Snir & Hitt, 2003), information asymmetry is present with regard to 
production costs and there is huge potential for cost-savings due to supplier learning 
effects (Whang, 1995). This means that there is a space for value creation via non-
contractible attributes of exchange, such as quality, supplier responsiveness, informa-
 
Figure 4-1. Taxonomy dimensions and antecedents and portfolio performance 
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tion sharing and innovation (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 
1993b).  
The range of services transacted through the online marketplace encompasses IT ser-
vices and other professional services (e.g. translation, accounting). Services related to 
website development represent the most popular area. The online marketplace is used 
by around 60,000 buyers, and contains over two thousand active projects at any point 
of time across all service categories and data on tens of thousands of auctions com-
pleted to date. By early 2006 the overall value of transactions facilitated by the mar-
ketplace exceeded USD 90 million.  Buyers are businesses and individuals predomi-
nantly from the US, while suppliers are small/medium IT companies and freelancers 
located in India, Eastern Europe and Russia. Some of the most active suppliers have 
turnovers of over USD two million over the time of their presence in the market-
place. 
The exchange process is organised as follows. Before buyers and vendors are able to 
enter the exchange, they are required to register on the website. Participation for buy-
ers is free of charge while a periodic fee applies to vendors. The buyer starts an auc-
tion by posting an RFP (request for proposals). The Project allocation mechanism 
comes in two basic types: open auctions (all suppliers can bid) and invite-only auc-
tions (only invited suppliers can bid). In 95% of cases there is only one supplier in the 
invite-only auctions, therefore we consider the invite-only auctions to be bilateral ne-
gotiations. In open auctions various suppliers are bidding and the buyer chooses the 
winner (which might not necessarily be the one with the lowest price).  
After the auction starts, vendors can bid. Bids specify price and estimated delivery 
time, contain information on vendor rating and earnings and a text field where the 
bidder can provide other relevant information. Once a bid has been submitted, it be-
comes visible to the buyer and other vendors. During the auction, the buyer can de-
cline or shortlist bids and communicate with vendors via message boards. 
There is no obligation for the buyer to allocate the project to any of the vendors, 
which results in quite a low project allocation rate of 30-40% (Snir & Hitt, 2003). 
When a project is awarded, the parties can use a virtual “working space” to commu-
nicate, exchange documents, track milestones, and settle payments via an escrow ac-
count. Upon project completion the buyer is able to rate supplier performance. The 
accumulated supplier rating is a part of the reputation and trust mechanism on the 
marketplace. 
4.3.2. Quantitative data  
We collected data on buyer activity from the Website Development sub-category of 
the marketplace. This is the most populated sub-marketplace, which allowed us to 
amass a substantial dataset of buyers busy with rather homogenous projects. This 
homogeneity is important in order to isolate potential effects of service type and 
complexity on exchange relationships. There were several stages in data collection 
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and processing. First, we focused on repeat buyers with a considerable exchange track 
record at the marketplace to ensure that each buyer had undertaken enough projects 
to make up a reasonable portfolio. We identified the most active buyers using a cut-
off level of 20 awarded projects (this included all projects awarded on the market-
place, not only IT-related). This resulted in a sample of 530 buyers who had awarded 
20 to 300 projects each, starting from the launch of the marketplace in 1999 until 
May 2006. 
Second, we filtered out projects from outside IT categories (Web design and devel-
opment, Simple Website and Web Programming) and projects with incomplete data, 
e.g. where buyer feedback on supplier performance was absent. In case if the feed-
back on at least 70% of projects was available (which is the cut-off level we chose, to 
ensure a reasonable amount of data in a portfolio), the portfolio was included in the 
further analysis. 
The final check was to make sure that portfolios contain data only from either of the 
two rather homogeneous project groups: 1) Web Programming or 2) Web Design 
and Development combined with Simple Website projects. The latter two sub-
categories were combined into a single group because an initial examination of the 
data had shown that the same suppliers tend to be active in both sub-categories.  
The procedure resulted in 104 portfolios containing data on 2,167 projects, worth a 
total of USD 1,111,130. The data were standardized in order to avoid the dispropor-
tional impact of nominally higher variables in the cluster analysis. See Table 4-1 for 
descriptive statistics and Table 4-5 for correlations between the variables. 
To extract data from the website of the online marketplace we used Kapow Robo-
Suite, a web data extraction agent; MS Excel and SPSS were employed at the stage of 
data processing and analysis.  
4.3.3. Operationalization  
Buyer-supplier exchange relationships. As discussed in the section on portfolio di-
mensions, our conceptualization of buyer-supplier exchange relationships relies on 
studies of the effects of IT on exchange governance (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; 
Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993b). These studies drew a distinction between market-
driven, arms-length transactions and close buyer-supplier relationships based on what 
can be described as two types of criteria that we refer to as “form” (number of sup-
pliers and relationships duration) and “contents” of exchange relationships (invest-
ments in non-contractible exchange attributes and the relationship-specificity of other 
assets, including IT). The data in our dataset allow for the assessment of the form of 
buyer-supplier exchange relationships but do not contain systematic details on their 
contents25. However, knowing whether a buyer allocates a significant portion of busi-
                                                
25 Anecdotal qualitative information about the contents of exchange relationships is available. We 
will draw on it in the analysis section.  
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ness to one or few suppliers or works with a wide range of suppliers, as well as know-
ing the duration of supplier relationships already provides us with a substantial basis 
on which to make a judgment relating to exchange relationships.  
 
Table 4-1. Cluster dimensions, antecedents, outcomes – descriptive statistics    
 Min Max Mean Median St. 
Dev. 
Share of projects per preferred supplier (%);  0.08 1.00 0.545 0.500 0.282 
Duration of relationships with preferred 
supplier (days). 
0 1,439 483 434 332 
Share of projects procured via open reverse 
auctions (%). 
0 1.00 0.438 0.41 0.328 
Portfolio size (USD) 1,066 52,380 10,684 7,302 10,256 
Average project value (USD) 84 2,387 534 416 434 
Average project length (days) 0 173 47.58 38.91 37.65 
Number of awarded projects divided by 
number of posted projects* 
0.40 1.00 0.82 0.86 .147 
Overall number of awarded projects 21 210 68.91 51.50 46.17 
Overall spend, USD 3,611 210,746 34,215 21,354 34,776 
Duration of presence at in the marketplace 
(days) 
120 2,353 1504 1,575 488 
Average satisfaction rating 3.78 5.00 4.8673 4.9751 0.2264 
Ratio: satisfaction with preferred supplier / 
average satisfaction 
.97 1.32 1.0264 1.0008 0.0508 
*Ratio awarded/posted: In our final dataset for 2,167 projects there were 2,142 auctions, mak-
ing the overall awarded/posted ratio to be 1,012. This means that sometimes a buyer awarded 
projects to more than one supplier in a single auction. However, from the theoretical perspec-
tive we are interested here only in opportunistic buyers, who post projects without awarding 
them. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, to avoid distortion of data, 
awarded/posted ratios above 1 were replaced with “1” in 6 cases throughout the dataset. 
 
Two variables operationalize the “form” of exchange relationships. We use Share of 
projects per preferred supplier26 to assess the extent to which one preferred supplier can 
                                                
26 An alternative way to operationalize this dimension would be via the number of suppliers used by 
a buyer. One disadvantage of this measure, however, is that it cannot elicit suppliers that are rela-
tively more import for the buyer when overall number of suppliers is high, e.g. if one supplier has 
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occupy an important role in the buyer’s portfolio of exchange relationships. We de-
fine “preferred” supplier as a supplier who obtains the largest proportion of buyer’s 
business in terms of the number of projects. A high share of projects allocated to the 
preferred supplier would indicate that at least one buyer has a high importance for the 
buyer. A low share would indicate that the buyer is likely to use an arms-length ap-
proach without favouring any supplier over others. It is important to note that this 
measure characterizes the whole portfolio of supplier relationships, rather than a 
buyer-supplier dyad. For instance, a high proportion of projects allocated to the pre-
ferred supplier (e.g. 75%) would mean that other suppliers, regardless of their num-
ber, have little weight and importance in the portfolio. If the preferred supplier re-
ceives a relatively small proportion of projects (e.g. 25%), this would mean that the 
buyer has an arms-length approach and treats all suppliers in an equally distant way.   
The second measure, Duration of relationships with the preferred supplier, provides an indi-
cation of the time perspective of the relationships with the preferred supplier. Suppli-
ers in longer relationships are likely to develop closer relationships with the buyer.  
Exchange mechanism. In order to assess the use of reverse auctions in the buyer’s 
portfolio, we use Share of projects procured via open reverse auctions as a straightforward 
measure. Since the buyer has only two options for the allocation mechanism – reverse 
auction or negotiations – the reverse of this measure accounts for the use of negotia-
tions by the buyer.  
Transaction characteristics. Three variables account for transaction characteristics. 
The variables Average project value and Average project length serve as proxies for project 
size and complexity (Snir & Hitt, 2003). Portfolio size is a characteristic of the volume 
of a buyer’s transactions at the portfolio level, rather than at the level of a single pro-
ject. Incorporating this measure allows us to assess whether, for example, buyers with 
large projects form different portfolios of relationships from buyers of small projects.   
Buyer opportunism. According to (Radkevitch et al., 2006a), opportunistic (as op-
posed to committed) buyers in online marketplaces for IT services are inherently 
likely to conduct auctions without awarding projects to suppliers in order to receive 
free advice or for the purposes of price benchmarking. While their research was con-
ducted on the level of individual projects, here we extrapolate this intuition to the 
level of buyers’ portfolios of exchange relationships with suppliers. We use Number of 
awarded projects divided by number of posted projects as a proxy for opportunism at the port-
folio level, as buyers with a lower level of this ratio seem to be more prone to oppor-
tunistic behaviour than buyers who award higher proportion of projects.  
                                                                                                                       
60% of business. In addition, our analysis showed that the number of suppliers and the percentage of 
projects allocated to the preferred supplier are highly (and negatively) correlated (- 0.782**). Since 
only using one of these two highly correlated variables would be appropriate for taxonomy develop-
ment by the means of cluster analysis, we chose to focus on the Share of projects per preferred sup-
plier.  
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Buyer experience. In order to capture different aspects of buyer experience in the 
online marketplace we operationalize this experience via three variables: Duration of the 
presence on the marketplace, Overall number of awarded projects and Overall spend (the volume 
of transactions).  
Portfolio performance. We proxy portfolio performance as an average of the buyer’s 
evaluations of projects performed by suppliers (Average satisfaction rating). This is simi-
lar to previous studies that operationalize relationship performance as the buyer’s 
overall evaluation of the supplier’s performance (Jap, 2007; Kumar, Stern, & Achrol, 
1992). Data on project evaluation is readily available from the marketplace in the 
form of a rating the buyer assigns to the supplier after a project has been accom-
plished. The second, nuanced measure, Satisfaction with the preferred supplier divided by 
average satisfaction, serves to compare the buyer’s relative satisfaction with the preferred 
supplier across clusters.  
Table 4-6 in the Appendix summarizes the variables that operationalize taxonomy 
dimensions.  
 
4.4. Analysis  
Cluster analysis consists of two stages – identification of the number of clusters and 
clustering observations in the sample. While there is normally little uncertainty with 
regard to the second stage, the first one can be realized in a variety of ways. In the 
present study we chose to apply rather simple and elegant solution suggested in 
(Bapna et al., 2004).   
First, we applied the K-means clustering method to find a number of different cluster 
solutions for our dataset. This method clusters objects into k partitions based on their 
attributes. The method assumes that the attributes form a vector space and aims to 
minimize the total within-cluster variance. It is commonly used in IS and marketing 
studies as a part of the procedure to develop taxonomies of actors, e.g. bidders 
(Bapna et al., 2004) or buyers (Cannon & Perreault Jr, 1999).  
Second, as advised by (Bapna et al., 2004), for each cluster solution we calculated av-
erage distance from points in a cluster to the relevant cluster centre (intra-cluster dis-
tance) and minimum distance between cluster centers among all clusters (intercluster 
distance). Better cluster solutions have smaller intra-cluster distances (the clusters are 
more homogeneous) and larger intercluster distances (the clusters are situated more 
apart from each other). Then, we established the optimal solution by dividing the in-
tercluster difference of a cluster by intra-cluster difference of the same cluster, which 
produces the dissimilarity ratio (Bapna et al., 2004), and by comparing them. The op-
timal cluster should have the highest dissimilarity ratio. According to the results in 
Table 4-3, the best solution is the one with five clusters containing 38, 4, 14, 42 and 6 
portfolios respectively. However, taking into account the small size of some of the 
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clusters, which puts into question their value for theoretical analysis27, as well as the 
similarity between the 4 and 5 cluster solutions, we chose to focus further analysis on 
the 4-cluster solution. Table 4-3 provides details of the 4-cluster solution. 
Based on cluster characteristics, i.e. the means of the variables used for clustering as 
presented in Table 4-4, we came up with the following names for the buyers in these 
clusters: Transactional buyers, Recurrent buyers, Small diversifiers, and Large diversifiers. In 
assigning the labels, we relied on our interpretation of how buyers prefer to organise 
their supplier relationships in different portfolio clusters and how they use different 
exchange mechanisms. 
 
Table 4-2. Dissimilarity ratios of different cluster solutions 
Number of clus-
ters in a solution 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dissimilarity ratio 1.358 1.489 1.510 1.646 1.484 1.418 1.419 1.564 1.351 
 
Figure 4-2 provides an illustration of the four types of buyer portfolios. The central 
node of each portfolio represents the buyer. The buyer is connected to other nodes, 
the suppliers. The connecting lines are either continuous or dotted, which means that 
respectively reverse auctions or negotiations dominate as an exchange mechanism. 
Thus, for example, most lines of Transactional buyers are continuous, while the lines 
of the relational suppliers are dotted. The size of the buyer nodes illustrates the 
monetary turnover of the portfolios. The dark colour of one of the supplier nodes 
denotes the preferred supplier. The size of the preferred supplier node relative to 
other supplier nodes in the same portfolio indicates an approximate proportion of 
business allocated to the preferred supplier. Thus, the size of preferred supplier node 
in the Recurrent portfolio is larger relative to other suppliers than in other portfolios.  
Cluster 1. Transactional buyers. We label the first portfolio cluster “Transactional buyers”, 
because the patterns of behaviour displayed in this portfolio are similar to arms-
length, market-driven exchange relationships. Most projects in this portfolio are pro-
cured via open reverse auctions (70%). Transactional buyers allocate few projects 
with a single preferred supplier, 32%, which is the lowest level among all clusters, and 
also have the shortest duration of relationships with preferred supplier, 241 days. It is 
interesting to note that while the average project value here is the smallest among all 
clusters (USD 397), the projects take longer to accomplish (48 days) than more ex-
pensive projects of Recurrent buyers (USD 504 and 30 days respectively). A possible 
explanation is that it takes longer for Transactional buyers to set up a sound commu-
nication and coordination with new, unfamiliar suppliers. 
                                                
27
 The same argument applies to the 9 cluster solution, which is the second-best.  
103
 
 
 
 
Heterogeneity of Buyer-Supplier Relationships 
 
89 
Cluster 2. Recurrent buyers. The label “Recurrent buyers” is used because buyers in this 
cluster assign high importance to preferred suppliers, with whom they have exchange 
relationships for a relatively long period of time. A key factor distinguishing Recurrent 
buyers from the other three clusters is the allocation of a higher share of projects 
(78%) to their preferred supplier. The duration of relationships with the preferred 
supplier is two times longer than that of Transactional buyers. These buyers use open 
reverse auctions the least of all four types (16% of projects); by contrast, in 84% of 
cases they use negotiations. Their project value (USD 504) is higher than that of 
Transactional buyers, which might be due not only to the project size and complexity 
but also to the fact that Transactional buyers pay lower prices as a result of competitive 
bidding at reverse auctions. This difference, however, is not statistically significant.  
 
 
Figure 4-2. Clusters of buyers’ portfolios of exchange relationships 
 
Clusters 3 and 4. Small diversifiers and Large diversifiers. The two remaining clusters ex-
hibit more similarities than differences, therefore we analyze them together. Buyers in 
these clusters do not demonstrate preferences for one or many suppliers or for ex-
change mechanisms to the extent that Transactional and Recurrent buyers do. Here, buy-
ers use negotiations somewhat more often than auctions, which are used in 46% and 
33% of cases respectively. Similarly, they favor single preferred suppliers (allocating 
to them 63% and 56% of projects), although to a lower extent than Recurrent buyers. 
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Therefore, we label these clusters “diversifiers”. The duration of their relationships 
with the preferred supplier is equally long – 873 and 806 days respectively. The dif-
ferences between Small and Large diversifiers lie in the size of the portfolio, in which 
Large diversifiers are far ahead of any other cluster (USD 35,888), and the project 
length. With regard to the latter, Small diversifiers have the lead with 105 days, which is 
almost two times longer than the project length of Large diversifiers, whose project 
value is over three times higher. A possible reason for this is that these are smaller 
firms or individuals lacking project management skills.  
In summary, the analysis of the four resulting clusters of buyer portfolios of exchange 
relationships showed considerable heterogeneity among buyers in terms of the three 
taxonomy dimensions – exchange relationships, allocation mechanism and transac-
tion characteristics. Transactional and Recurrent buyers demonstrate a completely differ-
ent approach towards arranging their portfolios of relationships. Transactional buyers 
display characteristics of arms-length exchange relationships. Even the preferred sup-
plier has little weight in their portfolio because of the low portion of projects it re-
ceives and the short duration of relationships. These buyers allocate projects mostly 
on a competitive basis, via reverse auctions. Recurrent buyers show a pattern of much 
closer exchange relationships, as they allocate a much higher proportion of their 
business to preferred suppliers via non-competitive negotiations; their exchange rela-
tionship duration is also longer. Two other portfolio clusters are somewhere in-
between the first clusters in terms of the preferences for preferred supplier and allo-
cation mechanism use.  
 
Table 4-3. 4-cluster solution 
 Transactional 
buyers 
Recurrent 
buyers 
Small 
diversifi-
ers  
Large di-
versifiers 
Scheffe 
diff. p<0.1 
Share of projects 
per preferred sup-
plier, % 
32 78 63 56 (1; 2,3,4) 
(2; 1,4) 
Duration of rela-
tionships with pre-
ferred supplier 
241 575 873 806 (1; 2,3,4) 
(2; 1,3,4) 
(3; 1,2) 
Share of reverse 
auctions, % 
70 16 46 33 (1; 2,3,4) 
(2; 1,3) 
(3; 1,2) 
Portfolio size 
(USD) 
7,884 9,692 6,223 35,888 (4; 1,2,3) 
Average project 
value (USD) 
397 504 379 1,579 (4; 1,2,3) 
Average project 
length (days) 
48 30 105 66 (1; 3) 
(2; 3,4) 
(3; 1,2,4) 
N 45 39 11 9  
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The variation in transaction characteristics does not seem to explain the difference in 
the way buyers organise exchange relationships in their portfolios. First, the proxies 
for project size and complexity (project value and duration) are not significantly dif-
ferent for Recurrent and Transactional buyers, whose ways of organising exchange rela-
tionships are drastically different. Second, the clusters of Small and Large diversifiers 
have quite different transaction characteristics (the differences in project value and 
duration are significant), while their relationships patterns are strikingly similar – there 
are no significant differences in terms of transaction mechanism use, use of preferred 
supplier or duration of relationships with the preferred supplier. In other words, 
transaction characteristics appear to be unrelated to the configuration of buyer-
supplier relationships.  
The next step in the analysis is to identify the links between clusters and their antece-
dents and portfolio performance. We conduct a Scheffe test for the significance of 
the pairwise differences between the means of the variables that underlie the antece-
dents and outcomes (see Table 4-4, last column). The Scheffe test is a procedure rec-
ommended for use in the case of unequal group sizes. With regard to Number of 
awarded auctions/ Number of posted projects, there are significant differences between 
Transactional and Recurrent buyers as well as between Recurrent buyers and Small diver-
sifiers. No differences in the Number of awarded projects are significant. Large diversifiers are 
significantly different from all other clusters in Overall spend. Finally, Transactional and 
Recurrent buyers are significantly different with regard to the Duration of presence in the 
marketplace, Average satisfaction and Satisfaction with preferred supplier. Below we discuss 
these results and their implications in more detail.  
Buyer opportunism. The analysis shows a significant difference in project award rate 
between Transactional buyers and Recurrent buyers as well as between Small diversifiers and 
Recurrent buyers. For Transactional buyers and Small diversifiers the award rate is signifi-
cantly lower than for Recurrent buyers. This result cannot be explained by transaction 
characteristics such as project size or uncodifiability (as all projects come from a 
rather homogenous service category), unless we assume that non-awarded projects 
have characteristics quite different from the awarded ones. One plausible explanation 
of the difference in the award rate, in line with (Radkevitch et al., 2006a), is that 
Transactional buyers and Small diversifiers are more opportunistic than Recurrent buyers and 
have a tendency to post projects without an intention to award them to suppliers. 
Instead, these buyers might use the marketplace for price benchmarking or for ob-
taining free advice from suppliers (Radkevitch et al., 2006a; Snir & Hitt, 2003). An 
alternative explanation, in line with (Carr, 2003; Snir & Hitt, 2003), would be that 
some buyers bear consistently higher costs when evaluating suppliers and their offers, 
and therefore sometimes fail to allocate their projects when evaluation costs become 
prohibitively high. This does not seem unlikely, as evaluation costs are definitely 
higher in auctions (which Transactional buyers and Small diversifiers use more intensively 
than Recurrent buyers) than in negotiations. An implication of this explanation would be 
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that as a construct in our model, evaluation costs would be an outcome of cluster 
configuration, rather than its antecedent. Although the data in our dataset does not 
for any discrimination between these two explanations, both of them increase the 
validity of our taxonomy by providing a theoretical explanation for the differences 
between the portfolio clusters.  
 
Table 4-4. Antecedents and outcomes of cluster variables 
 Transactional 
buyers 
Mean (st. 
dev) 
Recurrent 
buyers 
Mean (st. 
dev) 
Small  
diversifiers 
Mean (st. 
dev) 
Large  
diversifiers 
Mean (st. 
dev) 
Scheffe 
diff. p<0.1 
Number of awarded 
auctions/ Number 
of posted projects 
0.7673 
(0.1531) 
0.8718 
(0.1677) 
0.7682 
(0.1342) 
0.8589 
(0.2011) 
(1;2) (2;3) 
Number of awarded 
projects 
73.62 
(47.18) 
62.56 
(43.99) 
48.00 
(21.09) 
97.11 
(62.37) 
NS 
Overall spend, USD 27,538 
(20,761) 
34,719.44 
(41,333) 
16,009 
(9,301) 
87,670 
(32,447) 
(4; 1,2,3) 
Duration of pres-
ence on the market-
place 
1,595 
(540) 
1,330 
(444) 
1,599 
(376) 
1,683 
(317) 
(1; 2) 
Average satisfaction 4.7755  
(0.2917) 
4.97 
(0.0561) 
4.8572 
(0.2140) 
4.8932 
(0.1406) 
(1; 2) 
 
Ratio: satisfaction 
with preferred sup-
plier / average satis-
faction 
1.0468 
(0.0664) 
1.0058 
(0.0121) 
1.0311 
(0.0478) 
1.0078 
(0.0222) 
(1; 2) 
N (listwise) 45 39 11 9  
  
Buyer experience. The only significant difference between Transactional and Recurrent 
buyers in terms of experience is the duration of their presence in the market, 1,595 vs 
1,330 days. It is not quite plausible that Relational buyers convert into Transactional 
buyers after they spend more time at the marketplace. Therefore, we can conclude 
that experience cannot reasonably explain the observed heterogeneity in the portfo-
lios of exchange relationships.  
Portfolio performance. Recurrent buyers enjoy higher performance than Transac-
tional buyers (both variables that operationalize portfolio performance, Average satis-
faction and Satisfaction with the preferred supplier divided by average satisfaction, 
are significantly different)28. This result is in line with the extant literature in that close 
                                                
28 The small size of the difference in the level of satisfaction between the clusters may be due to the 
fact that in online markets for IT service suppliers performance ranking is used by buyers mostly to 
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buyer-supplier relationships and a high level of relational attributes (such as trust) lead 
to higher performance (Griffith et al., 2006; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). It is also inter-
esting that the level of performance according to both measures is the highest for 
Recurrent buyers across all clusters, while for Transactional buyers it is the lowest. 
In summary, the results of this analysis enhance the validity of our taxonomy of buyer 
portfolios of exchange relationships by identifying theoretically sound differences 
between different clusters of portfolios.   
So far, the analysis of the taxonomy has avoided any discussion of the mechanisms 
that underlie close exchange relationships adopted by Recurrent buyers and, to a lesser 
extent, by Small and Large diversifiers. In other words, we have focused more on the 
form of relationships, rather than on their contents. In the next sub-section we pro-
vide some qualitative evidence on the contents of close relationships. 
Qualitative evidence of non-contractible elements    
Previous studies have described the contents of close exchange relationships as dis-
playing the properties of cooperation and coordination (Clemons et al., 1993), trust 
and relational norms (Ganesan, 1994; Heide & John, 1992; Poppo & Zenger, 2002), 
as well as other non-contractible attributes such as quality, responsiveness, informa-
tion sharing, and innovation (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 
1993b), or. As discussed above, the online marketplace we study provides a favour-
able environment for the emergence of non-contractible exchange attributes to mani-
fest themselves, as supplier quality can be hard to determine ex ante, IT services are 
idiosyncratic, and there is potential for economies based on learning. Although it was 
not possible to systematically collect evidence on non-contractible attributes of ex-
change, we were able to find some anecdotal evidence relating to this. We studied 
comments that Recurrent buyers in our sample had left for projects accomplished by 
their incumbent suppliers. After screening the feedback of several Recurrent buyers we 
identified a number of quotes, in which buyers refer to one of the five non-
contractible attributes. These quotes are not unique but rather typical for the feed-
back Relational buyers give to their suppliers on this online marketplace. 
The qualitative evidence of the presence of the non-contractible exchange attributes 
is presented in Table 4-7. We argue that these quotes provide support (although an-
ecdotal) for the intuition that at least in some cases recurrent transactions between 
buyers and incumbent suppliers are motivated by suppliers’ investments in non-
contractible attributes (quality, responsiveness, information sharing, trust and innova-
tion). This result is in line with Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993), according to whom a 
supplier will be willing to invest in non-contractible attributes only if it expects to be 
able to appropriate a share of the created value. In the case of the online marketplace 
                                                                                                                       
reward or punish suppliers for good or bad performance respectively, rather than to objectively rank 
the performance. Over 90% of ranked projects have the highest possible rating.  
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of IT services such value comes in the form of new business from the same buyer 
awarded on a non-competitive basis, i.e. via negotiations rather than online reverse 
auctions.  
In the next section we discuss the theoretical implications of the developed taxonomy 
and its research limitations.  
 
4.5. Discussion 
There are four clusters of exchange relationships portfolios identified as a result of 
the taxonomy development – Transactional buyers, Recurrent buyers, Small diversifiers and 
Large diversifiers. In these portfolios buyers employ distinct ways of organising ex-
change relationships with their suppliers. Clearly, the picture we observe in practice is 
different from the predictions of the literature (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993a; Bakos 
& Brynjolfsson, 1993b; Clemons et al., 1993): we find not only portfolios based on 
close buyer-supplier relationships, but also portfolios of arms-length relationships, as 
well as mixed portfolios. In other words, within a single setting, we observe several 
forms of organising buyer-supplier relationships.  
The observed forms of exchange relationships, however, have much in common with 
a number of theoretical types, described in the literature.  
Transactional buyers’ style of organising their exchange relationships corresponds to 
market governance as described in the transaction costs literature. This form of ex-
change is applied to non-specific transactions and is subject to governance by classical 
contracts, where all contract contingencies can be explicitly specified (Williamson, 
1991). Parties to this type of exchange have a strong incentive to perform, rooted in 
the availability of market substitutes to the supplier and the buyer’s ability to quickly 
switch from one supplier to another. This type of exchange is of short-term nature 
and is characterized by intensive bargaining and competition. 
The pattern displayed by Recurrent buyers has properties similar to the recurrent con-
tracting transactions discussed in Ring and van de Ven (1992). Recurrent contracting 
is contingent on prior performance, contains emerging elements of non-contractible 
exchange attributes such as trust, and is subject to neo-classical contract governance 
(Ring & Van de Ven, 1992).  
From the perspective of recurrent exchange, it is likely that the small proportion of 
reverse auctions that is present in the portfolio of Recurrent buyers serves them early in 
each transaction’s trajectory to identify suppliers with whom to build closer exchange 
relationships in further recurrent projects. As supplier quality becomes known after 
the first projects, the buyer switches to non-competitive bilateral negotiations to allo-
cate further projects. This is in line with emerging business practices, where online 
reverse auctions are used to allocate long-term, rather than for discrete, one-off trans-
actions (Jap, 2003). Further, as relationships develop and the level of non-contractible 
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attributes in the exchange becomes high, buyers become unwilling to jeopardize their 
relationships with the incumbents by requesting them to participate in auctions too 
often (Elmaghraby, 2007). 
To summarize our intuition, while transactional buyers use reverse auctions for pro-
ject allocation on the basis of price, supplier rating and other directly observable at-
tributes, recurrent buyers mostly use reverse auctions as a screening instrument, sub-
stituted by non-competitive negotiations at a later stage. This intuition is in line with 
studies that have reported that reverse auctions can be used for supplier screening 
and allocation of long-term contracts (Elmaghraby, 2007; Jap, 2003). 
Finally, Small and Large diversifiers demonstrate properties somewhat close to those 
described by Holland and Lockett in their empirical investigation of mixed mode 
networks. In mixed mode networks, buyers tend to have close relationships with 
some firms and arms-length relationships with the others (Holland & Lockett, 1997). 
Similarly, in our setting buyers seem to use different exchange mechanisms for differ-
ent exchange relationships.  
This finding also implies that studies that focus solely on a dyadic view of exchange 
relationships (as is common in the literature, e.g. (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994)), may 
paint a limited picture of a firm’s exchange relationships. The few existing studies at 
the portfolio level, e.g. (Johnson & Selnes, 2004) and (Goerzen & Beamish, 2005), 
suggest that dyadic relationships make more sense when considered in the context of 
a relationships portfolio. 
It is not untypical that outcomes of a taxonomy development process cannot be eas-
ily explained by existing theories: for example, see (Cannon & Perreault Jr, 1999; 
Zhong & Wu, 2006). The key finding of the present study is that the existing theory 
does not help to explain how the diversity of buyers’ portfolios of exchange relation-
ships observed in our analysis can emerge in an environment characterized by rather 
homogenous services and where transaction attributes have no statistically significant 
effect on the portfolio configurations. An important direction for further research, 
which could help gain insights into the sources of the heterogeneity, would be the 
evolution of portfolios of exchange relationships over time. Another interesting di-
rection for further research would be testing the generalisability of the presented find-
ings across other online marketplaces and industries as well as across firms of larger 
size. 
The present study comes with a number of limitations. First, the nature of the online 
marketplace did not provide an opportunity to collect systematic data on non-
contractible attributes of exchange relationships, which introduced some speculative 
flavour to our discussion and conclusions. Second, the portfolios were analyzed in an 
aggregated fashion, as a whole, despite the fact that projects in these portfolios are 
often conducted years apart. This might result in a somewhat blurred picture of oth-
erwise dynamic and evolving exchange relationships. Third, in this study we focus 
only on online exchange relationships, although these might provide an incomplete 
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picture of buyers’ exchange activities: future studies should extend the scope by gath-
ering and analyzing data on offline exchange relationships along with online relation-
ships.   
 
4.6. Conclusions  
We conducted an exploratory investigation of empirical configurations of buyer-
supplier exchange relationships on an online marketplace for IT services and the ac-
companying use of online reverse auctions. We used buyers’ portfolios of supplier 
relationships as a unit of analysis and employed a clustering technique to develop a 
taxonomy of portfolios of buyer-supplier relationships. Further, we analyzed connec-
tions between clusters of buyers’ portfolios and cluster antecedents and outcomes. 
There are several key findings in the present study. First, the resulting taxonomy of 
exchange relationships revealed considerable heterogeneity of buyer-supplier ex-
change relationships in an online marketplace for IT services. This heterogeneity can-
not be explained by the variation in transaction attributes. Four clusters of portfolios 
of exchange relationships were identified – Transactional buyers, Recurrent buyers, 
Small diversifiers and Large diversifiers – that possess distinct mixes of exchange rela-
tionships, exchange mechanisms and transaction characteristics. Transactional buyers 
prefer arms-length relationships and tend to switch suppliers often, while Recurrent 
buyers develop longer and closer exchange relationships with incumbent suppliers. 
We also found some qualitative evidence on the existence of non-contractible ex-
change attributes in the Recurrent portfolios. The two other clusters, Small and Large 
Diversifiers, do not show such strong preferences either for arms-length or for recur-
rent exchange or for any exchange mechanism. Buyers in these clusters seem to com-
bine arms-length relationships with some suppliers and recurrent relationships with 
other suppliers. 
The high level of buyer experience across different portfolios indicates that they are 
not simply intermediary stages of the evolution of one single portfolio type but rather 
deliberate stances defined by an inherent intention of different buyers to pursue spe-
cific exchange relationship strategies. Furthermore, quite in line with the literature on 
inter-organisational relationships, Recurrent buyers were found to enjoy higher per-
formance of their portfolios than buyers in other clusters, while Transactional buyers 
have the lowest level of performance. 
Second, reverse auctions are found to be associated with short-term, arms-length ex-
change relationships, while bilateral negotiations support longer-term, recurrent ex-
change relationships that display non-contractible elements of exchange. On one 
hand, this supports some of the existing studies on reverse auctions that have reached 
similar conclusions (Emiliani & Stec, 2002; Van Tulder & Mol, 2002). On the other 
hand, our findings do not contradict studies that consider online reverse auctions to 
be appropriate for supplier screening and initiating long-term exchange (Elmaghraby, 
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2007). It is likely that reverse auctions can be used by Recurrent buyers to initiate re-
current relationships with preferred suppliers.  
Third, the presence of a large cluster of Recurrent buyers can have far-reaching con-
sequences for the online marketplaces. As the reliance on non-contractible elements 
of exchange is increasing, recurrent relationships can gradually evolve into even closer 
form of exchange such as relational contracting (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). For an 
online marketplace such as the one investigated in this study, that would mean that 
buyers in relational dyads would experience less need for the mechanisms of formal 
governance (e.g. formal terms and conditions, arbitration, rating systems) and at some 
point might choose to abandon the marketplace to avoid service fees. To prevent 
relational dyads from leaving, online marketplaces need to cater for close buyer-
supplier relationships. They must address the key characteristics of such relationships, 
such as their longer-term nature, intensive information exchange and accumulation, 
and re-use of knowledge. One way to address such issues would be via providing 
more value-added, collaboration-oriented functionality to support project execution, 
learning, information exchange and communication between long-term partners. 
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Table 4-6. Cluster dimensions, antecedents, outcomes, underlying variables, 
measurements 
Taxon. dimensions Variables Measurements 
Buyer-supplier ex-
change relationships 
Share of projects per pre-
ferred supplier (%) 
First, a supplier with the higher number 
of projects is identified in buyer’s portfo-
lio. Second, share of this supplier’s pro-
jects in the portfolio is calculated 
 Duration of relationships 
with  preferred supplier 
(days) 
Calculated as a difference between the 
starting dates of the last and the first 
projects with the preferred supplier 
Exchange mecha-
nism 
  
 Share of projects procured 
via open reverse auctions (%) 
Calculation is straightforward 
Transaction charac-
teristics 
  
 Portfolio size (USD) Monetary volume of all projects in a 
portfolio 
 Average project value (USD) Average of project values in a portfolio. 
Project value is operationalized as the 
price paid by the buyer to the supplier 
 Average project length (days) Difference between the date when 
buyer’s feedback for the project is as-
signed and the auction end date. The 
feedback is normally supplied right at the 
end of a project 
Cluster antecedents 
  
Buyer opportunism   
 Number of awarded projects 
divided by number of posted 
projects 
Calculation is straightforward 
Buyer experience   
 Overall spend (USD) Monetary volume of all projects awarded 
by the buyer in the marketplace 
 Overall number of awarded 
projects 
Calculation is straightforward 
 Duration of the presence in 
the marketplace (days) 
Difference between the date of data col-
lection and the date of buyer’s registra-
tion on the marketplace 
Portfolio perform-
ance 
  
 Average satisfaction rating  Rating available on the marketplace 
 
Ratio: satisfaction with  pre-
ferred supplier / average 
satisfaction 
Calculation is straightforward 
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Table 4-7. Qualitative evidence of non-contractible exchange attributes on the online 
marketplace for IT services 
Attribute  Qualitative evidence  
Quality “A very complex project, multiple flash applications, complex photoshop 
work, many complex html pages and custom programming. All done on 
time, within budget. I have now done more than 10 projects with triguns 
and they are becoming increasingly complex so that must speak for itself” 
[nippi] 
“Once again, the team at Onix Systems have excelled themselves. What 
was an excellent site already, has now been added to and with its im-
proved functionality, now becomes one of the premier sites of its class. 
Well done team, long may our relationship continue.” [auctionpix]  
Innovativeness  “This project is another perfect example of where the WINIT team was 
able to go above and beyond by providing not only the solution I was 
looking for, but also identifying problems with the original scope and 
coming up with creative solutions to address them that resulted in a much 
better end result. I have used this team for three years now and I’m very 
pleased to be able to WIN with WINIT” [gopro] 
Responsiveness “Sonic Web Graphics did a first rate job designing and coding our project. 
They were very responsive to comments and turn around work with im-
pressive speed. We will continue to use them extensively.” [clandesm] 
“This was a very difficult project with an extremely difficult client. Client 
demanded large changes mid-project. Triguns was able to handle these 
changes with good grace and speed. Another job well done.” [nippi] 
Information  
exchange 
“I relied heavily on the WinIT team on this project as it was our first 
.NET application. As always, WinIT offered suggestions and pointed out 
potential hurdles to me well in advance, before the issues had a chance to 
compromise project timelines and budget. WinIT is a valued business 
partner and they work very hard to foster the long-term relationship and 
joint success that we are both experiencing. Cheers!” [gopro] 
Trust “Excellent service and skill. This project turned out perfectly. Quick turn-
around and great price. Would highly recommend for any project size. 
Very professional and dependable provider. Thanks again!!!.” [lilesa]  
“This project originally had a very tight deadline and I knew I could count 
on WinIT to do whatever was necessary to deliver the project on time... I 
have worked with this team for over a year now and I really consider them 
to be my “virtual” production department. If you’re contemplating using 
them for the first time, just do it. You’ll be glad you did! Thanks!” [gopro] 
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Chapter 5. The Impact of Reverse Auctions on 
the Execution of a Construction 
Services Project 
 
When you start a job you always think -- how the hell are 
we going to finish this? But every job is finished… 
Bobby, Project Manager of InCo 
 
5.1. Introduction29  
A recent survey found that as many as 60% of industrial buyers do not use online 
reverse auctions (SupplyManagement.com, 2007). As one of the main reasons for not 
using reverse auctions, buyers indicated the fear that auctions can harm relationships 
with their suppliers. Such an attitude is not rare in the buyers’ community where re-
verse auctions are concerned. Due to their economic impact, online reverse auctions 
are often seen as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they optimize the pro-
curement process, stimulate competition among suppliers (Carter et al., 2004; Jap, 
2003) and result in lower prices for buyers (Jap, 2002). On the other hand, online re-
verse auctions can not only make suppliers concerned about the buyer’s opportunistic 
behaviour (Jap, 2003) but, arguably, also produce disruptive effects on buyer-supplier 
relationships (Emiliani, 2004).  
Most previous empirical studies that have looked at the “relational” aspect of online 
reverse auctions addressed the immediate effects of reverse auctions on buyer-
supplier relationships (Gattiker et al., 2007; Jap, 2003; Jap, 2007). By contrast, the ef-
fect of auctions on buyers-supplier relationships that form and develop during the 
contract execution phase has not really been the subject of any detailed examination. 
The importance of filling this gap stems from the well-known fact that relationships 
between contractual parties positively affect business performance (Kalwani & Nara-
yandas, 1995; Uzzi, 1997; Valsamakis & Groves, 1998). Whether reverse auctions im-
prove such relationships, damage them, or bring about some previously unknown 
                                                
29 I would like to thank Wouter Vermeer, a master student at Erasmus University Rotter-
dam School of Management, for helping with collecting and processing data for this re-
search project. 
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developments, is an issue of considerable academic and managerial importance (Jap, 
2007; Pearcy & Giunipero, 2006). 
In this study we adopt a focus on employees involved in the execution of the auc-
tioned contracts on a day-to-day basis in the role of project managers. Project manag-
ers are likely to be primarily affected by the outcomes of reverse auctions, as first they 
have to deal with the contract terms (e.g. price) established as a result of the auctions, 
and second they perform what is called in the literature a ‘boundary spanning func-
tion’, i.e. they represent their organisations in their contacts with the outside world 
(Aldrich & Herker, 1977). Boundary spanners control outbound and inbound infor-
mation and affect the development and quality of relationships with the outside or-
ganisations (Perrone, Zaheer, & McEvily, 2003; Weitz & Jap, 1995), leadership 
(Fleming & Waguespack, 2007), information transfer between the focal organisation 
and the outside world (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981), and the ability of organisations to 
cope with the environmental constraints (Aldrich & Herker, 1977). Being exposed to 
influences from both the inside and outside of their organisations, boundary spanners 
are susceptible to role pressures that arise due to conflicting expectations and de-
mands. To the extent that the reverse auctions’ outcomes can be related to these con-
flicting demands and expectations, they are likely to affect boundary spanners’ per-
formances and relationships with the other parties.  
Our investigation is set in the context of the building construction industry, where 
reverse auctions are picking up (Beall et al., 2003) and where projects are complex, 
lengthy and are subject to numerous risks and contingencies (Söderholm, 2007). In 
such situations, the skills of the individuals in boundary spanning roles are important. 
While a number of the skills successful construction project managers should possess 
have been previously identified, including interpersonal skills, negotiation skills, and 
leadership (Gardiner & Simmons, 1998), neither the boundary spanning nor project 
management literatures provide sufficient insight into the functioning of the compe-
tences that help such individuals resist the role constraints, manage contingencies and 
maintain productive relationships with other parties. Therefore, this study attempts to 
answer the following research questions: 
 
How do reverse auction outcomes affect the execution phase of auctioned contracts? 
What are the key relational competences of the boundary spanning individuals that in-
fluence the effect of the reverse auctions on inter-organisational relationships and project 
performance? 
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In order to answer the research questions we conduct a longitudinal case study into a 
renovation and redesign project of a public building in Amsterdam in the period Sep-
tember 2005 - October 2006. One key finding of this investigation is that the impact 
of online reverse auctions at the project execution stage is primarily in terms of ag-
gravating the role constraints of the project managers from the contractors’ side. The 
role constraints are found to negatively affect inter-organisational relationships and 
project performance. Another key finding consists in an inductive identification of 
three relational competences that enable project managers to mitigate the effect of 
the role constraints: benevolent gaming, reciprocity, and proactiveness.  
Figure 5-1 highlights the place of Chapter 5 in the context of the other studies of this 
dissertation. From the perspective of the dissertation structure and sequence, Chapter 
5 takes the investigation further from where it was left by Chapter 3, which treated 
auction outcome as a dependent variable and a deeper one, compared to Chapter 4, 
which looked at project outcomes but did not analyse the project execution stage. 
The chapter is organised as follows. First, we present a literature review on the effect 
of auctions on the inter-organisational relationships and on the boundary spanning 
and construction project managers’ skills. This is followed by a section introducing a 
research framework and another section explaining the methodology and describing 
the case. The chapter continues with an analysis of the effect of reverse auction out-
comes on the boundary spanners’ role pressures. Next, we discuss the relational ex-
change competences of project managers and elaborate on how these can mitigate the 
effect of the role constraints. The chapter ends with a discussion and conclusions. 
 
5.2. Literature 
5.2.1. Buyer-supplier relationships  
Inter-organisational relationships are of paramount importance in a wide range of 
exchange settings due to their positive effect on fundamental business outcomes such 
as costs and performance (Kalwani & Narayandas, 1995; Noordewier, John, & Nevin, 
1990). Full-blown inter-organisational relationships take time to develop, as they are 
rooted in the number and frequency of interactions between exchange parties, draw 
on the common exchange history and involve expectations of future business 
(Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Wilson, 1995).  
Buyer-supplier relationships have been a central issue in the literature on online re-
verse auctions in the domains of marketing, procurement, supply chain management 
and information systems research. The focus of discussion has been on the effects 
which reverse auctions exert on relationships between buying and supplying firms 
and the fit between long-term, cooperative inter-organisational relationships and the 
use of reverse auctions.  
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In a number of early studies into the link between inter-organisational relationships 
and reverse auctions, authors have argued that reverse auctions endanger or even de-
stroy buyer-supplier relationships (Bartezzaghi & Ronchi, 2003), by compromising 
non-financial priorities such as quality (Nair, 2005), amplifying the bargaining power 
exerted on suppliers, signalling an orientation towards short-term financial gains 
(Emiliani & Stec, 2002), making suppliers suspicious of the buyer’s opportunistic in-
tentions (Tassabehji et al., 2006) and thus making them willing to retaliate (Dani et al., 
2005; Emiliani, 2004). The procurement of commoditized direct and indirect inputs 
that are associated with arm’s-length, market relationships has been viewed as the 
primary appropriate area for the use of reverse auctions (Sawhney, 2003; Van Tulder 
& Mol, 2002).  
Other researchers have been more optimistic with regard to the use of reverse auc-
tions and their effect on buyer-supplier relationships. They have argued that reverse 
auctions can serve for supplier screening and as a “wake-up call” to existing suppliers 
(Jap, 2002), as a basis for the development and maintenance of long-term relation-
ships (James, 2003), and can be associated with the elements of relational exchange 
such as long-term contracts (Pearcy & Giunipero, 2006), supplier cooperation (Pearcy 
et al., 2007; Smart & Harrison, 2003) and high levels of trust and quality (Radkevitch 
& van der Valk, 2005). Within online markets, reverse auctions can be used along 
with (rather than in place of) long term relationships as an element of spot and fu-
tures markets to hedge risks (Grey, Olavson, & Shi, 2005), as well as within long-term 
relationships that are characterized by high non-contractibility, asset specificity and 
complexity of description (Wang & Archer, 2004). 
In addition, a number of enhancements and improvements have been suggested to 
make reverse auctions more relationship-friendly. These enhancements include using 
auctions as a part of a hybrid allocation mechanism to grant preferential terms to in-
cumbent suppliers (Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Katok, 2006), using multi-dimensional 
scoring rules accounting for non-price attributes (Koppius, 2002), subsidising idio-
syncratic investments, conducting post-auction negotiations and making payments to 
losing bidders (Daly & Nath, 2005). 
Recent contributions have come from several nuanced studies exploring these effects 
of reverse auctions on aspects of inter-organisational relationships based on datasets 
of auction transactions and/or (quasi-) experiments. In the context of the automotive 
industry the use of descending auctions has been found to lead to higher levels of 
suspicion among suppliers of opportunism by buyers than in the use of sealed bid 
auctions: this applies to both new and incumbent suppliers (Jap, 2003). Interestingly, 
at the same time incumbent suppliers have been found to increase their willingness to 
make idiosyncratic investments after the auctions (Jap, 2003). A quasi-experimental 
study in four industries further explored the effect of auctions on relational attributes 
(Jap, 2007). The number of bidders in auctions increases suppliers’ suspicions of op-
portunism, while the increase of the contract volume leads to a higher supplier satis-
faction and continuity expectations. Having around 6-7 lots in an auction leads to a 
120
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
106
decrease of opportunism suspicions and increases continuity expectations. Finally, 
using an auction-award rule in combination with a fully visible price also raises suspi-
cions of opportunism, as price visibility seems to enhance competition focus on price 
at the expense of non-price attributes, such as quality and relationships (Jap, 2007).  
Another study looked at the effect of buyer-supplier relationships before an auction 
on the supplier’s bidding aggressiveness, and the effect of this aggressiveness on the 
relationships after the auctions (Jap & Haruvy, 2007). In a survey of suppliers bidding 
in 12 online reverse auctions, the authors found that the number of competitors’ bids 
increases bidding aggressiveness. Incumbency, number of bidders, and the willingness 
to make relationship-specific investments lead to lower bidding aggressiveness. Bid-
ding aggressiveness was found to decrease suppliers’ disposition towards developing a 
relationship and also to decrease incumbent suppliers’ satisfaction with the relation-
ship (Jap & Haruvy, 2007). 
A study into the allocation mechanism choice by the buyer on an online marketplace 
for IT services found that prior repeat interaction with vendors favours the use of 
negotiations over auctions in the subsequent transaction, while the need to explore 
the marketplace and dissatisfaction with a vendor’s performance in the most recent 
project lead to the use of auctions instead of negotiations (Radkevitch, van Heck, & 
Koppius, 2008). Furthermore, a comparison of the use of reverse auctions and bilat-
eral negotiations has shown that the use of reverse auctions is associated with short-
term relationships while negotiations support long-term relationships. Buyers using 
predominantly negotiations tend to be more satisfied with their suppliers than buyers 
who predominantly use auctions (Radkevitch et al., 2006c). Further experimental in-
vestigation of the effects of different communication media on trust in procurement 
negotiations found that auctions are always lower on benevolence and honesty trust 
than face-to-face negotiations and lower than email in high procurement complexity 
situations; however, in low complexity situations auctions are equal in benevolence 
and honesty trust to email. Considering the effect of procurement complexity on 
trust, suppliers have higher trust in auctions when the level of procurement complex-
ity is low rather than when it is high (Gattiker et al., 2007).  
Finally, a recent study has shown that prior exchange has a clear value in procurement 
auctions. In the context of the high-tech industry, incumbent suppliers have been 
found to benefit from their past relationships with the buyer in comparison to new 
suppliers. Incumbents are three times more likely to win a contract than new suppli-
ers and, when selected as winners, they provide buyers with fewer cost savings than 
new suppliers (Zhong & Wu, 2006). See the Appendix for a complete overview of 
empirical studies into the effect of reverse auction on buyer-supplier relationships. 
Most of these empirical studies have looked at the immediate impact of online auc-
tions on buyer-supplier relationships, rather than at the effects that reveal themselves 
over time (e.g. they examine the effect on the level of supplier’s trust right after an 
auction event rather than whether such effect still persists when the supplier is work-
ing to fulfil the contract obligations). Several authors call for the exploration of more 
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“distant” effects of reverse auctions, such as the effects on buyer-supplier relation-
ships over multiple auctions or in the context of long-term relationships (Jap, 2007; 
Wang & Archer, 2004). Pearcy et al. (2006) suggest using “in-depth case studies” for 
this purpose (Pearcy & Giunipero, 2006). In the present study we take the investiga-
tion into the effect of reverse auction on the inter-organisational relationships one 
step further by evaluating the impact of auction on boundary spanners’ role con-
straints and the role of boundary spanners’ competences in moderating the effect of 
role constraints on inter-organisational relationships and project performance.  
In the next section we look at the literature on boundary spanners – employees who 
are at the forefront of inter-organisational relationships during the contract execution 
phase –  which will later allow us to conceptualize the impact of reverse auction at the 
project execution stage. 
5.2.2. Organisational boundary spanners  
The key role in developing and maintaining inter-organisational relationships rests 
with the boundary spanners, i.e. employees whose activity transcends organisational 
boundaries (Weitz & Jap, 1995). A boundary spanner is an organisational role that in-
volves processing information from outside organisations, representation of the in-
terests of the boundary spanner’s own organisation in the relations with other organi-
sations and providing links between the organisational structure and environmental 
elements (Fleming & Waguespack, 2007; Perrone et al., 2003: 423). A key aspect of 
this role is that due to their unique position boundary spanners are subject to contra-
dicting expectations from within and outside their organisation (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, 
& Snoek, 1964). For instance, the outside party in a project can expect strong adher-
ence to contractual terms and agreed quality level in a project, whereas the boundary 
spanner’s superiors from the inside of the company may exert pressure to cut costs in 
order to achieve higher margins. These conflicting expectations create pressures on 
the boundary spanning roles that affect their job satisfaction and performance 
(Lysonski, 1985). 
The literature distinguishes between two key types of boundary spanning: informa-
tional and representational (Adams, 1976; Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Tushman & 
Scanlan, 1981). The information roles are responsible for transmitting information 
and ideas between outside and inside the organisation (Fleming & Waguespack, 2007; 
Leifer & Huber, 1977). The representation roles are focused on activities such as sales 
and procurement (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981), but can also maintain or increase the 
political influence of an organisation and perform a mitigating function between the 
focal organisation and the third parties (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Friedman & Po-
dolny, 1992). Most of the discussion of the boundary spanners’ skills to date centres 
on those relating to the information role.  
Employees in both the informational and representational boundary spanning roles 
are affected by the uncertainty of the environment within which they operate (Aldrich 
& Herker, 1977). Defined in terms of turbulence, change and the nature of causal 
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relationships (Duncan, 1972), high uncertainty increases the amount of information 
that needs to be processed by boundary spanners and the time needed to make deci-
sions (Boulton, Lindsay, Franklin, & Rue, 1982). Uncertainty exacerbates the role 
conflicts (Lysonski, 1985; Lysonski & Woodside, 1989), decreases job satisfaction and 
negatively affects performance (Lysonski & Woodside, 1989). 
Boundary spanners in representational roles face an additional source of uncertainty 
and pressure in projects with a limited lifespan (e.g. short-term R&D alliances or con-
struction projects). In such projects boundary spanners face pressure to build rela-
tionships with outside parties in a fast manner and maintain them at the level appro-
priate to a particular exchange situation, under conditions of “co-opetition” (Lambe, 
Spekman, & Hunt, 2000). There is a possibility that collaborators at one point of time 
can turn into competitors at another point of time. Therefore, boundary spanners 
should be cautious about sharing information that may later be abused by the compe-
tition; they should also have a prepared “exit strategy” for projects that are inherently 
short-lived (Lambe et al., 2000). 
The skills of the boundary spanning individuals are a vital asset responsible for their 
performance. For instance, these skills affect the level of trust other organisations 
experience in relation to the boundary spanners (Perrone et al., 2003), the amount of 
information they are able to process (Dollinger, 1984; Lysonski, 1985), and the quality 
of inter-organisational exchange (Williams, 2002). Boundary spanners’ abilities and 
skills are thus linked to the organisation’s ability to counteract the effects of environ-
mental challenges: “An organisation’s ability to cope with environmental constraints 
depends in part on the ability of role incumbents to achieve a compromise between 
organisational policy and environmental constraints, to choose strategic moves to 
overcome constraints, or to create conditions in which the organisation’s autonomy is 
seldom challenged” (Aldrich & Herker, 1977: 223). Among the characteristics of suc-
cessful and efficient boundary spanners cited in the literature are flexibility, extrover-
sion, tolerance of ambiguity, self-assurance, need for visibility and savoir faire, need 
for achievement, being a locus of control, leadership and independence, risk-taking, 
and integrative complexity (Dollinger, 1984; Williams, 2002).  
Yet, to our knowledge there has been little dedicated research so far into the compe-
tences that help the boundary spanners of the representation type to overcome the 
environmental uncertainty and role pressures, although such competences are vital 
for the success of inter-organisational relationships and of work undertaken in col-
laboration with third parties. Since boundary spanners in representation and informa-
tion roles perform different functions, the skills required for their successful per-
formance are also likely to be different. A need for more research, in particular with 
regard to competences related to dealing with the outside parties, has been noted ear-
lier: “There needs to be more specific evidence to link the use of a particular set of 
competences or collaborative behaviour to outcomes.” (Williams, 2002: 121). 
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In the next subsection we briefly review the literature on a specific type of boundary 
spanner (project managers) in the construction industry in order to obtain more con-
text-specific insights into their skills. 
5.2.3. Uncertainty and project managers’ skills in 
construction projects 
Today organisations increasingly work together on a project basis, targeting specific 
challenges and exploring explicitly-defined business opportunities. Project-based in-
ter-organisational arrangements are widespread in many areas, including building con-
struction (Gardiner & Simmons, 1998), inter-organisational information system de-
velopment (Levina, 2005), oil exploration (Våland, 2002), and the development of 
cutting edge high-tech products (Lambe et al., 2000). Such projects require a high 
level of interaction between parties and are inherently collaborative (Wilson, 1995).  
In comparison with the projects in other industries, e.g. in manufacturing, projects in 
the construction industry are prone to a multitude of contingencies as the environ-
ment in which they are executed is less controllable (Galbraith, 1973). Almost every 
project in construction is unique and tailor-made, which makes project design, plan-
ning and execution crucial. The literature has identified two major sources of uncer-
tainty in construction projects. First, due to the unique nature of the projects, estimat-
ing resources and time needed to accomplish the related work can be challenging 
(Missbauer & Hauber, 2006). For example, in a project that requires redesign and 
renovation of a historical building, the number of people and time needed to remove 
interior walls is hard to estimate before starting the actual work if the thickness of the 
walls and the characteristics of the material they are made of are not precisely known. 
For buildings constructed over a hundred years ago the original drawings of the 
building design and the specifications of the materials are not necessarily available. 
Second, the project environment per se is a source of contingencies, such as conflicts 
between the project stakeholders due to the differences in their interests and goals, to 
changes of project specifications by the client; and to failures of sub-contractors 
(Söderholm, 2007). These characteristics create challenges in construction projects, 
specifically for the individuals in the role of project managers (Edum-Fotwe & 
McCaffer, 2000; Söderholm, 2007).  
In order to cope with the challenges of the projects, construction project managers 
need to possess a range of technical and administrative skills, which include planning, 
schedule control, cost estimation, quality control, performance reporting, risk identi-
fication and organisational planning (Edum-Fotwe & McCaffer, 2000). Also, due to 
the contingency-prone nature of construction projects as well as to the fact that con-
struction project organisations consist of people with different and some times con-
flicting interests (Loosemore, 1998), skills such as leading, communicating, negotiat-
ing and problem-solving are given an especially high importance (Edum-Fotwe & 
McCaffer, 2000).  
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Several studies have investigated the approaches employed by project managers to 
deal with other project stakeholders and contingencies. One study identified four 
broad practices project managers use to handle unexpected events: innovative action, 
detachment strategy, intensive meeting schedules, and negotiation of project condi-
tions (Söderholm, 2007). Another study stressed the ability to recognize and deal with 
the political aspects of construction projects (Pinto, 2000). Another study related a 
number of negotiation styles to specific negotiation outcomes in the construction 
industry (Cheung, Yiu, & Yeung, 2006). The authors found that such styles as obligat-
ing, dominating and avoiding are less relevant to functional outcomes. By contrast, 
integrating is found to be a way to achieve functional outcome, and compromising is 
found to help resolve disputes (Cheung et al., 2006). A number of guidelines for suc-
cessful bargaining have been identified as a result of an exploratory study of four 
construction projects: information management, avoidance of the coercive imposition 
of solutions, achieving a common definition of the disputed matter, being cautious 
about allocating blame, being cautious about temporary coalitions, considering the 
structure of project teams, and being cautious about goal inflexibility (Loosemore, 
1999). 
Yet so far the construction management literature seems to have lacked a dedicated 
analysis of the relationships-related competences of project managers, specifically 
with regard to how differences in the levels of such competences account for the 
differences in the levels of relationships of project managers with the clients’ side as 
well as in the performance of the projects. The present study aims to close this gap 
by conducting a longitudinal exploratory investigation of the competences employed 
by project managers to deal with specific challenges during the execution phase of a 
complex building renovation project, and relating these competences to specific rela-
tional and performance outcomes. 
 
5.3. Theoretical Framework 
5.3.1. The impact of reverse auctions on boundary 
spanners  
Our investigation has an exploratory nature, which is a consequence of a lack of theo-
retical knowledge on boundary spanners’ relational exchange competences and their 
role in the project execution stage. Yet, since some of the theoretical constructs with 
which the relational exchange competences are likely to interact have been established 
from the literature review and since we also investigate the effect of reverse auctions 
on boundary spanners, some elaboration on the theoretical background is possible. In 
this subsection we first introduce a typical setting in which construction projects take 
place and then elaborate on the relevant theoretical constructs.  
A typical setting for a building construction project involves the client hiring an archi-
tect (often an architectural design company) who develops a specification for a build-
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ing to be designed or renovated. The design phase is often carried out in collabora-
tion with other parties, such as installation advisors or interior designers. When the 
design has been approved by the client, potential contractors (e.g. constructing and 
installations companies) are shortlisted and invited for a tender of negotiations. A bid 
in a tender involves submission of a sealed bid with prices for the items listed in the 
bill of quantities. The winner is as a rule the bidder with the lowest price. During the 
project execution phase, the architect usually oversees the project, representing the 
interests of the client. On the contractors’ side the architect interacts with the con-
struction project managers to coordinate and monitor project activities.  
As outlined in the literature review, construction project managers are responsible for 
a variety of activities, many of which require them to span organisational boundaries. 
In particular, they often work at the site of the client organisation when that organisa-
tion continues to operate; they have to coordinate activities with the project managers 
of other companies involved in construction, e.g. installation companies; and they 
have to discuss the progress with the architect and implement changes to the plans 
and construction design, if necessary.  
In order to investigate the impact of reverse auctions on the contractors’ project 
managers during the execution stage, we consider this through the prism of the 
boundary spanning theory. The main reasons for focussing specifically on the con-
tractors’ side is that we expect contractors’ project managers to be much more af-
fected by the outcomes of reverse auctions (e.g. when the auction price is low) than 
the boundary spanners on the client’s side.  
The literature on boundary spanning is rooted in the role theory, according to which 
most of their time individuals perform distinct social roles: these roles are defined by 
the expectations produced by role senders, who are the individuals with whom the 
individual occupying a particular role interacts (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Since the activi-
ties of boundary spanners involve interaction with individuals both outside and inside 
their organisations, boundary spanners are subject to conflicting expectations relating 
to their activities from within and outside of their organisations. In the case of a con-
struction project manager these are likely to be, on one hand, the expectations of the 
project owner’s side that the project is going to be executed within the agreed time-
line and budget and according to the quality level specified in the contract 
(Trigunarsyah, 2004). On the other hand, the project manager is expected to execute 
the project so that the company earns a profit, or to minimize losses if the project is 
carried out in an unfavourable economic environment. 
We maintain that this contradiction between a) the need to carry out a construction 
project under conditions of constrained resources and time and b) the need to secure 
his company’s margin results in the project manager’s role constraints, reducing his 
manoeuvring space for successfully performing his work. The role constraints can be 
further aggravated by the environmental uncertainty that often plagues construction 
projects (Galbraith, 1973; Missbauer & Hauber, 2006). Unanticipated events, such as 
changes in the client’s needs, unexpected complications at the construction site or 
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changes in the governmental regulations can all make it harder for a construction 
manger to comply with the contract terms and margin requirements, resulting in a 
poorer performance. Consequently, construction project manager’s role constraints 
will make it more challenging to develop and maintain constructive inter-
organisational relationships, as the economic pressure will limit his ability to negotiate 
with and make concessions to the other parties. We graphically display the logic of 
this discussion in the research framework in Figure 5-2.  
At this point it is worth recalling that boundary spanners, in particular individuals 
occupying project management roles in the construction industry, are expected to 
possess a wide range of skills to cope with technical, administrative and interpersonal 
issues. The literature draws connections between boundary spanners’ skills and the 
different aspects of performance (Dollinger, 1984; Lysonski, 1985; Perrone et al., 
2003; Williams, 2002). In particular, it is suggested that an organisation depends on 
boundary spanner’s skills with regard to achieving a balance between the needs of the 
organisation and environmental constraints (Aldrich & Herker, 1977). 
As a starting point in the investigation of the construction project managers’ compe-
tences? related to dealing with other project stakeholders and project contingencies, 
we use the concept of relational exchange competence (Day, 1995; Lambe et al., 
2000). Although previously defined only at the level of organisations, relational ex-
change competence is identified as one of the antecedents of relational norms (flexi-
bility, solidarity and information exchange) in inter-organisational exchange (Lambe 
et al., 2000). Partners who possess relational exchange competence are believed to be 
able to develop these relational norms more rapidly. Relational exchange competence 
helps “shortcut the process necessary to establish the working norms” that are 
needed for functional inter-organisational relationships (Lambe et al., 2000). 
 
 
Figure 5-2. Research Framework of Chapter 5. The effect of reverse auction 
outcome on boundary spanners’ role constraints and the role of boundary 
spanners’ relational exchange competences in moderating the effect of role 
constraints on inter-organisational relationships and project performance. 
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However, relatively scarce details on the nature of the relational exchange compe-
tence and its mechanism are available in the literature. Day (1995) describes relational 
exchange competence as an organisational level capability that is based on experience 
and is a part of the organisation’s core competence, allowing the organisation to per-
form ahead of the competition in managing relational exchange. This involves select-
ing exchange partners and negotiating with them, designing the relationships mechan-
ics and monitoring the fit of the relationship to the changing environment (Day, 
1995). 
Despite the fact that the concept of the relational exchange competence is quite 
vaguely defined in the preceding literature, it seems to capture in general terms one 
important capability at the organisational level: developing and maintaining aspects of 
functional inter-organisational relationships such as relational norms. Therefore, we 
will use this concept the starting point of our inductive investigation of the compe-
tences at the level of boundary spanners. We will aim at inductively deriving dimen-
sions, or, more precisely, particular relational exchange competences, providing the 
definitions and relating these competences to particular relational and performance 
outcomes. The following definition of competence* is adopted: “an underlying char-
acteristic of a person in that it may be a motive, trait, skill, aspect of one’s self-image 
of social role, or a body of knowledge which he or she uses” (Boyatzis, 1982: 21). 
The next section provides details on the methodology of this study. 
 
5.4. Methodology  
5.4.1. Longitudinal case study  
In order to answer the research questions we have chosen a longitudinal exploratory 
case study design for the empirical investigation. A case study allows for the gathering 
of rich data on the phenomenon under investigation, including the data on the con-
text in which the phenomenon occurs (Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 2002). The exploratory, 
or inductive, type of case study is particularly useful when theory building is the goal 
of a research effort (Yin, 2002). In our case the inductive approach is appropriate 
because the body of knowledge on the effect of auctions on boundary spanners’ role 
constraints and, especially, the body of knowledge on boundary spanners’ relational 
exchange competences, is not sufficiently developed to permit a deductive, hypothe-
sis-testing investigation. In these circumstances, an inductive case study method 
would allow the tracing of the nature and workings of the boundary spanners’ rela-
tional exchange competences in great depth and detail, which is necessary to induc-
tively build up a basis for a theory. 
Investigation of the effect of auction outcomes as well as of the role and effect of 
boundary spanners’ competences during the project run requires the observation of 
causal relationships within and across a number of situations in which such effects 
manifest themselves. Such investigation is best served by a longitudinal type of study. 
128
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
114
The longitudinal aspect provides a rationale for a single case research design, due to 
its ability to deal with theory that examines the change in certain conditions over time 
(Yin, 2002). It also improves the measurement validity and provides more space for 
alternative interpretations of data (Franz & Robey, 1984).  
More specific rationales for using a longitudinal case study design are connected with 
the nature of the investigated phenomenon. Studying relational exchange compe-
tences, i.e. something that has to do with the dynamic realm of inter-organisational 
relationships, requires observation of the relationships during the process of their 
development, including changes in environmental characteristics and consequences of 
specific actions. Relationships may develop in an incremental way, where “for exam-
ple, a small investment in the relationships by one party might increase the trust of 
the other party. With greater trust, the other party makes a larger investment that in-
creases the trust of the first party” (Weitz & Jap, 1995: 311). Finally, collecting data 
on processes as they take place helps to avoid reporting bias, which can be an issue 
when respondents have to report on a number of episodes that have occurred at dif-
ferent points of time along the duration of a project. 
5.4.2. Case selection and data collection 
In choosing a suitable case we used theoretical sampling strategy to enable generaliza-
tion to theory, as recommended by the methodological literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Yin, 2002), rather than statistical sampling that is appropriate for generalizing from 
sample to population. From this perspective, an ideal case should allow for access to 
the respondents and the research site(s) over the extended time of a longitudinal case 
study, and for observing and assessing the theoretical phenomena in question (auc-
tion outcomes, boundary spanners’ pressures, boundary spanners’ relational exchange 
competence and project performance). Naturally, we were interested in a case where 
the contracts for construction services were allocated by means of online reverse auc-
tions. In September 2005 we were introduced to the key stakeholders of an appropri-
ate project by NegoAuction, a company that provides procurement services based on 
its proprietary online reverse auction platform.  
A case that satisfied the above conditions was a project for the remodelling and reno-
vation of the headquarters of a municipal agency in Amsterdam, undertaken in 2005-
2007. The initial project plan was based on the expected project duration of around 
two and a half years. We constrained our investigation and analysis to Phase One of 
the project, which had to be accomplished by April 2006 with the delivery of a facility 
that was crucial in the services infrastructure of the Agency, had a high political im-
portance and represented in itself an independent module in the whole renovation 
and remodelling project. The timeline of the project as captured by the present case 
study is presented in Figure 5-3. 
The data collection efforts spread across ten months of the field study, from Septem-
ber 2005 to July 2006. The data collection was divided into three stages, as shown in 
Figure 5-3, and focused on a) the auctioning and start-up stage of the work; b) the 
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project and relationships dynamics at a more mature stage of Phase One and c) the 
final stage of Phase One.  
Twenty-eight interviews were conducted. We conducted interviews and follow-up 
interviews of contractors’ project managers, employees of the client organisation, a 
foreman, architects, an installation consultant, procurement consultants and the em-
ployees of an organisation that provided the software for reverse auctions and organ-
ised the auction event. The interviews were semi-structured: the design of the inter-
view guide was evolving as the project progressed and the data collection focus was 
adjusted. Detailed field notes were taken during the interviews, and all interviews 
were tape-recorded and transcribed (and translated from Dutch into English, when 
necessary) shortly afterwards. Some of the interviews were followed by a phone call 
and/or email. The details of these interviews are provided in Table 5-1.  
Apart from the interviews, we also employed other sources of data, such as partici-
pant observations (all at the Agency’s premises), documents (planning diagrams, 
meeting minutes, company leaflets) and corporate websites. Observation 1 (Figure 
5-3) took place on the day of the auction event: one of the researchers was allowed to 
be present during bidding for Lot 2 at the Agency’s premises. Observation 2 took 
place during a meeting of the construction team (including representative of the 
Agency, two contractors’ project managers and representatives of the architectural 
and installation consulting companies: see Table 5-2) at the Agency’s premises. Plan-
ning diagrams and meeting minutes were particularly insightful as they allowed us to 
trace the project’s actual progress against the planning and related project stages to 
the specific actions of boundary spanners. They also provided additional information 
for triangulation with the interview data. 
 
 
Figure 5-3. The Agency headquarters renovation and redesign project bench-
marks and case study data collection. 
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5.4.3. Case introduction 
The present case study focuses on a building re-design and renovation project com-
missioned by a municipal healthcare agency based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 
Founded in 1901, the Agency is the oldest and the largest municipal healthcare or-
ganisation in the Netherlands and employs around 1,200 people working in 35 loca-
tions across Amsterdam. The Agency is responsible for a range of activities in the 
domain of public healthcare, including the ambulance service, the maintenance of a 
central emergency room for all emergency services in Amsterdam, parent and child 
centres and a pest control service, etc. The infectious diseases arm of the Agency 
takes care of the treatment of contagious diseases such as measles and meningitis, 
provides vaccinations for travellers abroad and maintains an outpatients’ clinic for 
sexually transmitted diseases. The latter, further referred to as “the Clinic”, provides 
anonymous examination and treatment to over 22,000 visitors on a yearly basis.  
Several hundred Agency employees are based at its Amsterdam headquarters: an 8-
storey, 19th century building that has the status of a “Rijksmonument” (i.e. national 
monument) and is protected by law. Some of the Agency’s mission-critical facilities, 
such as the regional microbiological laboratory, are also located in the main headquar-
ters building and several smaller adjacent buildings. 
In the years before 2005, the conditions of the headquarters building had become 
increasingly unsatisfactory for the Agency due an outdated internal infrastructure, the 
evolving demands of the tenants, pressure on efficiency and rising workspace stan-
dards. In response to this situation, the Agency decided to remodel and renovate its 
headquarters. 
Apart from the interior remodelling and redecoration (including changes in the layout 
of some of the rooms, plastering, etc) and replacement of water pipes, data networks, 
upgrade of the air-circulation systems and replacement of the canteen and kitchen 
equipment, the project included relocation of the Clinic from a site in Amsterdam to 
the headquarters building. Challenges to the Clinic relocation were related not only to 
preparing a new space and physically relocating the Clinic. The relocation had to be 
well planned and announced well in advance, as the Clinic operates largely on a con-
fidential and anonymous basis (i.e. the Agency did not have its clients’ contact infor-
mation) and therefore not all the patients or clients could be directly informed about 
the relocation. This imposed additional importance on the strict compliance with the 
project plan.  
In addition, the senior management of the Agency had substantial commitments to 
donors and the public with regard to the timely delivery of the Clinic. James, the head 
of the Agency’s Facility Management Department, considered the Clinic a key deliv-
ery of Phase One, and repeatedly emphasized the importance of its delivery on time: 
132
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
118
 
James (October 2005): “But you have to realize that the Clinic is not up for negotia-
tion. We made this clear from the beginning. Not for negotiation planning-wise. But 
the rest, everything that’s going on with the permit, things that cannot go on the roof 
and new type of design that we have to make – this is going to change a little bit… 
But the Clinic will have to be ready on March, 17, whatever happens.” 
 
Table 5-2. Parties involved in the Agency headquarter redesign and renovation pro-
ject
31
.  
Party Description Representatives Involved in 
proj. execution  
The Agency Municipal healthcare or-
ganisation based in Am-
sterdam; headquartered in a 
historical building close to 
the city centre. 
James, Head of Facil-
ity Management Dept 
Wouter, Head of 
Housing  
Jan, foreman 
Yes 
Architects Co Company hired by the 
Agency to design and man-
age its headquarters redes-
ign and renovation project.  
Kenny, Director 
Ron, Vice-director 
Frank, Project man-
ager. 
Yes 
Installation 
Advisors Co 
Installations consulting 
company; involved before 
the auction in the design 
phase; involved as a con-
sultant at the execution 
phase. 
Willem, Director Yes 
Procurement 
Co  
Procurement consultancy 
with experience of organis-
ing European tenders. 
Ron, Consultant No 
NegoAuction Provider of online reverse 
auctions platform 
Jan, Director 
Elliot-Jan, Consultant 
No 
ConCo Construction company Patrick, Director 
Ronald, Project man-
ager 
Yes 
InCo Installations company Elliot, Director 
Bobby, Project man-
ager 
Yes 
                                                
31 Pseudonyms were used instead of most of the people’s and companies’ names in order to 
preserve confidentiality. 
133
 
 
 
  
Impact of Auctions on Project Execution 
 
 
119 
 
The overall building space to be remodelled and renovated represented around 50% 
of all facilities occupied by the Agency in Amsterdam. According to estimations made 
prior to the tender, the monetary value of the project exceeded 9 million EUR.. The 
project was divided into three parts, which had to be carried out in parallel but repre-
sented three separate contracts: building construction, installation of electro-technical 
equipment, and installation of the air-circulation system and utilities. The latter two 
contracts also included ten-year maintenance commitments.  
Within the Agency, the leading role in setting up and conducting the renovation and 
remodelling project belonged to the “Afdeling Facilitair Bedrijf”, i.e. the Facility 
Management Department. This department was responsible for the success of the 
project and managed the relationships with all external parties involved in it. 
Several other parties were contracted to devise specifications and planning for the 
headquarters renovation and remodelling project. Architects Advisors and Project Manag-
ers Co (further referred to as Architects Co), a construction design and project manage-
ment bureau, was responsible for the detailed design of the construction part of the 
project and subsequent project management. Installation Advisors Co (further referred 
to as Installation Advisors), an installations design and consulting company, produced 
detailed specifications and drawings of the two parts of the installation works, i.e. 
Elektrotechnisch (electrical and data networks, wirings, light, etc.) and Werktuigbou-
wkundig (air-conditioning and utilities).  
The three contracts for the project were allocated by means of an online reverse auc-
tion event on September 9, 200532. In each of the three auctions three bidders took 
part: as a result, the construction contract was allocated to ConCo, a construction 
company, and InCo, an installation company, won the two auctions for electrical and 
utilities installations contracts. 
ConCo is a relatively small Dutch construction company with over 30 years on the 
market, specialized in construction and remodelling work in the healthcare sector. Its 
primary clients are hospitals and medical laboratories. ConCo is a part of a major 
Dutch construction holding with several billion EUR of turnover.  
Ronald is an experienced project manager, in his forties, working for ConCo for sev-
eral years. He started his career as an auto mechanic and later moved into construc-
tion.  
InCo is a Dutch subsidiary of a publicly-traded pan-European engineering company 
with several billions EUR of turnover. InCo has a regional office in the central Neth-
erlands focused on electrical engineering projects in building construction. 
                                                
32
 The auctions will be discussed in detail in Section 5.5. 
134
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
120
Bobby, the InCo’s project manager, is in his thirties and has been working as a pro-
ject manager for the last 7 years. Just like Ronald from ConCo, he was an auto me-
chanic early in his career.  
In construction projects, project owners (clients) are not actively involved in opera-
tions during the construction stage. In our case, Architects Co acted as the project 
owner’s agent, a role that encompassed the management of relationships with the 
contractors on the Agency’s behalf, ensuring the compliance of the work progress, 
scope and quality levels with the specifications, planning and contractual terms, and 
also resolving disputes. Further in the discussion we will refer to the Agency, Archi-
tects Co and Installation Advisors jointly as the “project owner side”. However, the 
employees and management of the Facility management Department were still in-
volved in some communication with the contractors over operational issues as well as 
in biweekly construction team meetings. At the same time, intensive communication 
between the contractors and advisors took place on a daily basis.  
Table 5-2 contains a brief description of all parties involved in the project at different 
stages. 
5.4.4. Analytical strategy 
In order to produce an “analytical generalization” (Yin, 2002) we went through sev-
eral steps in the analysis, from the raw data to theoretical concepts and the specifica-
tion of causal relationships. The steps in this analytical process are similar to the ones 
undertaken in other inductive case studies of IS and organisational phenomena 
(Levina & Ross, 2003; Sabherwal, Hirschheim, & Goles, 2001). The intermediate and 
final deliveries of the analysis were also roughly in line with Pettigrew’s three types of 
analysis output: analytical chronology, diagnostic case and theoretical case. 
Step 1. Analysis of raw data. Prior to starting the fieldwork we developed a set of codes 
on the basis of the main relevant streams of literature and a set of the sensitizing be-
liefs as suggested by (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Because in our longitudinal case 
study the gap between the first and last interviews had been expected to exceed one 
year, we started coding the interview transcripts soon after the first interviews had 
been carried out. This also allowed us to update the list of codes in the course of the 
analysis, as new information was acquired and some of the sensitizing beliefs were 
adjusted. 
As the coding progressed, the interview transcripts were re-arranged and relevant 
chunks of data were grouped according to the themes of the assigned codes. For cod-
ing and regrouping the data we used a software tool for qualitative data analysis At-
las.ti. The total size of interview transcripts exceeded 200 pages.  
The causal links emerging within and between the themes were turned into a visual 
form and analyzed by the means of causal diagrams (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
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Step 2. Initial case write-up. Bringing the analysis of the raw interview data to a higher 
abstract level overlapped with the development of the first iterations of case study 
write-ups, which were used for producing reports for different stake-holders of the 
building redesign and renovation project. Different versions of the reports were pre-
pared, for example, for the Agency and for the two contractors. This was done in 
order to maintain confidentiality of sensitive information.   
The company reports were sent to the study participants, and then discussed over the 
phone or in personal meetings. The feedback provided validation of the relationships 
between the emerging concepts, and contributed several new insights.  
Step 3. Producing analytical generalizations. The next step was moving from the initial case 
write-ups to a theoretical case. The process involved intensive collaboration and go-
ing through a number of iterations of the case with a number of parties. The work 
regarding the data processing and analysis was conducted by the author under the 
supervision of two senior faculty members. This group of researchers would periodi-
cally meet to discuss the progress and challenge each other with new ideas and alter-
native explanations of the observed phenomena. One of the more mature versions of 
the theoretical case was presented to a group of academic colleagues at a research 
seminar, and the feedback resulted in further revisions of some of the constructs and 
links between them. Overall, one year passed between the earliest and latest versions 
of the theoretical case, with several iterations occurring in-between.  
In order to systematically examine project managers’ role constraints and relational 
exchange competences in interaction with their context, we used the Pettigrew’s con-
textualist approach (Pettigrew, 1990), which encompasses several key elements: 1) 
embeddedness of the phenomenon under investigation in multiple interconnected 
levels of analysis; 2) temporal interconnectedness, i.e. locating and investigating the 
phenomenon in past, present and future time; 3) mutual influence of context and ac-
tion and the need to explore both in their interrelation; 4) development of “holistic 
and multifaceted” explanation of the phenomenon, rather than explanations based on 
singular and/or linear causation (Pettigrew, 1990). Below we explain how each of Pet-
tigrew’s elements was realized in the context of our study. 
First, in the present research the discussion of relational exchange competences and 
their outcomes considered two levels of analysis: individual (project manager) level 
and project level. The boundary spanner level is addressed by the discussion of the 
impact of reverse auctions on boundary spanners’ pressures, as well as by the discus-
sion of relational exchange competences. The project level is represented by the dis-
cussion of the project performance. An interplay between these two levels of analysis 
is inherent to explanation building. 
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Figure 5-4. The Agency headquarters renovation and redesign project and 
case study timeline. 
 
Second, the longitudinal nature of the empirical investigation allowed for observing 
and analysing temporal interconnectedness in explanation building. For instance, in 
order to reach conclusions with regard to the effect of auction outcomes on project 
managers’ role constraints we drew upon several situations at different points in the 
project run where these effects revealed themselves in the most visible ways. Simi-
larly, when considering project managers’ relational exchange competences we had to 
analyse their actions both within the context of preceding events (e.g. disputes over 
prices) as well as in relation to expectations of future events (e.g. forthcoming project 
milestones).  
Third, the mutual influence of the context and action was taken into account in the 
analysis of the impact of project contingencies (e.g. appearance of government rul-
ings) on the actions of the individuals in the construction project. The individuals 
would respond to the changes in the context by suggesting and negotiating changes in 
the building design and project plan that would further affect their work.  
Fourth, we were trying to produce a “holistic and multifaceted” explanation by chal-
lenging ourselves with alternative explanations of the observed phenomena. The al-
ternative explanations are presented in the Discussion section of this chapter.  
A final note that needs to be made with regard to the methodology is that one relat-
ing to the narrative. The case study format provides the researcher with an opportu-
nity to choose to arrange the narrative in a way that better displays the theoretical 
value of the empirical situation and findings (Van der Blonk, 2003). In order to avoid 
what has been called “death by data asphyxiation” (Pettigrew, 1990) and structure the 
case narrative, we adopted a technique that is similar to the narrative strategy of pre-
senting and analysing process data (Langley, 1999). For the purposes of arranging the 
narrative and making sense of the data, in describing the case study we focus on sev-
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eral situations during the execution stage (further referred to as “exchange episodes”) 
that are characterized by a high level of contingencies and/or escalation of relation-
ship between the parties. Focusing on such exchange episodes helps understand the 
behaviour of the boundary spanners under the influence of contingencies as well as 
the interaction and relationships between the parties. Figure 5-4 displays the exchange 
episodes in the context of the project and case study timeline.  
 
5.5. Reverse Auctions and Their Outcomes 
5.5.1. Auction preparation and bidding 
The so-called European procedure for tendering applied to the sourcing process due 
to the project size and the fact that the Agency is a municipal organisation. The pro-
cedure implies that the announcement of the tender has to be placed into a European 
tender database and exposed to potential participants in all 25 (at that time) EU 
member countries. About 30 companies expressed an initial interest in the project. 
The procedure consisted of three main stages. First, for each of the three auctions 
five participants were selected by Architects Co and the Agency, and allowed into the 
next round on the basis of their qualifications. Second, these semi-finalists submitted 
packages with more detailed information and their proposed prices. Prior to the third 
stage (auctions), the company with the highest price had to be excluded from further 
participation, which is a standard practice of tenders for construction services: there-
fore, four companies were allowed to bid for each of the three contracts. In reality, 
shortly before the submission of the packages, a company that was a finalist in all 
three auctions unexpectedly withdrew from participation33, leaving each of the three 
auctions with just three bidders. 
The third stage was the auction event that was prepared by NegoAuction, a provider 
of online reverse auction services, and Procurement Co, a procurement consultancy, 
and took place on September 9, 2005. Three distinct lots were auctioned consecu-
tively from approximately 9.30 am to 6.30 pm.  
The participants’ starting bids in the auction were those submitted at the previous 
tender stage. Minimum bid decrements in the three auctions were 30, 30 and 20 thou-
sand EUR respectively. The bidders did not have full information about the prices of 
their competitors. They could, however, observe their own current rank in the com-
petition and the monetary amount that separated them from the first place (if differ-
ent from zero). Further, the auctions were based on a price/quality scoring rule. The 
rule gave 95% weight to bid price and 5% to supplier quality score in bidding for the 
construction lot, and a 90%/10% ratio in bidding for the installation contracts. The 
                                                
33 The supplier claimed that it did not have enough manpower to prepare the necessary 
documents in time due to the summer holiday season. 
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scoring rules and quality score were determined and communicated to bidders prior 
to the auction.  
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Figure 5-5. Bidding for Lot One – the construction remodelling and renova-
tion contract. 
 
The bidding dynamics at the three auctions are presented in Figures 5.5-5.7. At the 
construction auction (Figure 5-5) there was no competition for the first place, as the 
bid submitted by one of the bidders, ConCo, was unrivalled. 
The final price of Lot One was above the initially-estimated cost. The difference be-
tween the estimated cost (EUR 2,364,631) and the winning bid (EUR 2,617,493) was 
EUR 252,862, i.e. the auction did not result in a price decrease compared to the esti-
mation. The price/quality scoring rule did not affect contract allocation due to a large 
gap between the winner’s bid and the bid of the closest competitor. 
Auctioning Lot Two, however, was more successful from the viewpoint of the tender 
team. Two suppliers were competing fervently for the first place for ten rounds, 
which resulted in a final price for the electrical equipment installation and mainte-
nance contract (EUR 3,260,000) being EUR 1,180,000, or 27% lower than the esti-
mation (EUR 4,440,000). Interestingly, the winner in this auction was not the lowest 
bidder (the winning bid was EUR 10,000 higher than the lowest competitor’s bid), 
due to the price/quality scoring rule (Figure 5-6). The winner’s quality score was 
83.7%, while Bidder 4’s quality score was 75.2%. Although the quality score ac-
counted only for 10% of the overall score, the implication of this difference was that 
Bidder 4 would have to propose a price below EUR 3,235,000 to rival the winner’s 
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bid of EUR 3,260,000. And, since the minimum bid decrement in bidding for this lot 
was EUR 30,000, the next possible bid for Bidder 4 was EUR 3,220,000.  
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Figure 5-6. Bidding for Lot Two – the electro-technical equipment installation 
and maintenance contract. 
 
The price of Lot Three (EUR 2,499,100) was EUR 219,100 higher than the estima-
tion (EUR 2,280,000), despite intensive competition between two of the three bidders 
(Figure 5-7). The bidding was won by InCo – the company that had also won bidding 
for Lot Two. In this case the quality score of Bidder 3, who was the second lowest 
bidder, was slightly higher than that of the winner, InCo (87.7% vs 85.6%). However, 
this difference was not enough to make up for the EUR 6,900 difference between the 
final bids of the two companies. Moreover, in order to secure the leadership Bidder 3 
would have to bid EUR 2,486,000 in the next round (bid decrement of EUR 20,000). 
All in all, savings from the three auctions totalled EUR 708,038 respective to the ini-
tial estimation of EUR 9,084,631. Compared to the starting price, the overall reduc-
tion was EUR 491,770. The overall result was seen as a moderate success by the 
Agency and the tender team, since not all individual auctions resulted in price reduc-
tion compared to initial estimations. 
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Figure 5-7. Bidding for Lot Three – the air-conditioning and utilities installa-
tion and maintenance contract. 
 
As a result of the bidding, the two winning contractors committed to hundreds of 
pages of specifications and drawings developed by Architects Co and Installation Ad-
visors Co for the construction and installation parts respectively. In addition, the 
winners had to submit detailed calculations with the types and prices of the construc-
tion and installations materials and equipment to be used in the projects. These calcu-
lations were approved by the Agency and external municipal bodies before the final 
commitment was made.  
5.5.2. Bidding strategies 
We had an opportunity to gain an insight into the valuations and bidding strategies of 
the winning bidders by interviewing their respective decision-makers. Both at ConCo 
(winner of the construction lot) and InCo (winner of the installation lots), company 
directors were responsible for bidding. The two directors, however, had different 
standpoints in relation to reverse auctions, which had profound effects on their re-
spective bidding strategies.  
Patrick, the Director of ConCo, saw auctions primarily as a “haggling” ritual. In his 
understanding, by making progressive price concessions during the bidding process a 
bidder creates an impression that whatever its price is, it is still “negotiable” and there 
is a space for further reduction: 
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Patrick (director of ConCo): “We call this… a Turkish market… I want to buy the 
shoes and you tell me 10 dollars – No, 5. – No, 9 – No, 6… That’s what we call 
“Turkish market”, haggling. It’s not a negotiation… I do not agree with that process.” 
 
The director was anxious that this approach to bidding would undermine the integrity 
of his company’s position during the project run: 
 
Patrick (director of ConCo): “You should say your price is your price; during the process 
you should maintain that vision. Because otherwise the discussion goes on…” 
 
Therefore, his decision was to bid his “valuation”, i.e. cost plus a standard profit mar-
gin:  
 
Patrick (director of ConCo): “When I thought of a strategy for the auction, I thought 
I’m not the Turkish guy with a leather case… I’m just a contractor and I know what is 
my price, what is the amount of money I want to have… So we approach it just like we 
give an envelope.” 
 
As a result, ConCo did win the auction by bidding its claimed valuation, but at a price 
considerably below its competitors. 
Quite an opposite approach was demonstrated by the second winner. InCo was 
gradually lowering its bid price until the competitors dropped out. InCo’s director 
Elliot fully realized the opportunity for ratchet bidding (Kamecke, 1998) based on an 
awareness of their own costs:  
 
Elliot (director of InCo): “All I’ve done during the auction is to calculate.  First I try to 
figure out the score of the other companies. [Interviewer: How?] When I see the figures 
change I assume who is saying and what they are saying, when I see people go down in 1, 
2, 1, 2 I know the strength of their score. So I can calculate that. When I knew that, I 
could calculate with our score, which I had received in advance, what the new price should 
be. And I knew how strong it was. I assumed somewhere a low price, which we had cal-
culated, that was the bottom. When I calculated the other scores back, they should be 
there. They could not get lower than that. (You assume your score was higher? [Inter-
viewer]) Yes, and I calculated, this was done here, I could predict the moment they should 
stop. And we had our price. And the price we got the job for was higher then the lowest 
price in a non-auction”. 
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Elliot repeatedly emphasized that the auction procedure allowed InCo to get a higher 
price than would have been the case in a sealed-bid auction (if the envelopes had 
been submitted): 
 
Elliot (director of InCo): “In a normal tender there is one single price which will give you 
the job, yes or no. It should be lower then we have it now. [Interviewer: so in an envelope 
tender you would have given that lower price?] Yes, you should have to. Because it’s only 
a one-time procedure… Every job you want to have, you have to make a good proposi-
tion about the price. The best proposition because it is only one you can do. So when you 
go to all the trouble of getting an invitation, you invest a lot of time to make the parts. 
And we only have one chance to get the job. So you have to point out your right price”. 
 
In essence, InCo was able to extract additional gains form the auction by following 
the dominant bidding strategy, whereas ConCo ended up by winning the project at 
the level of their valuation34. If ConCo had also used the dominant strategy of ratchet 
bidding, it might well have ended up by pocketing an additional EUR 450,000 (Figure 
5-5).  
One additional factor for InCo was that it had a complementary effect from bidding 
in two consecutive auctions. This allowed InCo to win both auctions by balancing 
gains and losses from the two: 
 
Elliot (director of InCo): “I independently bid on both [auctions], but when I knew I 
had won the auction of one, I used the advantage of that one to get the other one lower. 
So at the end it was a total price for me. We ended up with a price which was higher 
then I knew it should be. So I took that price advantage as an extra possibility to lower 
the other price when it was necessary.” 
 
5.5.3. Effect on role constraints 
Overall, as a result of the bidding InCo was likely to be better-off with regard to its 
profit margin than ConCo, as the bidding strategy of the former allowed it to retain 
some financial slack above the costs and minimal profit margin. However, we main-
tain that the role constraints resulting from the auction prices nevertheless were 
strong for both project managers. This is due to the fact that the overall market situa-
tion was unfavourable to contractors – this was the time of a buyer’s market, when 
construction companies were struggling with low demand, when a number of re-
spondents thought the auction prices were quite low, and when even InCo, that did 
                                                
34
 Here we assume that the respondents’ accounts of their valuation were honest. 
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relatively well in the auction compared to other bidders, had only a modest profit.  
The opinion was that ConCo was on the edge of losses in the project, perhaps as a 
result of price miscalculations. Unfortunately, we could not access the actual financial 
data of the companies as it was considered commercially sensitive information. 
It seems likely that the auction prices (and consequently the role constraints) were 
affected by the economic conditions of the construction market. At the time when 
the Agency was preparing and conducting its auction event, the economic conditions 
in the Dutch construction market were such that the capacities of the construction 
companies were in excess of demand for construction services. Respondents explic-
itly characterized the situation as a “buyer’s market”. This situation put the Agency in 
a strong negotiation position versus its suppliers, and was favourable for the use of 
the reverse auctions. This is how some of our respondents summarized the market 
conditions: 
 
Ron (Procurement Co BV, procurement consultant; September 2005): “We thought 
that there’s a lot of competition in this market, there’re a lot of suppliers who really want 
to bid for this interesting project …we think [thought] that the market is such that they 
want to have work, so there will be a lot of people to join the auction.” 
 
Willem (Installation Advisors Co, director; March 2006): “At this moment in Holland 
the prices are very low. A lot of firms are getting killed.” 
 
5.6. Project Execution, the Effect of Reverse 
Auctions and the Behaviour of Boundary Span-
ners 
In this section we first discuss the boundary spanning activities of the contractors’ 
project managers in the Agency headquarters renovation and redesign project. Then 
we focus on three exchange episodes (Figure 5-4) that highlight important bench-
marks during the contract execution phase and reveal the effects of reverse auction 
outcomes on project managers’ role constraints as well as their behavioural responses 
to such situations. 
5.6.1. Boundary spanning activity of contractors’ 
project managers 
The boundary spanning activity by Ronald and Bobby took many forms during the 
Agency’s headquarters renovation and redesign project. Both contractors’ project 
managers were in charge of coordinating their respective teams on the floor of the 
Agency’s building. This included monitoring the work progress against the plans, and 
144
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
130
controlling the work quality. The activities of the team onsite were complicated by 
the need to perform the work inside an organisation that was continuing its opera-
tions: the progress of the construction teams had to be coordinated with different 
departments of the Agency that had to relocated back and forth to allow the teams to 
perform the renovation and redesign work, and the level of the noise during the con-
struction work had to be monitored. 
The project managers had to be constantly in touch with each other in order to coor-
dinate the joint work of the installation and construction teams as well as with the 
other parties, such as Installation Consultants Co and Architects Co. The relation-
ships with the Architects Co were the most crucial as its employees had to manage 
the project on behalf of the Agency and as such to monitor the conformity of the 
contractors’ work with the plan, budget and quality level, as well as engage in coordi-
nating activities with the Agency’s Facility management and other departments re-
garding departments’ relocations?, providing access to different parts of the building, 
and so on.  
The construction team, consisting of the contractors’ project managers, the director 
of Installation Consultants Co, a project manager from the side of the Architects Co 
and the head of the Agency’s Facility management department, held biweekly meet-
ings where the project progress was evaluated and any relevant issues regarding plan-
ning, budget or quality were discussed.  
In the course of the case study interviews, it emerged that other project stakeholders 
placed a high importance on those individuals occupying project management roles in 
the contracting companies, and related the success of the whole project to the per-
formance of these individuals: 
 
Patrick, director of ConCo (Commenting on InCo): “You have so much [many re-
gional offices] of InCo - in Amersfoort and other places… It’s not the company, it’s 
the people [that account for the success of a project]. It does not matter if it is InCo or 
another party… It is a project manager from InCo who makes the job - that counts, 
not the company.” 
 
Willem, director of Installation Advisors Co (Commenting on one of the contractors): 
“It’s a very good firm but I always say that it is the people who are working for that 
firm make that firm or break it down… This is the man who is in charge, who is 
leading the project...” 
 
Tellingly, the importance of a good project manager was placed even above that of a 
particular company.  
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5.6.2. Project execution 
Exchange episode I. Plan renegotiation (October 2005 – November 
2005).   
Shortly after the work had started an unexpected development took place. According 
to the building design, the roof of the headquarters building had to accommodate a 
new, more powerful, air-conditioning system. However, a governmental body re-
sponsible for protection of historical monuments that oversees this kind of change 
refused to grant the permission due to the historical value of the building. 
The project ran into a bottleneck and a solution to the problem had to be found 
quickly, as the progress of the work on other parts of the building depended on the 
air-conditioning system and especially on the ventilation shaft that had to go through 
the building from the top all the way to the bottom. After several weeks of discus-
sions between James, Ron (Vice-Director of Architects Co) and Willem (director of 
Installation Advisors), an adjusted design was put forward. It was decided to install 
the air-conditioning equipment in an adjacent building. Consequential to this decision 
was the need to adjust the location of the ventilation shafts in the building. The adja-
cent building also had to undergo renovation, which increased the overall project 
budget.  
However, changing the design was only part of the solution. The adjusted design also 
had to be translated into a new work plan for the contractors, whose first reaction to 
the changes was to significantly increase the time requested to accomplish Phase One. 
The first version of the adjusted plan proposed by ConCo and InCo incorporated a 
delay to the delivery of the Clinic of approximately six weeks. This was not acceptable 
to the Agency, considering their obligations and political factors. Therefore, Archi-
tects Co responded with a counter-offer to cut the delivery time by six weeks: for this 
purpose, the sequence of tasks to be carried out during Phase 1 was rearranged. The 
contractors, however, still thought the plan was too tight. It was not until January 
2006 that the parties were able to settle for a compromise. In the final version of the 
plan the Clinic delivery was still delayed by about three weeks compared to the origi-
nal plan.  
The effect of auction outcomes  
The need to adjust building design and the project plan highlighted a twofold effect 
of auction outcomes on the contractor project managers’ role constraints. First, their 
willingness to increase the time needed to accomplish the Clinic was driven by the 
desire to avoid adding workers to their teams that would drive costs up for their 
firms. Second, the fixed price nature of the contract (which is not a direct conse-
quence of the auctions but it is strongly associated with this allocation mechanism 
(Bajari et al., 2006; Stark, 1974)) by its nature allows less flexibility in dealing with 
contingencies than do more flexible time-and-material contracts, thus aggravating 
project managers’ constraints in delivering the expected results.  
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Behavioural response of contractors’ project managers 
This situation revealed differences in the approach of the project managers of ConCo 
and InCo to the negotiations with the project owner side. Ronald of ConCo saw the 
unexpected changes to design and plan as impediments to the normal project run, 
defined by original specifications and plan. When discussing his negotiation behav-
iour, he explained to the interviewers that his initial rejection of the new plan was a 
result of a disagreement with the suggested terms (rather than a tactical intent to 
reach a compromise). 
Quite a different understanding of the negotiations was demonstrated by Bobby of 
InCo. Bobby saw the project as a “game” played by the customer and contractors, 
where parties consciously use negotiation strategies to reach a compromise solution. 
Bobby’s strategy was to deliberately overstate the need for extra time in the first ver-
sion of the adjusted plan, assuming that a similar strategy was being pursued by the 
other party. The goal was to reach a middle ground after several rounds of negotia-
tions involving mutual concessions. In such a “game”, parties’ behaviour was deter-
mined not so much by the formal routines of the project but by the understanding of 
the goals and behaviours of their counterparts: 
 
Bobby: “With the planning, you always have to learn this… The first planning [is 
done] with the thought that: “If I do something - you always have some criticism”. So, 
what you do with your first planning, we already knew in advance they would not 
agree. So, we thought we could do this, and than we added another 3 or 4 weeks, be-
cause they will be claiming them back. So, they send it back with the remark that is 
should be six weeks shorter. So, we say 6 weeks is too much. So, everyone starts mak-
ing a noise and then we agree on something in the middle, which is about the thing we 
had in mind at first. This is how it works in life right…”  
 
The outcome of such gaming behaviour looks more like a compromise solution than 
a win-lose situation. We call this behaviour ‘benevolent gaming’ and analyze it in 
more detail in Section 5.6.4. For the project owners and contractors this behaviour 
resulted in an intensive negotiation exercise and provided an opportunity to get to 
know each other better. On the contractor’s side, Bobby appeared to be more flexible 
and insightful in negotiations than Ronald.  
Exchange episode II. Price renegotiation (January – June 2006) 
In the construction industry the work is not part of the initial specification, but at the 
same time does not entirely fall outside the scope of the project handled by the means 
of change orders (‘meer- en minderwerk’ in Dutch). For example, this can be some 
previously-unanticipated details of the work (e.g. the soil is harder to excavate than 
expected) or new requests from the project owner. Contractors compose such change 
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orders, which are subject to approval by the client. However, more significant 
changes to the initial specifications can be more difficult to deal with if they can be 
argued to be a new project, rather than an extension of the main project. In this case, 
the terms of the initial contract (e.g. prices in the Bill of material) do not apply and 
new terms have to be negotiated. The key difference with the “meer- en minderwerk” 
is that the basis for price calculation (detailed prices for types of work and materials 
agreed upon at the tender) can be questioned.  
When it became known that the ventilation shaft had to be constructed in a different 
part of the building as a result of the permit denial, ConCo came up with a new calcu-
lation of the price for its own part of the work. To the surprise of the project owner’s 
side, the price of the shafts was EUR 145,000, a 3.5 times increase over the initial 
price of EUR 40,000. As a key reason for the large price change, ConCo suggested an 
error in its original calculations. Ronald also argued that building a shaft in a different 
place was equivalent to a new project, to which the base prices fixed in the tender 
would not apply.   
Architects Co reacted with indignation. Frank, the project manager responsible for 
the project from Architects Co’s side, believed the demand for the price increase was 
outrageous. He considered ConCo’s demand a clumsy attempt to cover some of the 
losses, which, in his opinion, ConCo incurred due to the low price of the project.  
After this clash, the communication between Ronald and Frank stalled. Frank refused 
to discuss this pricing issue as he felt the differences in the positions were too wide to 
be bridged on the manager’s level. As time was passing by, the argument was affect-
ing all project parties in terms of managerial time and effort spent to resolve it. The 
deadlock eased only after a special meeting in February 2006, at which James urged 
the parties to solve the problem, which he saw as a threat to the timely delivery of the 
Clinic. The parties had to agree to proceed with the construction of the shaft and to 
return to the discussion of the prices later on. The issue itself was not entirely re-
moved from the agenda until as late as June 2006, although the parties at that time 
were already discussing a compromise price of around EUR 50,000 – much less than 
initially demanded by ConCo. 
The effect of auction outcomes  
Unlike in Episode I, in Episode II ConCo was the only party suffering from the con-
tingency. However, the way that the auction outcome and contingency affected 
Ronald was similar to the situation in Episode I. Here, again, the constraints imposed 
on Ronald’s behaviour as a result of the auction outcomes manifested themselves, 
because the low contract price did not allow ConCo capacity to absorb the losses 
from the calculation mistakes and made Ronald look for ways to cover the loss. In 
addition, the fixed price nature of the contract did not allow ConCo to negotiate and 
allocate additional budget to the shafts as a cost-plus contract structure would have 
allowed (Bajari et al., 2006).  
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Behavioural response of contractors’ project managers 
An important effect of the argument over the shaft price was that it seemed to have 
undermined parties’ benevolence trust (Ganesan, 1994) in each other. The tactics 
adopted by Ronald resulted in a clash with the project owner’s side, and prevented 
him from getting support from the project owner’s side in jointly finding a compro-
mise solution:   
 
Frank (Architects Co): “When they make mistakes in calculations, like in this case, 
we always want to look with them what we can do about that… When they have 
really made a mistake in calculations, we can always go about it in another way, for 
instance by being less tough on them when negotiating other things... We can reduce 
damage to them, but not in this way. So it has to be a bit more like… we do it to-
gether, cooperative, but they also should trust us a bit that we won’t squeeze them 
[makes a squeezing sound] in the next two years.” 
 
Ronald, however, believed in voicing his concerns and trying to solve them on the 
spot, despite the arguments this tactic often provoked:  
 
The meetings are normal and healthy... And also in these meetings it is allowed to 
sometime smash heads. Because you should be able to tell one another clearly and hon-
estly what is the situation. That is what happens, we are doing that, so we do not 
speak Spanish… 
 
Bobby was not directly involved in the discussion of the shaft prices. However, his 
approach to potential conflicts with boundary spanners was somewhat different:  
 
Bobby (InCo): “Look, you are always dealing with people. How does someone on the 
opposite side of the table react when I say “Don’t be tough on me, it already costs me 
this much?”... Then if everyone is ok with it, then you have a good project. Well, yes, 
and if they are not, it has to come from some side. [It’s a bit of giving and taking], 
and how you exactly do this, when you do and when you don’t – that is a matter of 
feeling each other and seeing how the project works out. Look, you can start with lin-
ing up tough from the beginning “I need this, and that and bla-bla-bla” but you know 
it will bounce back at you because you have to deliver together.” 
 
Throughout Phase One of the project, Bobby had successfully applied these tactics in 
discussing issues regarding the installations specifications with Installation Advisors 
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Co. When Bobby would come across problems in the specifications he did not try to 
immediately use them to his advantage but saw an opportunity in such problems for 
achieving a mutually beneficial outcome (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007) in the longer 
run. Bobby worked together with Installation Advisors Co to solve such problems, 
expecting to be rewarded with easily-approved change orders at a later stage. We call 
this behaviour a relational exchange competence of reciprocity and explain it in more 
detail in Subsection 5.6.4. 
This episode shows that a failure to apply a flexible, accommodating negotiation 
strategy involving understanding of concerns of the other party, results in missed op-
portunities, increases management costs (as reported by the respondents) and de-
creases the benevolence trust.  
Exchange episode III. Relationship escalation (April – May 2006) 
Starting from October 2005 the construction team held biweekly meetings, at which 
they discussed operational issues such as work progress, compliance with the plan-
ning and budget, potential risks, etc. Frank or Ron (Architects Co), Ronald (ConCo), 
Bobby (InCo), Willem (Installation Advisors Co) and a few others were the usual par-
ticipants. At the meetings, Ronald often reported delays in ConCo’s part of the work, 
citing late changes to the interior design introduced by the customer as a key reason. 
InCo did not report similar issues at the meetings.  
At the meeting on March, 28, less than three week before the Clinic deadline, Ronald 
announced that a delay of 2 to 3 weeks was expected due to the alleged poor quality 
of the floor and plinths in the Clinic location. This was unacceptable to the Agency 
and Architects Co, and made them look for an ad hoc solution that would ensure the 
completion of Phase One on time. They rapidly engineered a twofold response. First, 
the workload was re-arranged again, so that ConCo could spare more resources to 
finish the Clinic on time. Second, it was decided to escalate the discussion to a higher 
management level and to call for a meeting with Patrick, the ConCo director. To 
strengthen the message, on the eve of the meeting Ron sent an official letter to Pat-
rick, warning them of sanctions in the case that the Clinic relocation deadline on May 
8 was not met. 
The meeting between James, Ron, Patrick, and Ronald took place on April 13. James 
and Ron started by expressing their concern over ConCo’s performance and empha-
sizing the need to finalize the work before the deadline. They drew attention to the 
lack of performance efforts on the part of ConCo, in particular, to poor planning at 
the manager’s and the floor levels. Patrick and Ronald argued that the delays were 
primarily caused by the late changes in the design that the Agency had made at the 
last moment. In the end, however, ConCo agreed to work overtime and during the 
weekends in order to avoid missing the relocation deadline.  
Another issue emphasized by James during the meeting was what he saw as under-
realized potential for process optimization of ConCo’s work at the Agency’s site. He 
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pointed out numerous instances where the work organisation could have been im-
proved if Ronald had taken a proactive approach. One example was the under-
utilization of trolleys used to deliver materials to the floor under construction. On the 
way back, these trolleys were empty, while, according to James, it would have been 
much more efficient to load them with construction waste that had to be later re-
moved anyway.  
The opinion on the project owner’s side was that the delays could at least partially be 
attributed to the passive attitude Ronald had to anticipating and solving problems. 
However, not all of these concerns were openly voiced at the meeting, as Ron and 
James did not want to further aggravate relationships with Ronald. After the meeting, 
both sides evaluated the results of the discussion as constructive, although it was uni-
versally acknowledged that escalating a problem to the director’s level was not good 
for the relationships between the two sides. 
The effect of auction outcomes  
The escalation of the Clinic delivery issue to the directors’ level was a result of delays 
that had been piling up on ConCo’s side. Some of the interviewees linked these delays 
to ConCo’s unwillingness to increase the size of its construction team on site, as well 
as to the quality of the team (ConCo once had to replace its foreman per request of 
the Architects Co). ConCo’s resources were constrained and their low profit margin 
(or negative one) prevented them from expanding their construction teams, even 
when this was needed. And the source of these resource constraints could be traced 
back to the auction outcomes, the low contract price, which had not left ConCo 
much financial slack in allocating their resources for the project.  
Behavioural response of contractors’ project managers 
The critical delay increased tensions in the relationships between the parties. Ronald’s 
standpoint towards the delays was that they were objective and unavoidable conse-
quences of the project contingencies, such as the Agency’s late design decisions. 
Moreover, he did not see such delays as having dramatic effects on the project or on 
relationships with his counterparts:  
 
Ronald (ConCo): “Of course, you do come across the fact that due to changes your 
work is done later than planned, but all problems are solvable.” 
 
Such an attitude, however, was not shared by other stakeholders, for whom the delays 
continued to undermine credibility trust in Ronald: 
 
James (the Agency): “I would from my side like some transparency so I can know 
what I can count on. But I still don’t know what I can count on. What I can count 
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on is that if we set a date at the planning – we are not going to make it. That is what 
I know, so I’m always fighting to make the two weeks, one week. To make the one 
week two days; to make the two days one day…” 
 
According to James, this was typical of Ronald’s attitude towards work-related issues 
that required initiative and forward-thinking. This is how James later commented on 
this issue, emphasizing that Ronald would only see a problem when explicitly pointed 
to it, which was a sharp contrast to Bobby’s proactive, sometimes even slightly ag-
gressive, approach to joint problem solving:  
 
James (the Agency): “You know where you see the big difference between Bobby and 
Ronald? Ronald says: “I understand your problem - I’m going to do my best and I al-
ready did my best”. And Bobby says: “You are bullshitting; I’m not going to do it 
that way.” - ”Why not?” - “Well because these are the risks…” - “Ah, ok, I have 
not seen it that way, you are right...” Then you are looking ahead… So, he dares to 
tell you where you go wrong and he does not go along with: “Ok, you are right, and 
I’ll do my best, I did my best and…” He goes on with “If we want to do this together, 
this is what I think…”  
 
Ronald, on the other hand, was hurt by the escalation of the problem with the Clinic 
delay to the management level. He saw this as an expression of low confidence in him 
as project leader: 
 
Ronald (commenting on the meeting on April, 13): “You build up tension when you 
at a certain point overrule the project leader and get his director involved. Because basi-
cally, you state by this action, that you do not have faith in the project leader. And 
that’s a shame”. 
 
This episode shows that, as the spiral of distrust continued to unfold between Ronald 
and the representatives of the client’s side, the relationships were further worsened by 
ConCo’s unsatisfactory performance in terms of meeting critical deadlines. Such a 
performance seems to have negative effects on competence-based trust as well as on 
relational norms between the parties. At least some of the roots of the problem lie in 
Ronald’s lack of initiative and forward thinking with regard to solving work-related 
issues (which can be contrasted by Bobby’s display of these qualities). We refer to 
possessing and using these qualities as a relational exchange competence of proactive-
ness, which we discuss in detail below.  
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In the meantime, the competence-based trust in Bobby was increasing because of his 
proactive approach to problem-solving, the good overall performance of InCo and, 
not the least, because of the contrast with Ronald. 
5.6.3. Project performance outcomes in Phase One 
After the meeting on April 13, ConCo assigned additional workers to the Clinic site. 
They worked during the weekends in order to catch up with the delivery schedule. 
With more workers, the progress was faster, and on April 30 the Clinic was finally 
ready for an acceptance inspection. InCo was able to finish the work in time and with 
a high quality level.  
The inspection, performed by the representatives of the Agency and Architects Co, 
however, found a number of issues of the work that did not conform to the specifica-
tions or showed a poor quality. One of these issues, for instance, was the ceiling in 
one of the rooms, which was only half-ready. The inspection team put together a list 
of such issues and passed it to ConCo for immediate fixing, which cost ConCo one 
more week to fix. When the relocation of the Clinic started, some of the workers 
were still finishing the last parts. 
By contrast, the quality of the work by InCo did not raise any concerns with the pro-
ject owner’s side, although their part of work was also significant and they had had to 
follow the pace of ConCo in their progress. 
Both ConCo and InCo had some amount of additional work due to design adjust-
ments and late design decisions by the Agency. However, these resulting amounts 
were not considered by the respondents (particularly, the employees of Architects 
Co) as anything beyond the normal level in construction projects. The overall budget 
for Phase One was still exceeded, but this overrun was attributed to the design ad-
justments that resulted from the denial of permits. 
The project owner’s side was quite critical in evaluating the work done by ConCo 
during phase one of the project:  
 
Frank (Architects Co): “It costs us too much time and money to get the contractor 
[ConCo] to do his work.”  
 
When asked whether he would have selected ConCo if in the beginning he had had 
the knowledge acquired during the project, Frank’s answer was strongly negative. The 
performance of InCo, on the other hand, did not provoke any dissatisfaction. When 
asked if they would choose InCo for the project, if they had a chance to go back in 
time to September 2005, our interviewees from the Agency and Architects Co re-
sponded with a definite “yes”. 
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Overall, differences in the performance between ConCo and InCo in Phase One were 
quite visible along the dimensions of quality and time, both of which are key in the 
construction industry. 
5.6.4. Analysis: relational exchange competences of 
project managers  
In this section we discuss three relational exchange competences of contractors’ pro-
ject managers that emerged during the interviews and subsequent analysis of the col-
lected data via numerous iterations. These are: benevolent gaming, reciprocity and 
proactiveness. Taken together, these three competences seem to capture most of the 
differences in the behaviour between the two project managers that were important 
in dealing with the role constraints. As these competences were emerging, we were 
trying to relate them, where possible, to the existing literature, as suggested by 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). These dimensions are discussed below. 
Benevolent gaming 
As demonstrated by Bobby in Exchange Episode I, being able to play “games” with 
the other parties is an important competence of a boundary spanner, especially at an 
early stage of a relationship. The term “game” was frequently used by several inter-
viewees (e.g. Frank, Bobby and Patrick, ConCo’s director). Our working definition of 
benevolent gaming is taking certain extreme positions as the negotiations progressed 
and then gradually surrendering these positions in the process of negotiation with the 
aim of achieving a compromised negotiation outcome. This type of behaviour is im-
portant for several reasons. First, it allows parties to build an understanding of the 
personalities and business qualities of their exchange counterparts and put these 
qualities to test. Secondly, it allows for the signalling of cooperative intentions, being 
at the same time relatively secured against the possible opportunism of the opposite 
party. Thus, benevolent gaming helps prepare the ground for establishing certain pat-
terns of cooperative norms between the parties. In fact, this is similar to the effect of 
“social lubrication” that helps make the further negotiations more effective and effi-
cient (Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 2002). Third, if successful, gaming 
behaviour allows parties to secure their own business interests without harming and 
alienating the other party. This is also important for future exchange interaction, as 
negotiators who have a “distributive” reputation (i.e. a reputation for being able to 
claim value) face more resistance in negotiations and achieve worse outcomes than 
negotiators without such a reputation (Tinsley, O'Connor, & Sullivan, 2002). In addi-
tion, taking a rigid position in negotiations, and aligning one’s own behaviour mostly 
with formal rules and instruction is a characteristic of a limited personal autonomy 
(Perrone et al., 2003). Such behaviour can alienate the counterparts, as shown by the 
example of Ronald in Exchange Episode II, during the negotiations over the price of 
the shafts. 
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A representative of the client’s side (January 2006): “Ronald is quite conservative per-
son. Well I’d say [he is] a prototype contractor. I think he’s not the type of a man for a 
job where you need to be very flexible and have to possess a long-term vision… I do not 
think he sees the impact of this type of game at this stage. I don’t think he sees what he 
does at this moment”. 
 
Gaming behaviour can be related to relational norms in that it promotes information 
exchange by means of intensive communication about parties’ respective negotiation 
positions and related issues, as well as flexibility, via the process of mutual adjust-
ment. 
Interestingly, when the results of the analysis were presented to one of the interview-
ees at a feedback session, he commented that gaming can also be about cheating: 
gaming becomes benevolent once the rules of the game become known to and shared 
by all parties involved, when all parties understand they are playing a game and make 
it cooperative. Perhaps, the emergence and adoption of a particular set of assump-
tions or rules regarding the mode of gaming depends in part of the individual styles 
of negotiators (Kern, Brett, & Weingart, 2005) and their improvisations during the 
first negotiation encounters (McGinn & Keros, 2002). 
As one author has noted in the construction project management literature, on the 
one hand contingencies during the construction projects can result in conflicts and 
deterioration of relationships, but on the other hand they provide opportunities for 
building trust and achieving cohesion between organisations (Loosemore, 1998). Pos-
sessing and displaying the competence of benevolent gaming at the initial stages of 
relationships helps a project manager to achieve his business goals in a cooperative 
manner, to create mutually beneficial outcomes, and establish patterns of cooperative 
norms for subsequent exchange episodes even when contingencies are frequent. 
The benevolent gaming competence resonates with the skills of influencing, bargain-
ing and negotiation emphasized as necessary in the toolkit of a “competent” bound-
ary spanner in an exploratory piece of research by Williams (2002). 
Reciprocity 
The second relational exchange competence that emerged from the data is reciproc-
ity. Reciprocal behaviour is conceptually different from gaming behaviour, as recipro-
cal behaviour emphasizes the need to give away certain benefits to the opposite party 
as a tactical move to invest in reciprocal relational norms and establish benevolence 
trust with that party. Unlike benevolent gaming, the purpose of which is to resolve an 
exchange situation at hand, reciprocal behaviour is primarily oriented towards the 
future, as by incurring a loss in one exchange episode and gaining in another, parties 
still can achieve a win-win result over the lifespan of a project. This insight is consis-
tent with the literature on the “shadow of the future”, which identifies expectations 
of the continuity of the exchange relationships as a driver of trust in a given exchange 
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situation (Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). Secondly, while the primary role of “gaming” 
is in the exploration and probing of the other parties (e.g. with regard to what level of 
relational norms it can be possible to achieve), reciprocity is more targeted at actually 
building relational norms and trust in its two forms, credibility and benevolence 
(Ganesan, 1994). It shows to the other party the readiness to sacrifice some immedi-
ate gains with an implicit or explicit expectation for reciprocation in future. Recipro-
cal behaviour is especially beneficial for building relationships if “giving” and “tak-
ing” have asymmetric value, so that a sacrifice by one party has a higher weight as a 
gain for the other party.  
Reciprocal behaviour is a competence Ronald seemed to lack in Exchange Episode 
II. If he had chosen to withdraw or constrain his claims for the shafts price increase 
in the very beginning of the dispute, the outcome of the price renegotiation might 
have been more favourable for ConCo (as Frank hinted).  
At the same time Bobby was able to secure more understanding with regard to 
change orders for InCo by deliberately taking an easy stand on certain shortcomings 
in the installation specifications made by Installation Advisors Co.: 
 
Bobby: “I have to work with a different group of people every year or two years, so after 
two months you know a lot about how people work. And if he [a person] is important 
for you, you have to agree with him a bit, because he does determine if you get your 
money or not. That is, I think one of the most important attributes of a project leader, 
that is that you have knowledge about the people; that you can see how somebody at the 
other side of the table is working. It is easiest to burn him to the ground, but if that is 
the person who decides whether you do or don’t get your money, then you are doing that 
at the wrong person. Well, a lot of people do not understand this very well…” 
 
Bobby: “Meerwerk in our case often is the result of a mistake of the advisor. When we 
solve this problem for them, we expect a flexible attitude of the advisor in cases of meer-
werk.” 
 
We argue that the competence of reciprocity promotes all three dimensions of rela-
tional norms. Information exchange and flexibility are enhanced, as the other party is 
expected to reciprocate in providing valuable information and reacting to the coun-
terpart’s requests. Solidarity is strengthened by increasingly relating the individual ef-
forts of one party to the realization of the other party’s goal in the exchange.  
Our findings on the importance of reciprocity as a relational exchange competence of 
boundary spanners are in line with Hornby et al (2000), who emphasize the value of 
reciprocity that manifests itself in: “respect and concern for the individual, gives value 
to mutual understanding and the building of mutual respect” (Hornby, Atkins, Beale, 
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Campbell, & Sanders, 2000: 160). At the same time, it should be noted that reciproc-
ity can be a risky strategy to pursue, as it is based on an assumption that the other 
party will reciprocate in the future. Therefore, reciprocity involves some initial level 
of trust in the other party, and might be appropriate at a slightly later stage of rela-
tionship development in projects than “gaming”, which is partly aimed at building 
such trust.  
Proactiveness 
Finally, the third relational exchange competence of the project managers consists in 
being able to act proactively in response not only to the immediate and obvious op-
portunities and challenges, but also to anticipate forthcoming challenges, bottlenecks 
and deviation from normal project routines. As demonstrated by Ronald in Exchange 
Episode III (delays), continually ignoring uncertainties about the forthcoming work 
(e.g. not checking the quality of the floor in the Clinic facilities in advance) leads to 
losing control of the plan and subsequent conflicts with the exchange counterparts: 
 
Willem (Installation Advisors Co): “Their [ConCo’s] price is too low. And he 
[Ronald] does not want to think what he has to do. He always says “Give the drawing 
and I do it”. This is not thinking! He said “I keep all the drawing from the architect. 
Here’s a change in the drawing. Is there everything in it? How high is the door? I do not 
see the height of the door. What must be the height of the door? Tell me, Mr [name of 
an employee of the Agency’s Facility management department], how high is the door? Is 
it like that? Ok, I order it. I order this as you said to me”… He is not cooperative! It 
is a way of work, but it is not a good way and not a good attitude for this kind of pro-
jects.”  
 
James: “He [Ronald] is hiding behind the rules”. 
 
The discussion of proactiveness resonates with insights from Williams (2002): “A 
poor partner is perceived as one who slavishly or dogmatically ploughs a representa-
tive furrow in partnerships arenas and, irritatingly, has to “report back” everything to 
the home organisation. Conversely, the more effective partners are those who are em-
powered, within certain negotiated parameters, to engage constructively with other 
partners. They have a feel for what may or may not be acceptable to their home or-
ganisations and are ready to play the partnership game.” (Williams, 2002) p. 120. 
A Project manager’s proactiveness is related to the relational norms of information 
exchange and flexibility, as a higher freedom of a boundary spanner to act on his own 
discretion enables him to share information more rapidly and be more flexible in re-
sponse to the needs of the other party. Moreover, a proactive problem-solving ap-
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proach helps achieve mutually beneficial (integrative) outcomes in negotiation situa-
tions (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). 
The value of being a proactive boundary spanner seems to be especially high in the 
face of uncertainties and contingencies, which are inherently prone to renegotiations 
and conflicts. By using his behavioural discretion to create and realize opportunities 
for regaining losses by acquiring extra work and optimizing work processes, a compe-
tent project manager can to some extent neutralize the effects of low prices without 
jeopardizing exchange relationships with the other project stakeholders or perform-
ance in the project itself.  
 
5.7. Discussion 
5.7.1. Propositions  
In the above sections we have presented an inductive longitudinal case study of a 
construction project for which the contractors were selected by means of an online 
reverse auction. Based on the analysis of the empirical evidence, in this section we 
formulate propositions that can be tested in future studies. Also, here we discuss the 
findings and their implications, as well as the limitations of this study.  
The first research question this study intended to answer is: How do reverse auction out-
comes affect the execution phase of auctioned contracts? The empirical evidence revealed a two-
fold effect of auction outcomes on the contractors’ project managers. First, boundary 
spanners’ constraints with regard to delivering high performance in the project are 
aggravated by the price resulting from the auctions, as project managers have to, on 
one hand, secure a profit margin or minimize losses for their own company and, on 
the other hand, need to accomplish the project with the budget, time and quality 
standards defined at the contracting stage. Therefore, our first proposition is as fol-
lows: 
 
Proposition 1.1. The lower the auction prices, the more boundary spanners’ constraints are aggra-
vated at the project execution stage. 
 
The second aspect of the auction effect is that due to the fixed price contract often 
associated with auctioning construction contracts (Bajari et al., 2006), boundary span-
ners’ manoeuvring space in dealing with contingences during the execution stage (e.g. 
changes in governmental regulations or client requirements) are limited. Our second 
proposition regarding the effect of reverse auctions is: 
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Proposition 1.2. Fixed price contracts associated with reverse auctions aggravate boundary span-
ners’ constraints by reducing their manoeuvring space in dealing with project contingencies.  
 
It is important to note that whereas the effect of prices on project managers’ con-
straints is likely to be similar regardless of the contract allocation form, e.g. also if the 
low price results from a negotiation, the effect of the fixed-price contract on the con-
straints is associated with auctions rather than with negotiations. This is due to the 
fact that, as the previous literature has revealed, in the construction industry negotia-
tions are often (although not always) used along with cost-plus contracts, while auc-
tions are associated with fixed-price contracts (Bajari et al., 2006). The underlying 
reason for this is that when complexity of the project is high and contractor’s input 
might be needed already in the project design phase, the communication structure 
associated with auctions (i.e. when most of the information is transmitted in the form 
of bids rather than unstructured communication between the parties) stifles the in-
formation exchange necessary to deal with contingencies of complex projects (Bajari 
et al., 2006).  
Another aspect of the present investigation is in revealing the relational exchange 
competences of project managers that enable them to alleviate at least some of the 
effects of role constraints. We attempted to answer the following research question: 
What are the key relational competences of the boundary spanning individuals that influence the effect 
of the reverse auctions on inter-organisational relationships and project performance? 
In an effort to answer this research question we defined and elaborated on the nature 
and workings of the relational exchange competences of boundary spanners, namely 
gaming, reciprocity and proactiveness. The empirical evidence shows that a low level 
of these competences aggravates the effect of auction outcomes on project managers, 
while a high level of relational exchange competences help mitigate the effect of the 
constraints on relationships and performance. Therefore, we propose: 
 
Proposition 2.1. A high level of project managers’ relational exchange competences of benevolent 
gaming, reciprocity and proactiveness mitigates the effect of role constraints on relationships and per-
formance.  
 
Proposition 2.2. A low level of project managers’ relational exchange competences of benevolent 
gaming, reciprocity and proactiveness enhances the effect of role constraints on relationships and per-
formance.  
 
More specifically, we attempted to investigate a connection between the level of rela-
tional exchange competences of project managers in terms of the relational norms 
they establish with the client’s side and performance in the project. A positive rela-
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tionship between a high level of relational exchange competences and relational 
norms became apparent. Reciprocal behaviour of project managers results in higher 
solidarity and flexibility; proactiveness leads to more information exchange; benevo-
lent gaming can lead to a higher level of all relational norms. Consequently, boundary 
spanner’s failure to perform at a high level of relational exchange competences cre-
ates damage to relational norms. The effect of relational exchange competences ex-
presses itself in individual exchange situations and becomes reflected in the relational 
norms not immediately, but over time. Boundary spanners in our case study appear to 
be consistent in displaying high or low levels of relational exchange competences. 
Therefore, the next proposition is as follows: 
 
Proposition 3.1. Project managers’ relational exchange competences of benevolent gaming, reciproc-
ity and proactiveness positively affect the development of relational norms with their exchange counter-
parts.  
 
In addition we showed that the relational exchange competences are associated with a 
higher project performance in terms of quality and time (unfortunately, we did not 
have enough evidence to analyse the effect on the budget). We propose: 
 
Proposition 3.2. Project managers’ relational exchange competences of benevolent gaming, recip-
rocity and proactiveness positively affect the performance in the project.  
 
Our results regarding the effects of relational exchange competences on relational 
norms resonate with the discussion of interimistic relational exchange (IRE). This is 
defined as “a close, collaborative, fast-developing, short-lived exchange relationship 
in which companies pool their skills and/or resources to address a transient, albeit 
important, business opportunity or threat” (Lambe et al., 2000). The term “interimis-
tic” refers to the interim nature of relationships in such exchange situations. The ex-
change parties in IRE are able to develop relationships that are deeper than it is pos-
sible to achieve over a number of repeated individual transactions, but not as well-
developed and sophisticated as in exchange situations that are close to the “rela-
tional” end of the continuum. The concept of interimistic relational exchange refers 
to many real-world exchange situations that are bounded by a relatively short and 
explicitly-defined lifespan, giving inter-organisational relationships less time to de-
velop and mature than is typically assumed in evolutionary models of relationships 
development (Dwyer et al., 1987; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). The lifespan of the ex-
change may be limited by the exploration of a business opportunity or duration of a 
project in which exchange parties are engaged. Expectations of future transactions 
are, thus, also limited compared to the traditional view.  
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Relational exchange competence is one of the antecedents of relational norms (flexibility, 
solidarity and information exchange) in IRE. Partners who possess relational ex-
change competence are believed to be able to develop relational norms more rapidly. 
Thus, relational exchange competence helps “shortcut the process necessary to estab-
lish the working norms necessary for functional IRE” (Lambe et al., 2000).  
Our results contribute to the discussion of IRE in two ways. First, we inductively 
identify three distinct relational exchange competences that enable boundary spanners 
to quickly develop relationships with their counterparts. Secondly, we discuss how 
each of these competences relates to three relational norms (flexibility, solidarity and 
information exchange) between the parties. This way we make one step in the direc-
tion of the development of a non-evolutionary model of relationships development, a 
model for which Lambe et al (2000) call.  
Another insight that emerges from our empirical findings is that relationships be-
tween each of the contractors and the customer’s side seem to follow certain patterns 
which we, following some of the literature, call ‘virtuous’ and ‘vicious’ cycles 
(Sabherwal, 1999). In a virtuous cycle “each time partners act together they take a risk 
and form expectations about the intended outcome and the way others will contrib-
ute to achieving it. Each time an outcome meets expectations, trusting attitudes are 
reinforced.” (Vangen & Huxham, 1998: 8). 
A clear example of the virtuous cycle is the relationships between Bobby and the pro-
ject owner’s side. Bobby’s strong relational competences allowed him to establish a 
high level of relational norms with the project owner’s side, leading to higher trust 
and performance. InCo’s good performance earned Bobby further credit in terms of 
trust and relational norms. This is how Bobby spoke about the project after the end 
of Phase One:  
 
Bobby (InCo): I think this is an enjoyable job… Well, not like this [makes a 
“money” gesture], but the job in general I think it is pretty nice. Because the people of 
Architects Co, Ron, Frank and Jan, I can get along with them, I think they are nice 
people… For me that [getting along with people] is the foundation, because when you 
have to work with people you have to do something about that. Because [otherwise] 
you can be arguing all the time, like the contractor [Ronald] does, but that is too 
much for me.  
 
A vicious cycle starts with low level of boundary spanner’s relational exchange com-
petences, which results in a low level of relational norms. These lead to low credibility 
trust as well as benevolence trust, and low trust deteriorates performance.  
The relationships between Ronald and the project owner’s side provide an example 
of the vicious cycle. Before their trust in Ronald deteriorated, they had refrained from 
escalating the discussion to the director’s level. However, after the long haggling 
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about the shaft’s price and new reported delays, the Agency and Architects Co be-
came less tolerant and resorted to applying pressure on Ronald. These developments 
are in line with the findings on the use of coercive strategy in inter-organisational rela-
tionships between architects and constructors in the construction industry elsewhere 
(Lui, Ngo, & Hon, 2006). The authors defined coercive strategy as “manipulation and 
reciprocation towards partners with an aim to influence their immediate actions”, and 
found that the high level of both inter-organisational and interpersonal trust makes 
the use of coercive strategy less likely (Lui et al., 2006). This seems to explain why 
Architects Co and the Agency refrained from coercive actions until their trust in 
ConCo dropped considerably. 
5.7.2. Implications and limitations 
Our analysis has a number of managerial implications. A strategic aspect of this dis-
cussion is that complex projects, where the number of contingencies and threats to 
the normal project run is high and/or the price is low, require a very competent 
boundary spanner to be in charge in order to secure the success of such projects. In 
fact, we could see that this was understood by InCo: 
 
Elliot (director of InCo): “In the procurement way [i.e. when projects are allocated via 
tenders and auctions] you can’t build any relationships… So, within the job it must 
be as smooth as possible. So, you have to put on a project manager who is a master in 
every job, who is a master of working with all kinds of people, communicates with all 
types of people, and gets things done out of his knowledge and skills; has proven 
knowledge of what he is doing. Like Bobby, for instance… One of the strongest points 
about Bobby is that he can cooperate with many people. I have never heard anyone 
say: “Oh, no Bobby, I don’t like to work with him”.  No one said it. We specifically 
chose Bobby for the job…  Well, he can do a relational type of job but it [the rela-
tional job] is easier. And he can handle this [the Agency’s project], on the edge of a 
business case, on the business side of the job, and stays cooperative within the project.” 
 
Therefore, assigning a boundary spanner with an appropriate level of the relational 
exchange competences to IRE projects can be seen as a strategic choice that can be 
made in advance by a contractor’s decision makers on the basis of the analysis of a 
project’s properties, such as its complexity and risks. 
One last aspect of the implications of our findings pertains to auction design. In the 
analysis of the auction outcomes we showed that a price/quality scoring winner se-
lection rule enabled InCo to win bidding for Lot 2 (installation and maintenance of 
electro-technical equipment), retaining some financial slack due to its higher quality 
score over that of its closest competitor. One suggestion to improve this allocation 
rule based on our results would be to explicitly incorporate the quality of contractor’s 
project manager, particularly the level of his/her relational exchange competences, in 
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the quality score. Although the relational exchange competence along the dimensions 
of benevolent gaming, reciprocity and proactiveness is surely hard to measure, years 
of project managing work experience and references from people who used to work 
together with the specific managers can serve as a basis for the evaluation. Such en-
hancement of the price/quality project allocation rule would allow companies with 
competent project managers who are better able to handle role constraints and vari-
ous contingencies to have an advantage in bidding. By increasing the weight of pro-
ject manager’s competences in the price/quality scoring rule for projects with a 
higher level of anticipated uncertainty, the auction designer is able to create a mecha-
nism that would enable allocation of complex and contingency-prone projects to 
more efficient contractors. As the literature from the field of multidimensional auc-
tions suggests, this can also increase efficiency and Pareto optimality of auction out-
comes (Koppius, 2002).  
Finally, we discuss a number of limitations to the present findings. Being primarily a 
method for inductive research, an exploratory case study provides instruments and 
discovers data that can help lay the foundations of new theories. A downside of the 
method, however, is that it provides rather limited ways of discriminating between 
alternative explanations for the observed relationships. We recognize this limitation, 
and below we identify several explanations for our findings that have to be tackled by 
further research.  
We have found four potential alternative explanations for the observed outcomes. 
The first alternative explanation for the difference in the project performance of 
ConCo and InCo and their relationships with the client’s side can lie in the extent to 
which the two companies and the role constraints of Ronald and Bobby respectively, 
were affected by the auction outcomes. As we discussed in Section 5.5, there are two 
reasons to believe that InCo’s profit margin in the project was less affected. First, due 
to the ratchet bidding strategy used by InCo, it had been able to bid higher than its 
marginal cost in the tender, even if (as InCo’s director acknowledged), it had to give 
away in bidding for Lot 3 some of the slack gained in bidding for Lot 2. Second, a 
high quality score allowed InCo not to lower its bidding price as much as its oppo-
nents did. It looks plausible therefore, that the constraints faced by Bobby in execut-
ing the project were somewhat more relaxed than those faced by Ronald. This differ-
ence can potentially explain some of the variation in the performance and relation-
ships, in addition to the difference in the managers’ relational exchange competences.  
Another explanation for the difference in the behaviour of Ronald and Bobby is the 
difference between ConCo’s and InCo’s contracts. Unlike the contract of ConCo, the 
two contracts won by InCo included 10-year maintenance provisions in addition to 
the main installation work. So, one could suggest that the more cooperative behav-
iour displayed by Bobby of InCo was a result not only of his superior relational ex-
change competences but of InCo’s expectations to gain additional work from the 
client during the 10 years of maintenance. After all, a contractor who already knows a 
project, in particular its design, its client and the architect, is in good position “to es-
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timate the likelihood of later design changes, the costliness of responding to them, 
and the likely reaction to a post-auction proposal to increase compensation in re-
sponse to requested design changes” (Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994: 379). There is, 
however, a counter-argument to this alternative explanation. It stems from the fact 
that the maintenance part of the contract would have to be executed by a different 
company within InCo’s large holding, InCo Maintenance. This company has a sepa-
rate budget, making its performance only remotely related to that of InCo. Since 
Bobby and InCo’s management were unlikely to directly benefit from potential addi-
tional work at the maintenance stage even if it occurred, it seems unlikely that the 
maintenance contracts provided Bobby with additional incentives to be more coop-
erative or relaxed his role constraints at the project execution stage.  
The third explanation pertains to the difference in the complexity of the work exe-
cuted by the two contractors and its effect on project performance. One difference 
between construction and installation work is that the former requires less expert 
knowledge to judge its progress and quality, on the face of it, than the latter. For ex-
ample, for James of the Agency and Frank of the Architects Co it was easier to evalu-
ate the quality of the walls and doorways made by ConCo just by looking at them 
than the quality and durability of air-conditioning and heating systems installed by 
InCo. As one of the respondents told us in an interview, “everybody could have an 
opinion” on the work done by ConCo. This lack of the visibility of InCo’s work 
might have been a reason for its smoother relationships with the client’s side than the 
ones ConCo had, and for the higher pressure on ConCo. 
The fourth and final alternative explanation is related to the third one. The literatures 
on both boundary spanning and construction project management assign great im-
portance to project managers’ technical skills, e.g.  relate them to boundary spanners’ 
leadership and power (Fleming & Waguespack, 2007; Spekman, 1979). In our inter-
views several respondents, e.g. James of the Agency and Willem of Installation Advi-
sors Co complimented the high level of technical expertise of Bobby and expressed 
doubts about that of Ronald. The level of technical expertise was difficult to objec-
tively evaluate, especially because Ronald and Bobby had similar backgrounds and 
approximately the same relevant work experience. There is a possibility therefore that 
some of the variation of Ronald’s and Bobby’s performance and relationships with 
the client side stemmed from the difference in their technical skills rather than the 
difference in their respective constraints and/or relational exchange competences.  
We propose that the limitations of the research method used in this study in dealing 
with alternative explanations should be overcome in further research that would en-
hance the maturity of the emerging theory. In particular, further survey-based cross-
sectional studies can take into account and measure the level of role constraints and 
technical expertise, as well as account for the different types of work performed by 
contractors in construction projects. This will enable us to quantify the relative effects 
of these variables in addition to the effect of relational exchange competences on the 
relationships between parties and performance in projects.  
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5.8. Conclusions 
This study has considered the impact of online reverse auctions on buyer-supplier 
relationships and performance during the execution stage of a construction project. 
We employed the theoretical perspective of organisational boundary spanning to 1) 
conceptualize and assess the impact of auctions on individuals in the boundary span-
ner roles during the project execution phase, and 2) investigate the relationship be-
tween the impact of auctions on boundary spanners and the performance in the pro-
ject and identify boundary spanners’ competences that can mitigate this relationship. 
The empirical study was designed in the form of a longitudinal inductive case study 
and performed in the context of the building construction industry, where it focused 
on the project managers from the contractors’ side.  
This investigation resulted in several findings and contributions to the literature. First, 
we found that during the project execution stage, the effect of auction outcomes on 
contractors’ project managers is twofold. One aspect of auction impact is that the 
project managers’ role constraints are aggravated by the prices resulting from the auc-
tions because these project managers have to, on one hand, accomplish the project 
with the budget, time and quality standards defined at the contracting stage and, on 
the other hand, secure a profit margin or minimize losses for their own company. 
The other aspect of auction impact is that project mangers’ role constraints were ag-
gravated by the fixed-price nature of the contract associated with reverse auctions, 
which reduced their ability to deal with project contingencies at the execution stage.  
Second, by building on behavioural patterns that emerged from the analysis of the 
empirical data, we identified three relational exchange competences that help contrac-
tor’s project managers cope with their role constraints. These competences are be-
nevolent gaming, reciprocity and proactiveness. We demonstrated that when the level 
of these competences was low, a project manager’s role constraints had a consider-
able negative effect on his relationships with the client’s side and on project perform-
ance. By contrast, a high level of the relational exchange competences enabled an-
other project manager to overcome the effect of the role constraints, which resulted 
in cooperative relationships with the client side and good project performance.  
These findings contribute to the bodies of knowledge on the effect of online reverse 
auctions on buyer-supplier relationships, as well as knowledge on the nature and role 
of the skills of boundary spanners and construction project management. The litera-
ture on online reverse auctions benefits from the new insights into how the impact of 
auctions spreads throughout the execution stage of auctioned projects, whereas pre-
vious investigations were limited mostly to the investigation of the immediate effects 
of reverse auctions on buyer-supplier relationships.  
The contribution to the literatures on boundary spanning and construction project 
management consists in identifying three relational exchange competences of con-
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struction project managers and explaining their role in mitigating boundary spanners’ 
role constraints and their effects on relationships with their exchange counterparts 
and project performance.  
There are also important managerial implications of the findings produced by this 
study. First, boundary spanners with strong relational exchange competences seem to 
be better positioned to cope with the complexities and uncertainties of construction 
projects. Therefore, assigning a boundary spanner with an appropriate level of rela-
tional exchange competences to projects where there is a high level of uncertainty is a 
strategic choice that can be made in advance by decision makers on the basis of the 
analysis of project characteristics. This is in line with the insight of Aldrich et al. 
(1976) that abilities of boundary spanners are a critical differentiator in heterogene-
ous environments characterized by high pressures and contingencies.  
Second, we suggest that the design of reverse auctions for projects, where uncertainty 
and contingencies are expected (such as the one featured in the present study), could 
incorporate a price/quality award role where some weight is allocated to the skills of 
the project managers, particularly their level of the relational exchange competences. 
This would allow companies with competent project managers to have an advantage 
in bidding for complex projects.  
Further research into the impact of reverse auctions during the project execution 
stage and the effect of boundary spanners’ relational exchange competences, in addi-
tion to the theory-testing directions already outlined in the discussion section, should 
focus on establishing the generalization of the present findings in other industrial 
contexts where reverse auctions are taking root, e.g. in the IT services industry, as we 
discussed in Chapters 2-4. 
To conclude, we mention two other limitations to the findings. The first one con-
cerns the richness of the data collected in the course of the case study. This limitation 
comes from the fact that most of the interviews were conducted in English, which 
was not the native language either of the respondents or of the interviewers. Some 
nuances of the case might have escaped our attention due to this factor. Another 
possibility is that an even more refined model of relational exchange competences 
could have resulted from an ethnographic study, which would have allowed the ob-
servation of the behaviour of participants on a daily basis, thus ensuring better cap-
turing of behavioural nuances and outcomes. 
The second limitation deals with the focus of this study, constrained limited to the 
effect on, and the relational exchange competences of, one specific type of boundary 
spanner in the construction projects - contractors’ project managers. Future studies 
will hopefully be able to more fully explain the variation in the parties’ relationships 
and project performance by simultaneously taking into account competences of 
boundary spanners on contractors’ as well as on the client’s side, e.g. architects who 
manage the project on behalf of the client.  
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ye
r-
su
p
p
lie
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s.
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
an
d
 
q
u
as
i-
ex
p
er
im
en
t 
w
it
h
 
68
 
su
p
p
lie
rs
 
in
 
au
to
m
o
-
ti
ve
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
. 
S
up
p
lie
r’
s 
o
p
p
o
rt
un
is
m
 
su
s-
p
ic
io
n
. 
S
up
p
lie
r’
s 
w
ill
in
gn
es
s 
to
 
m
ak
e 
id
io
sy
n
cr
at
ic
 
in
ve
st
-
m
en
ts
. 
T
h
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 s
up
p
lie
r’
s 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
is
m
 s
u
sp
i-
ci
o
n
s 
b
ef
o
re
 a
n
d
 a
ft
er
 t
h
e 
au
ct
io
n
 i
s 
gr
ea
te
r 
in
 
o
p
en
-b
id
 t
h
an
 i
n
 s
ea
le
d
-b
id
 a
u
ct
io
n
 f
o
r 
b
o
th
 
in
cu
m
b
en
t 
an
d
 n
ew
 s
up
p
lie
rs
. 
In
 
se
al
ed
-b
id
 
au
ct
io
n
s 
su
p
p
lie
r’
s 
w
ill
in
gn
es
s 
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to
 m
ak
e 
id
io
sy
n
cr
at
ic
 i
n
ve
st
m
en
ts
 b
ef
o
re
 a
n
d
 
af
te
r 
th
e 
au
ct
io
n
 i
n
cr
ea
se
s,
 w
h
ile
 i
n
 o
p
en
-b
id
 
au
ct
io
n
s 
it
 d
o
es
 n
o
t 
ch
an
ge
. 
In
cu
m
b
en
t 
su
p
p
lie
rs
 i
n
cr
ea
se
 t
h
ei
r 
w
ill
in
gn
es
s 
to
 m
ak
e 
id
io
sy
n
cr
at
ic
 i
n
ve
st
m
en
ts
 t
o
 m
at
ch
 
th
at
 o
f 
n
ew
 s
up
p
lie
rs
 s
o
 t
h
at
 n
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 
ex
is
ts
 p
o
st
-a
u
ct
io
n
. 
(E
m
ili
an
i 
&
 
St
ec
, 2
00
4)
  
S
up
p
lie
rs
’ 
re
ac
ti
o
n
 
to
 
re
-
ve
rs
e 
au
ct
io
n
s;
 t
h
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f 
re
ve
rs
e 
au
ct
io
n
s 
o
n
 
su
p
p
lie
rs
’ 
b
u
si
n
es
s 
p
o
lic
ie
s 
an
d
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
. 
S
u
rv
ey
 o
f 
23
 s
up
p
lie
rs
 
in
 
th
e 
U
S 
ae
ro
sp
ac
e 
in
d
u
st
ry
. 
S
up
p
lie
r 
re
ta
lia
ti
o
n
. 
S
us
p
ic
io
n
s 
o
f 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
is
m
. 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
is
ti
c 
b
eh
av
io
u
r.
 
S
up
p
lie
rs
 s
ee
k 
to
 r
et
al
ia
te
 b
y 
in
cr
ea
si
n
g 
th
ei
r 
p
ri
ce
s.
  
B
uy
er
s 
ar
e 
se
en
 a
s 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
is
ti
c 
b
y 
su
p
p
lie
rs
, 
w
h
ic
h
 i
gn
it
es
 s
im
ila
r 
b
eh
av
io
u
r 
in
 s
up
p
lie
rs
.  
(W
an
g 
&
 
A
rc
h
er
, 2
00
4)
 
C
h
o
o
si
n
g 
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e 
o
n
lin
e 
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
 
fu
n
c-
ti
o
n
al
it
y 
fo
r 
p
ro
cu
re
m
en
t 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
s.
 
F
iv
e 
ca
se
 
st
ud
ie
s 
o
f 
o
n
lin
e 
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
s.
  
B
uy
er
 
su
p
p
lie
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s:
  
sh
o
rt
-t
er
m
 
(a
d
ve
rs
ar
ia
l, 
ar
m
-
le
n
gt
h
) 
ve
rs
us
 l
o
n
g-
te
rm
 (
co
-
o
p
er
at
iv
e,
 
b
as
ed
 
o
n
 
tr
u
st
, 
et
c)
. 
R
ev
er
se
 a
u
ct
io
n
s 
ar
e 
ap
p
lie
d
 b
o
th
 i
n
 s
h
o
rt
-
te
rm
 
an
d
 
lo
n
g-
te
rm
 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s,
 
th
e 
la
tt
er
 
b
ei
n
g 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
ze
d
 
b
y 
h
ig
h
 
n
o
n
-
co
n
tr
ac
ti
b
ili
ty
, 
as
se
t 
sp
ec
if
ic
it
y 
an
d
 c
o
m
p
le
x-
it
y 
o
f 
d
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
. 
(D
an
i 
et
 
al
., 
20
05
) 
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
o
f 
a 
co
n
ce
p
-
tu
al
 f
ra
m
ew
o
rk
 
fo
r 
st
u
d
y-
in
g 
an
d
 
u
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
g 
b
u
ye
r-
su
p
p
lie
r 
b
eh
av
io
ur
 
in
 r
ev
er
se
 a
uc
ti
o
n
s.
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s,
 
un
sp
ec
i-
fi
ed
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
.  
B
uy
er
 a
n
d
 s
up
p
lie
r 
b
eh
av
io
u
r 
ac
ro
ss
 
a 
se
ri
es
 
o
f 
re
ve
rs
e 
au
ct
io
n
s.
 
B
uy
er
 
an
d
 
su
p
p
lie
r 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
s 
d
em
o
n
-
st
ra
te
 
un
et
h
ic
al
 
an
d
 
ga
m
e-
lik
e 
b
eh
av
io
u
r,
 
ai
m
in
g 
at
 “
w
in
n
in
g 
at
 a
ll 
co
st
s”
 a
n
d
 o
b
ta
in
in
g 
a 
p
o
w
er
fu
l 
p
o
si
ti
o
n
.  
(P
ea
rc
y 
&
 
G
iu
n
ip
er
o
, 
20
06
) 
T
h
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f 
re
ve
rs
e 
au
c-
ti
o
n
s 
u
se
 o
n
 a
) 
p
ri
ce
 r
ed
uc
-
ti
o
n
 
an
d
 
b
) 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 o
f 
b
u
ye
r-
su
p
p
lie
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s.
 
S
u
rv
ey
 
o
f 
14
2 
p
u
r-
ch
as
in
g 
m
an
ag
er
s 
in
 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
in
d
us
tr
ie
s 
an
d
 a
ca
d
em
ic
s.
 
G
o
ve
rn
an
ce
 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
o
f 
b
u
ye
r-
su
p
p
lie
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s 
(“
b
id
-a
n
d
-b
u
y”
 
vs
 
“d
ev
el
o
p
-
in
g/
m
ai
n
ta
in
in
g 
th
e 
lo
n
g-
te
rm
 r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
s”
).
 
U
se
 o
f 
re
ve
rs
e 
au
ct
io
n
s 
fo
r 
b
u
yi
n
g 
cu
st
o
m
-
iz
ed
 d
ir
ec
t 
m
at
er
ia
ls
 c
an
 b
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 
d
ev
el
o
p
in
g/
m
ai
n
ta
in
in
g 
th
e 
lo
n
g-
te
rm
 
re
la
-
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s.
  
(T
as
sa
b
eh
ji 
et
 
al
., 
20
06
) 
T
h
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f 
re
ve
rs
e 
au
c-
ti
o
n
s 
o
n
 
su
p
p
lie
r-
b
u
ye
r 
F
iv
e 
ca
se
 
st
ud
ie
s 
an
d
 
16
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
it
h
 
S
up
p
lie
rs
’ 
su
sp
ic
io
n
 
o
f 
b
u
ye
r’
s 
o
p
p
o
rt
un
is
m
. 
S
up
p
lie
r-
b
uy
er
 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s 
ch
an
ge
 
n
eg
a-
ti
ve
ly
 a
s 
a 
re
su
lt
 o
f 
re
ve
rs
e 
au
ct
io
n
s.
 S
u
p
p
lie
rs
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re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s.
 
su
p
p
lie
rs
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
ac
k-
a g
in
g 
in
d
us
tr
y.
 
S
up
p
lie
rs
’ 
w
ill
in
gn
es
s 
to
 
sh
ar
e 
fu
tu
re
 s
av
in
g 
re
su
lt
in
g 
fr
o
m
 
te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
ca
l 
im
-
p
ro
ve
m
en
ts
. 
S
up
p
lie
rs
’ 
d
is
co
n
te
n
t 
w
it
h
 
ce
rt
ai
n
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
. 
b
ec
o
m
e 
u
n
w
ill
in
g 
to
 
sh
ar
e 
fu
tu
re
 
sa
vi
n
gs
 
(f
ro
m
 i
n
n
o
va
ti
o
n
s)
 w
it
h
 b
uy
er
s 
an
d
 m
ig
h
t 
b
e 
w
ill
in
g 
to
 r
et
al
ia
te
. 
In
cu
m
b
en
t 
su
p
p
lie
rs
’ 
at
ti
-
tu
d
e 
to
 t
h
e 
b
uy
er
 m
ay
 w
o
rs
en
 r
eg
ar
d
le
ss
 o
f 
w
h
et
h
er
 t
h
e 
su
p
p
lie
r 
lo
se
s 
th
e 
b
u
si
n
es
s.
  
S
up
p
lie
rs
 a
re
 d
is
co
n
te
n
te
d
 w
it
h
 b
id
d
er
 q
u
al
i-
fi
ca
ti
o
n
s 
an
d
 s
u
sp
ic
io
u
s 
o
f 
p
h
an
to
m
 b
id
d
in
g,
 
ex
p
lo
it
at
io
n
 o
f 
in
cu
m
b
en
ts
, l
ac
k 
o
f 
cl
ar
it
y 
an
d
 
co
m
p
le
te
n
es
s 
o
f 
p
ro
d
uc
t 
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
s.
  
(Z
h
o
n
g 
&
 W
u,
 
20
06
) 
 
S
up
p
lie
rs
’ 
b
id
d
in
g 
b
eh
av
-
io
u
r 
an
d
 i
ts
 i
m
p
ac
t 
o
n
 a
uc
-
ti
o
n
 
o
ut
co
m
e;
 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f 
n
o
n
-p
ri
ce
 
su
p
p
lie
r 
at
-
tr
ib
u
te
s 
o
n
 b
id
d
in
g 
b
eh
av
-
io
u
r 
an
d
 
o
n
 
au
ct
io
n
 
o
u
t-
co
m
e.
 
E
xp
lo
ra
to
ry
 
st
at
is
ti
ca
l 
an
al
ys
is
 o
f 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
 
d
at
a 
fr
o
m
 
64
 
au
ct
io
n
 
ev
en
ts
 
co
n
d
uc
te
d
 
b
y 
o
n
e 
b
u
ye
r 
in
 h
ig
h
-t
ec
h
 
in
d
u
st
ry
. 
S
up
p
lie
r’
s 
in
cu
m
b
en
cy
. 
 
P
ri
o
r 
b
u
ye
r-
su
p
p
lie
rs
 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s 
ar
e 
re
-
w
ar
d
ed
 i
n
 a
w
ar
d
in
g 
co
n
tr
ac
ti
n
g 
in
 n
ew
 a
uc
-
ti
o
n
s.
 
In
cu
m
b
en
t 
su
p
p
lie
rs
 
ar
e 
th
re
e 
ti
m
es
 
m
o
re
 l
ik
el
y 
to
 w
in
 a
 c
o
n
tr
ac
t 
th
an
 n
ew
 s
u
p
-
p
lie
rs
. 
A
s 
w
in
n
er
s 
o
f 
re
ve
rs
e 
au
ct
io
n
s,
 
in
-
cu
m
b
en
ts
 p
ro
vi
d
e 
b
uy
er
s 
w
it
h
 l
es
s 
co
st
 s
av
-
in
gs
 t
h
an
 n
ew
 s
u
p
p
lie
rs
.  
(R
ad
ke
vi
tc
h
 e
t 
al
., 
20
06
c)
  
U
se
 
o
f 
re
ve
rs
e 
au
ct
io
n
s 
an
d
 
b
ila
te
ra
l 
n
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s 
in
 p
ro
cu
re
m
en
t 
o
f 
IT
 s
er
-
vi
ce
s 
ac
ro
ss
 
m
ul
ti
p
le
 
p
ro
-
je
ct
s.
  
 
E
xp
lo
ra
to
ry
 
st
at
is
ti
ca
l 
an
al
ys
is
 o
f 
10
4 
p
o
rt
fo
-
lio
s 
o
f 
b
uy
er
-s
up
p
lie
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s 
fr
o
m
 
an
 
o
n
lin
e 
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
 f
o
r 
IT
 s
er
vi
ce
s.
 
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
b
uy
er
-s
up
p
lie
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s.
 
Sh
ar
e 
o
f 
o
n
e 
su
p
p
lie
r 
in
 
b
u
ye
r’
s 
p
o
rt
fo
lio
 o
f 
p
ro
je
ct
s.
 
B
uy
er
’s
 s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
su
p
p
lie
r.
  
In
 b
u
ye
rs
’ 
p
o
rt
fo
lio
s 
o
f 
p
ro
je
ct
s,
 r
ev
er
se
 a
u
c-
ti
o
n
s 
ar
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 s
h
o
rt
-t
er
m
 r
el
at
io
n
-
sh
ip
s 
w
h
ile
 
n
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s 
su
p
p
o
rt
 
lo
n
g-
te
rm
 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s.
 B
u
ye
rs
 i
n
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
cl
u
st
er
s 
u
se
 
th
e 
tw
o
 
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s 
in
 
co
m
b
in
at
io
n
 
to
 
a 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
ex
te
n
t.
 
B
uy
er
s 
us
in
g 
p
re
d
o
m
in
an
tl
y 
n
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 s
at
is
fi
ed
 w
it
h
 t
h
ei
r 
su
p
p
lie
rs
 t
h
an
 b
uy
-
er
s 
u
si
n
g 
p
re
d
o
m
in
an
tl
y 
re
ve
rs
e 
au
ct
io
n
s.
  
(J
ap
, 2
00
7)
  
T
h
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
re
ve
rs
e 
au
c-
ti
o
n
 
d
es
ig
n
 
an
d
 
b
id
d
in
g 
p
ar
am
et
er
s 
o
n
 
b
uy
er
-
su
p
p
lie
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s 
fr
o
m
 
T
w
en
ty
-f
iv
e 
q
u
as
i-
ex
p
er
im
en
ts
 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
12
5 
su
p
p
lie
rs
 
fr
o
m
 
fo
u
r 
in
d
us
tr
ie
s.
 
S
up
p
lie
r’
s 
o
p
p
o
rt
un
is
m
 
su
s-
p
ic
io
n
. 
S
up
p
lie
r’
s 
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
co
n
ti
n
ui
ty
. 
T
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
b
id
d
er
s 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
su
sp
ic
io
n
 o
f 
o
p
p
o
rt
un
is
m
. 
In
cr
ea
si
n
g 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
b
id
-
d
er
s 
u
p
 t
o
 a
p
p
ro
xi
m
at
el
y 
12
 p
o
si
ti
ve
ly
 a
ff
ec
ts
 
su
p
p
lie
r’
s 
sa
ti
sf
ac
ti
o
n
.  
169
      
su
p
p
lie
rs
’ p
er
sp
ec
ti
ve
. 
S
up
p
lie
r’
s 
o
ve
ra
ll 
sa
ti
sf
ac
ti
o
n
. 
T
h
e 
h
ig
h
er
 t
h
e 
co
n
tr
ac
t 
vo
lu
m
e,
 t
h
e 
h
ig
h
er
 i
s 
th
e 
sa
ti
sf
ac
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
co
n
ti
n
u
it
y 
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s.
 
H
av
in
g 
6-
7 
lo
ts
 i
n
 a
n
 a
uc
ti
o
n
 l
ea
d
s 
to
 a
 d
e-
cr
ea
se
 
o
f 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
is
m
 
su
sp
ic
io
n
s 
an
d
 
in
-
cr
ea
se
s 
co
n
ti
n
ui
ty
 e
xp
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s.
  
In
 a
u
ct
io
n
s 
w
it
h
 p
ar
ti
al
 p
ri
ce
 v
is
ib
ili
ty
 (
ra
n
ks
),
 
o
ve
ra
ll 
sa
ti
sf
ac
ti
o
n
 
is
 
h
ig
h
er
. 
H
av
in
g 
m
o
re
 
b
id
d
er
s 
as
 w
el
l 
as
 h
av
in
g 
to
o
 f
ew
 o
r 
to
o
 m
an
y 
lo
ts
 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
is
m
; 
u
si
n
g 
au
ct
io
n
-
aw
ar
d
 r
ul
e 
in
 c
o
m
b
in
at
io
n
 w
it
h
 f
u
lly
 v
is
ib
le
 
p
ri
ce
 r
ai
se
s 
su
sp
ic
io
n
s 
o
f 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
is
m
.  
G
re
at
er
 p
ri
ce
 d
ro
p
s 
le
ad
 t
o
 le
ss
 s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
.  
(G
at
ti
ke
r 
et
 
al
., 
20
07
) 
T
h
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
o
f 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
 
m
ed
ia
 
o
n
 
th
e 
le
ve
l 
o
f 
su
p
p
lie
rs
’ 
tr
us
t 
in
 
p
ro
cu
re
m
en
t 
n
eg
o
ti
a-
ti
o
n
s.
 
Si
x 
ex
p
er
im
en
ts
 
in
-
vo
lv
in
g 
13
9 
“s
up
p
li-
er
s”
. 
H
o
n
es
ty
 t
ru
st
. 
B
en
ev
o
le
n
ce
 t
ru
st
. 
F
ac
e-
to
-f
ac
e 
n
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s 
re
su
lt
 
in
 
h
ig
h
er
 
p
o
st
-t
re
at
m
en
t 
tr
u
st
 t
h
an
 e
m
ai
l 
n
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s 
in
 
lo
w
 
p
ro
cu
re
m
en
t 
co
m
p
le
xi
ty
 
si
tu
at
io
n
s,
 
b
u
t 
sh
o
w
 n
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 u
n
d
er
 h
ig
h
 c
o
m
p
le
x-
it
y.
 
E
m
ai
l 
is
 
h
ig
h
er
 
in
 
p
o
st
-t
re
at
m
en
t 
tr
u
st
 
th
an
 
au
ct
io
n
s 
in
 
h
ig
h
 
co
m
p
le
xi
ty
 
si
tu
at
io
n
s 
b
u
t 
eq
u
al
 i
n
 l
o
w
 c
o
m
p
le
xi
ty
 s
it
u
at
io
n
s.
 A
u
c-
ti
o
n
s 
ar
e 
al
w
ay
s 
lo
w
er
 o
n
 t
ru
st
 t
h
an
 f
ac
e-
to
-
fa
ce
 
n
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s.
 
T
h
es
e 
fi
n
d
in
gs
 
h
o
ld
 
fo
r 
b
o
th
 b
en
ev
o
le
n
ce
 a
n
d
 h
o
n
es
ty
 t
ru
st
. 
P
ro
cu
re
m
en
t 
co
m
p
le
xi
ty
-w
is
e:
 
fa
ce
-t
o
-f
ac
e 
n
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s 
ar
e 
al
w
ay
s 
h
ig
h
 o
n
 t
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Chapter 6. Conclusions of the Thesis 
 
We have conducted four empirical studies that use quantitative as well as qualitative 
empirical research methods to investigate factors affecting the usage and outcomes of 
online reverse auctions for services as well as the relationships between the parties 
involved in such auctions. 
This last chapter of the thesis starts with a discussion of the findings of the four em-
pirical chapters in the light of the three problem areas identified in Chapter 1: auction 
context, service characteristics, and buyer-supplier relationships in reverse auctions. 
We continue by reviewing the managerial implications for auction stakeholders, and 
by discussing the main limitations of the findings and the possible directions for fu-
ture research. 
 
6.1. Reflections on the Findings  
As we argued in Chapter 1, the three problem areas that inspired this research are 
inherently intertwined. The characteristics of the services are related to the auction 
context, i.e. stages and aspects of the procurement process and actors’ behaviour be-
fore auctions (such as choosing the allocation mechanisms), during auctions (e.g. tak-
ing measures to reduce the costs of evaluating bids) and after auctions (executing the 
contract). Similarly, service characteristics are related to buyer-supplier relationships, 
because the nature of service contracts often requires buyers and suppliers to interact 
during the contract execution stage. The subsequent discussions of the findings ar-
ranged around the three problem areas are closely interconnected and often pertain to 
more than one problem area.  
6.1.1. Reverse auctions and their context 
One of the cornerstones of the discussion in Chapter 1 was a perceived gap between 
what some researchers call two “worlds” (Elmaghraby, 2007) – the world of academic 
models of auctions and the business world in which auctions exist amid a great vari-
ety of business practices, rules and behaviour (Jap, 2002; Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994; 
Smith, 1990). We would like to recall a quote from Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) that 
summarizes the rationale underlying this gap: “Behaviour in auctions will tend to be 
altered by the context in which the auctions arise. Furthermore, the outcome of com-
petitive bidding will typically affect economic relationships external to the market in 
which the transaction occurs.” (Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994: 364). 
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This dissertation has taken a step towards bridging this gap between the two 
“worlds”. The efforts towards that end, on the one hand, have been based on the 
solid ground of academic theories (auction theory, contract theory, transaction costs 
theory). On the other hand, they have relied on an analysis of a broad variety of em-
pirical evidence relating to auction-driven transactions from two contexts: online 
marketplaces for IT services and building construction projects. The variety of con-
text-specific factors that frame the use and outcomes of reverse auctions is impressive 
– from the specific designs of allocation mechanisms and functionality of online mar-
ketplaces to EU regulations determining when specific allocation mechanisms can be 
used and municipal regulations affecting certain important elements of already-
auctioned construction projects. Our analyses have brought more clarity into how 
these contextual factors affect actors’ behaviour before, during and after the reverse 
auctions, as well as into the outcomes of auctions and auctioned contracts.  
In Chapter 2 we looked at the part of the procurement process that takes place before 
auctions on an online marketplace for IT services. We identified and quantified the 
effect of the buyer’s prior repeat exchange interaction with vendors on the choice of 
allocation mechanism in the buyer’s next transaction. We found that prior exchange 
interaction greatly increases the propensity of the buyer to negotiate, rather than to 
use an auction, with a given vendor. However, in cases when the buyer needs to ex-
plore the supply landscape in the marketplace or when the buyer is dissatisfied with 
the vendor’s performance in the most recent project, the use of auctions in the sub-
sequent project becomes more likely. Chapter 2 also contributes to the body of litera-
ture on allocation mechanism choice (Bajari et al., 2006; Corts & Singh, 2004; Gold-
berg, 1977; Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). Until now the literature has considered only dis-
crete exchange situations, ignoring the historical context in which exchange occurs 
(Bajari et al., 2006; Bonaccorsi et al., 2000; Leffler et al., 2003; Manelli & Vincent, 
1995). This represents a considerable gap for both theory and practice, which has 
been bridged by our study.  
In Chapter 3 we identified five distinct tactics that buyers can use during the preparation 
for and bidding at auctions to manipulate the level of costs incurred when evaluating 
vendors and vendor bids in online auctions for IT services, namely search (for the 
vendor), RFP preparation, budget announcement, negotiation, and bid filtering. Em-
pirical testing confirmed our hypotheses that the use of these tactics leads to a higher 
likelihood of project allocation, which implies a reduction of underlying bid evalua-
tion costs. We also studied how the effectiveness of the cost-reducing tactics changes 
as buyers gain experience in transactions on the online marketplace. Buyer experience 
significantly interacts with two tactics – budget announcement and RFP preparation. 
Interestingly, while buyer experience increases the effectiveness of budget an-
nouncement, leading to a sharper increase of the allocation likelihood, at the same 
time buyer experience decreases the effectiveness of RFP preparation. Overall, in 
Chapter 3 we have extended and tested the theory on the effects of evaluation costs 
on the outcomes of transactions in the online environment (Carr, 2003; Snir & Hitt, 
2003). While most previous studies have treated evaluation costs as an exogenous 
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factor, this study considers them endogenous. This study contributes to the electronic 
markets literature by providing empirical support to theoretical reasoning on costly 
bid evaluation, by testing the direct implications of existing models (Carr, 2003; Snir 
& Hitt, 2003). This is important because the “record of direct application” of many 
key models is typically weak (Barua et al., 1997). By testing some of the direct conclu-
sions of the evaluation cost models, this study helps further to link analytical auction-
theoretical models with the business context in which online auctions occur. 
Further, in Chapter 5 we analyzed how auction outcomes affect the project execu-
tion in the building construction industry after auctions take place. As the findings of 
Chapter 5 are also relevant to the two other problem areas – service characteristics 
and buyer-supplier relationships – we address them in detail in the next subsections. 
Our results show that focussing on the broad context of reverse auctions for services 
helps understand actors’ behaviour and auction outcomes. Taken together, these re-
sults emphasize the value of undertaking further efforts targeted at embedding auc-
tion research within the empirical contexts, and also demonstrate the rewarding re-
sults of such efforts.  
6.1.2. Procurement of services 
Services possess a number of characteristics that have implications for the use and 
outcomes of auctions, including complexity, information asymmetry, and interaction 
between buyers and vendors during service delivery (Lovelock, 1983; Richmond et al., 
1992; Snir & Hitt, 2003). We obtained interesting insights regarding the implications 
of these characteristics for auction use, actors’ behaviour, and auction outcomes.  
We found in Chapter 2 (as already discussed above) that experienced buyers of IT 
services who are satisfied with the performance of their past projects prefer to nego-
tiate their next projects with their incumbent vendors (which is likely to be related to 
the cost-reducing effects of learning, idiosyncratic investments and relational norms, 
which are important in the case of IT services), while new or dissatisfied buyers 
choose to auction their projects. However, the insights of Chapter 5 suggest that 
other factors can also affect the use of auctions. Although the literature warns against 
the use of auctions for allocating complex projects (Bajari et al., 2006; Goldberg, 
1977), in practice there are situations when this inevitably occurs, e.g. when regula-
tions prevent state or municipal organisations from resorting to alternative mecha-
nisms such as negotiations. When this is the case and contingencies are expected dur-
ing the project execution, we found that the difference for the relationships between 
the parties as well as for the performance in the project can be made by the boundary 
spanning individuals who manage project execution on a day-to-day basis. This find-
ing is likely to hold true not only for the building construction industry but for other 
fields where services are complex and interaction is intense, such as customised soft-
ware development. 
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Further, Chapter 4 showed that buyers on online IT service marketplaces have a 
number of different ways to organize their procurement. We identified four clusters 
of portfolios of exchange relationships – Transactional buyers, Recurrent buyers, 
Small diversifiers and Large diversifiers – that possess distinct mixes of exchange rela-
tionships, exchange mechanisms and transaction characteristics. Transactional buyers 
prefer arm’s-length relationships and tend to switch suppliers often, while Recurrent 
buyers develop longer and closer exchange relationships with incumbent suppliers. 
The two other clusters, Small and Large Diversifiers, do not show such strong prefer-
ences either for arm’s-length or for recurrent exchange or for any exchange mecha-
nism. With regard to the exchange mechanism use the picture is also quite diverse: 
while Relational buyers mostly prefer negotiations and Recurrent buyers mostly stick 
to reverse auctions, buyers in the two other clusters seem to use both exchange 
mechanisms to a comparable extent. The high level of buyer experience across differ-
ent portfolios indicates that they are not simply intermediary stages of the evolution 
of one single portfolio type but rather deliberate stances defined by the inherent in-
tention of different buyers to pursue specific exchange relationship strategies.  
Service characteristics also play a significant role in Chapter 3. We found that when 
idiosyncratic and customizable services are concerned, and evaluating vendors’ bids is 
inherently costly, buyers have ways to decrease their bid evaluation costs by manipu-
lating their behaviour and applying what we call evaluation-cost-reducing tactics. 
These tactics enable buyers to better control their costs and increase the project allo-
cation likelihood. 
The contributions of the above insights from different chapters into how service 
characteristics are related to the use of reverse auctions, the behaviour of actors 
within auctions and auction outcomes pertain to several research areas: the role of 
bidding and bid evaluation costs on online professional service marketplaces (Carr, 
2003; Snir & Hitt, 2003), the role of product (service) complexity in the choice of 
allocation mechanism (Bajari et al., 2006; Bonaccorsi et al., 2000; Leffler et al., 2003; 
Manelli & Vincent, 1995), the heterogeneity and behaviour of actors in online mar-
ketplaces (Bapna et al., 2004) and the research into buyer-supplier relationships in 
reverse auctions (Gattiker et al., 2007; Jap, 2003; Jap & Haruvy, 2007). 
Overall, although we believe that such context-specific effects of service characteris-
tics can be to some extent generalized to other settings, it is very probable that other 
contexts contain numerous examples of different context-specific actor behaviour, 
and further research into these contexts will produce many valuable contributions for 
both theory and practice. 
6.1.3. Reverse auctions and buyer-supplier relation-
ships  
In Chapter 1 we highlighted a discussion in the literature on whether or not close 
buyer-supplier relationships can co-exist with the use of reverse auctions by the buy-
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ers (Emiliani, 2004; Jap, 2002; Pearcy et al., 2007). Our findings provide diverse in-
sights into this subject.  
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 looked at how buyers used reverse auctions and, at the 
same time, how they used vendors for repeat business. The studies used very differ-
ent research approaches and, on the face of it, produced results that may seem con-
tradictory. Chapter 2 found that IT service buyers avoid using reverse auctions with 
their established vendors unless they are not satisfied with the vendor performance 
(new buyers, having no established vendors, are more open towards reverse auctions). 
Chapter 4, however, revealed the existence of buyer types that recurrently use the 
same vendors but also use reverse auctions. The contradiction here is not a real one, 
as Chapter 2 looks at individual transactions while Chapter 4 analyses the entire port-
folio of exchange relationships. It is likely that buyers who rely heavily on auctions in 
their first steps in the marketplace or switch vendors at some point of their transac-
tion history appear to predominantly use negotiations when looked at from a portfo-
lio perspective that covers several years of transaction history.  
The investigation of buyers’ portfolios of exchange relationships in Chapter 4 also 
showed that reverse auctions are associated with short-term, arm’s-length exchange 
relationships, while bilateral negotiations support longer-term, recurrent exchange 
relationships that display non-contractible elements of exchange. On the one hand, 
this supports some of the existing studies on reverse auctions that have reached simi-
lar conclusions (Emiliani & Stec, 2002; Van Tulder & Mol, 2002). On the other hand, 
our findings are in line with studies that consider online reverse auctions appropriate 
for supplier screening and initiating long-term exchange (Elmaghraby, 2007). It is 
likely that reverse auctions are used by Recurrent buyers, as already noted above, to 
initiate recurrent relationships with preferred suppliers.  
All in all, our findings suggest that, with established vendors and when the level of 
relational norms with the vendor is high, buyers are reluctant to use reverse auctions. 
Buyers on the online marketplace for IT services seem to avoid using auctions “as a 
wake-up call for their incumbent supply base”, unlike some previous studies suggest 
(Jap, 2002). Also, when complex projects are auctioned, auction outcomes in combi-
nation with project contingencies are likely to place a strain on relationships during 
the execution stage (Chapter 5). All this does not provide a simple answer to the de-
bate in the literature, but it does make the picture more nuanced and complete. 
Another interesting insight from Chapter 5 is that even within the same construction 
project and with the same buyer different contractors can have different relationships, 
from cooperative to non-cooperative. We identified three relational exchange compe-
tences that can make a difference between cooperative and non-cooperative relation-
ships: benevolent gaming, reciprocity, and proactiveness. We demonstrated that when 
the level of these competences was low, the project manager’s role constraints had a 
considerable negative effect on his or her relationships with the client’s side and on 
the project performance. By contrast, a high level of relational exchange competences 
enabled another project manager to overcome the effect of the role constraints, 
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which resulted in cooperative relationships with the client side and good project per-
formance. 
These findings contribute to the bodies of knowledge on the effect of online reverse 
auctions on buyer-supplier relationships (Emiliani, 2004; Jap, 2002; Pearcy et al., 
2007), as well as to the knowledge on the nature and role of the skills for the litera-
ture on both boundary spanning and construction project management. The literature 
on online reverse auctions benefits from the new insights into how the impact of auc-
tions spreads throughout the execution stage of auctioned projects, whereas previous 
investigations were limited to the investigation of the immediate effects of reverse 
auctions on buyer-supplier relationships (Gattiker et al., 2007; Jap, 2007). The contri-
bution to the literatures on boundary spanning and construction project management 
(Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Loosemore, 1999; Lysonski & Woodside, 1989) consists in 
identifying three relational exchange competences of construction project managers 
and explaining their role in mitigating boundary spanners’ role constraints and their 
effects on relationships with their exchange counterparts and project performance.  
 
6.2. Summary of Managerial Implications 
We studied reverse auctions in two contexts that belong to two different industries: 
online marketplaces for IT services and public tenders for building construction pro-
jects. Consequently, some of the managerial insights resulting from the four studies 
are context-specific, while others can be generalized across contexts. The managerial 
insight for different stakeholders and contexts are summarized in Figure 6-1 and dis-
cussed in detail below. 
6.2.1. Implications for market-makers and auction 
designers 
First of all, we suggest that the bidding outcomes of auctions and the execution stage 
of auctioned building construction projects (as well as IT projects) can benefit from 
the adjusted auction design that we suggest in Chapter 5. We suggested that the de-
sign of reverse auctions for projects, in which uncertainty and contingencies are ex-
pected (such as in the one featured in the present study) can incorporate a price/ 
quality award rule with some weight allocated to the project managers’ skills, particu-
larly the level of the relational exchange competences. This would allow companies 
with competent project managers to have an advantage in bidding for complex pro-
jects. This is likely to be applicable to IT projects (e.g. custom software development) 
and building construction projects, which are particularly prone to contingencies at 
the execution stage (Kern et al., 2002) and the role of the vendor’s project manager 
and his/her skills is very important (Levina & Vaast, 2005). 
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Two other insights are more relevant to the context of the online IT services market-
place. The first of these insights concerns the reduction of buyer’s bid evaluation 
costs (Chapter 3). Since market-makers benefit from the buyer’s ability to decrease 
evaluation costs (which drives up the number of allocated projects) by earning more 
commission fees from realized projects, it is in their best interests to encourage the 
growth of buyer awareness of the cost-reducing tactics, e.g. by promoting “best prac-
tices” for sourcing among buyers, making available case studies and making the use of 
tactics more intuitive, especially for buyers who lack experience.  
Another insight comes from Chapter 4, where our exploratory analysis identified four 
clusters of repeat buyers of IT services. The presence of a large cluster of Recurrent 
buyers can have far-reaching consequences for the online marketplaces. As the reli-
ance on non-contractible elements of exchange (e.g. trust, reciprocity, etc) increases, 
recurrent relationships can gradually evolve into even closer forms of exchange such 
as relational contracting (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). For an online marketplace such 
as the one investigated in Chapter 4, this means that buyers in relational dyads would 
experience less need for the mechanisms of formal governance (e.g. formal terms and 
conditions, arbitration, rating systems), as it comes at additional cost, and at some 
point the buyer might choose to abandon the marketplace to avoid service fees. We 
suggest that to prevent relational dyads from leaving, online marketplaces need to 
specially cater for close buyer-supplier relationships. They must address the key char-
acteristics of such relationships, such as their longer-term nature, intensive informa-
tion exchange, and accumulation and re-use of knowledge, e.g. by providing more 
value-added, collaboration-oriented functionality to support project execution, learn-
ing, information exchange and communication between long-term partners. 
6.2.2. Implications for buyers of services 
The results of Chapter 2 suggest that buyers who are satisfied with their incumbent 
vendors avoid using reverse auctions. The two groups who opt eagerly for reverse 
auctions instead of negotiations are new buyers (who, apparently, want to explore the 
marketplace by having a number of suppliers compete for their projects) and buyers 
who are unhappy with the performance of their incumbent suppliers. Unlike what 
one previous study suggests (Jap, 2002), buyers on the online marketplace for IT ser-
vices seem to avoid using auctions “as a wake-up call for their incumbent supply 
base”.  
Also, Chapter 5 suggested that auctioning complex construction projects, can lead to 
problems with the performance and inter-organisational relationships during the re-
alization of the projects, in case market conditions and other factors lead to low con-
tract prices. 
Once a buyer decides to start a reverse auction, the buyer should keep in mind the 
five tactics that are likely to help decrease the bid evaluation costs to successfully allo-
cate their project. As the evaluation costs decrease, there is less chance for “perfectly 
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acceptable bids” to be ignored just because of the high expected level of evaluation 
costs (Carr, 2003). This leads to smaller overall efficiency loss in the sourcing process. 
Such an increased buyer ability to cope with evaluation costs and take contracting 
decisions is beneficial for vendors, too. 
6.2.3. Implications for suppliers of services 
According to the analysis in Chapter 5, boundary spanners with strong relational ex-
change competences are better positioned to cope with the complexities and uncer-
tainties of construction projects. Therefore, assigning a boundary spanner with an 
appropriate level of relational exchange competences to projects with a high level of 
uncertainty is a strategic choice that can be made in advance by decision-makers, on 
the basis of the analysis of project characteristics. This is in line with the insight of 
Aldrich et al. (1976), that abilities of boundary spanners are a critical differentiator in 
heterogeneous environments characterized by high pressure and many contingencies.  
We suggest that this conclusion is also likely to hold for complex IT services projects, 
where boundary spanning between organisations is a critical factor for their collabora-
tion and performance (Levina & Vaast, 2005). 
Finally, one implication for the vendors of IT services on marketplaces such as 
Elance and RentACoder is that before committing to bidding in auction they should 
pay attention to the buyer’s track record in terms of awarding/ not awarding previous 
projects, as well as to the steps a given buyer is taking to reduce its evaluation costs. 
This can help vendors develop heuristics and avoid bidding for projects that have low 
chances of being awarded.  
 
6.3. Limitations  
We have already extensively discussed the limitations of the four individual studies of 
this thesis in the four respective empirical chapters. In this section we briefly go 
through these limitations once again, by discussing first the limitations that deal with 
the focus, assumptions and operationalization of constructs in the individual studies, 
and then more general ones that have to do with the methods and the type of data 
used in the thesis.  
In this thesis we utilized two main types of data – transaction records from an online 
service marketplace and qualitative data obtained in a longitudinal case study – to test 
and develop theories that are rooted in a number of theoretical perspectives, such as 
transaction costs theory, auction theory, contract theory, organisational perspective of 
boundary spanning, and others. A distinct theoretical focus of each of the four stud-
ies led to a situation in which constructs and data had to be matched in a unique 
combination, appropriate for a given deductive or inductive empirical exercise. Con-
sequently, most of the limitations are specific to the individual chapters.  
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A key limitation of Chapter 2 “Choosing between Auctions and Negotiations in Online Mar-
kets for IT Services” is that we cannot fully compare the effects of prior relationships on 
the allocation mechanism choice to factors identified by prior studies, such as con-
tract complexity (Bajari et al., 2006). The measures for complexity available at our 
marketplace lack the refinement necessary for drawing such conclusions.  
In Chapter 3 “Coping with Costly Bid Evaluation in Online Markets for IT Services”, the hy-
potheses rely on an assumption that the use of cost-reducing tactics has negligible 
costs compared to the costs of bid evaluation. As our empirical investigation did not 
produce any evidence that extensively describing RFPs and negotiating with vendors 
results in a lower project allocation likelihood, which would signal increased total 
costs, this assumption seems plausible. Another issue in Chapter 3 is the metrics used 
to account for the use of some of the tactics. For instance, the measurements used to 
capture negotiation and search might not fully account for the relevant buyer efforts 
to negotiate and search in the online marketplace. Indeed, we only trace the presence 
of invited vendors at an auction and references to message board discussions in bids 
instead of directly measuring relevant efforts (e.g. time spent on searching in the ven-
dor database and number of messages exchanged between parties). However, this 
only implies a stricter test of the underlying theoretical effects, and the actual impact 
of the tactics can be expected to be stronger, rather than weaker.  
In Chapter 4 “Heterogeneity of Buyer-Supplier Exchange Relationships in Online Markets for IT 
Services”, a considerable limitation is that the nature of the online marketplace did not 
provide an opportunity to collect systematic data on non-contractible attributes of 
exchange relationships. In addition, in this chapter we focus only on online exchange 
relationships, although they might provide an incomplete picture of buyers’ exchange 
activities: future studies should extend the scope by gathering and analyzing data on 
offline exchange relationships along with online relationships. 
In Chapter 5 “The Impact of Reverse Auctions on the Execution of a Construction Services Pro-
ject”, which is another inductive study, we identify several rival explanations to some 
of our findings that should be dealt with in further research that would enhance the 
maturity of the emerging theory. In particular, further survey-based cross-sectional 
studies could take into account and measure the level of role constraints and technical 
expertise, as well as account for the different types of work performed by contractors 
in construction projects. Two other specific limitations of Chapter 5 are related to the 
use of the English language, non-native for both the researchers and the respondents, 
and to the focus of the study, constrained to contractors’ project managers. One of 
the suggestions for future research in Section 6.5 deals specifically with this latter is-
sue.  
The final issue to be discussed here is the limitations of the case study research 
method, which we employed in Chapter 5. A key criticism of the case study research 
method is believed to be the limited generalizability of its findings to other empirical 
settings, which case study theorists rebuff by arguing that it is not a goal of case study 
research to achieve statistical generalizations; rather, the goal is the generalizability to 
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theory (Lee, 1989; Yin, 2002). Having conducted an inductive case study, we regard 
its findings as a first step in theory building, which requires further development, re-
finement, and testing by deductive methods. We discuss these and other directions of 
research in the next section.  
 
6.4. Generalizability Issues 
A theory that lacks generalizability lacks usefulness (Lee & Baskerville, 2003). In this 
subsection we discuss issues related to the generalizability of our findings. More spe-
cifically, we discuss issues that are relevant to all theories developed in this thesis in 
general, rather than specific generalizability issues applicable to individual research 
projects. The latter have been addressed in the individual chapters. Similarly, we do 
not discuss here a process used to ensure theoretical generalizability of the case study 
findings – the details on that can be found in section 5.4. 
The theory development process in this thesis relied on stylized facts and data from 
two empirical settings: online marketplaces for IT services and tenders in the building 
construction industry. The theoretical findings should be generalized with caution 
beyond these areas. There are several aspects of generalizability that we explicitly ad-
dress here: generalizability for large project sizes, different online markets and differ-
ent types of services.  
Project size. Our findings were obtained with the data from a marketplace that con-
sists of small and medium companies as well as freelancers. The average size of the 
contracts we studied is much smaller than the size of typical B2B software develop-
ment contracts. As Gefen and Carmel (2008) note in a study that uses data from a 
marketplace similar to ours: “Such contracts span from three to six orders of magni-
tude larger than the typical Rent A Coder contract and thus different marketplace 
behaviour is likely” (Gefen & Carmel, 2008: 11). The results of Chapters 2-4 should 
be generalized to larger transactions with much caution, as larger companies are likely 
to employ much more formalized procedures and rules for the choice of allocation 
mechanisms, choice of vendors and project execution.  
Examples of more formalized procedures include studies into the procurement auc-
tions of electronic components or automotive parts, where a winner is always selected 
(Jap, 2003; Zhong & Wu, 2006); and studies into the public procurement of construc-
tion services, where buyers are obliged to use tenders (rather than negotiations) when 
certain criteria (e.g. monetary volume of the project) are met (Bajari et al., 2006).  
Other online marketplaces for IT services. Chapters 2 to 4 use transaction data 
from a single (although the most populated one) subdivision of a leading online ser-
vice marketplace – Web Development. Other marketplaces for professional services, 
such as oDesk, onForce or eWork all have their own peculiarities in the way they al-
low entrance of buyers and vendors to the marketplace, the bidding procedures and 
the way collaboration between buyers and vendors is organized during the project 
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execution stage. Although our investigations (that are outside the scope of this disser-
tation) showed that at least part of the findings (e.g. those in Chapter 3) hold for the 
data from RentACoder marketplace as well, further attempts to apply our findings to 
other online marketplaces should at least take into account the difference in the de-
sign between the marketplaces.  
Other services. As the area of the application of online reverse auctions is expanding 
within and beyond IT services and building construction services, other types of ser-
vice contracts that start to be auctioned include professional services such as tax con-
sulting, legal advice or language translation. The findings of this thesis are likely to be 
highly relevant for those services where evaluation costs represent an important issue 
(e.g. legal advice or tax advice), where auctioning and negotiating contracts are equally 
viable options, repeat buying is a commonplace practice and where the interaction 
between buyers and vendors during the project execution stage is complex and im-
portant for the overall project performance.  
On the other hand, it is quite likely that other contexts contain numerous examples of 
different context-specific actor behaviour, and further research into these contexts 
will produce many valuable contributions for both theory and practice.   
 
6.5. Further Research 
We organize the discussion of suggestions for further research around the three fa-
miliar problem areas: auction context, service characteristics and buyer-supplier rela-
tionships. At the end of this section we also elaborate on several more general re-
search themes inspired by this research.  
6.5.1. Auction context, service characteristics and 
buyer-supplier relationships 
There are several ways to generate additional insights into the three problem areas on 
the basis of what has already been done in this dissertation. We analyse them by dis-
cussing extensions to each of our four empirical chapters. For instance, the research 
in Chapter 2, “Choosing between Auctions and Negotiations in Online Markets for IT Services”, 
can be further enhanced by providing a basis for assessing the relative effects of fac-
tors from our study as well as previous studies (especially the effect of project com-
plexity) on mechanism choice. This can be achieved by collecting additional data 
from IT services buyers by means of a survey. This approach to data collection will 
also allow for the gathering of companies’ demographic data and explicitly accounting 
for it in the analysis.  
There are several ways to extend and capitalize on the findings of Chapter 3 “Coping 
with Costly Bid Evaluation in Online Markets for IT Services”. This can be done by sepa-
rately or jointly applying a number of approaches and methods, such as analytical 
modelling, laboratory experiments and field research. First, further testing of the hy-
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pothesized relationships and, especially, of the underlying evaluation cost reduction 
mechanisms should be carried out. This can be done in a laboratory setting that pro-
vides a proper environment to measure actors’ hidden attributes, such as the level of 
evaluation costs, and also enables researchers to extend the generalizability by ensur-
ing control over interfering factors. Second, analytical modelling using auction theory 
can be applied to model buyer equilibrium behaviour with regard to the use of evalua-
tion cost-reducing tactics.  
An important direction for further research regarding Chapter 4 “Heterogeneity of Buyer-
Supplier Exchange Relationships in Online Markets for IT Services”, which can help gain in-
sights into the sources of the heterogeneity, is the evolution of portfolios of exchange 
relationships over time. Another interesting direction for further research is testing 
the generalizability of the above findings across other online marketplaces and indus-
tries (e.g. building construction and professional services), as well as across firms of 
larger size. 
In Chapter 4 we focused only on online transactions; however, they might provide an 
incomplete picture of buyers’ exchange activities. Future studies should extend the 
scope by gathering and analyzing data on offline exchange relationships, along with 
online relationships. 
With regard to Chapter 5 “The Impact of Reverse Auctions on the Execution of a Construction 
Services Project”, future studies should be able to more fully explain the variation in the 
parties’ relationships and project performance by simultaneously taking into account 
competences of boundary spanners on the contractors’ as well as on the client’s side, 
e.g. architects who manage the project on behalf of the client.  
Further research into the impact of reverse auctions during the project execution 
stage and the effect of boundary spanners’ relational exchange competences, in addi-
tion to the theory-testing directions already outlined in the discussion section, should 
focus on establishing the generalization of the present findings in other industrial 
contexts where reverse auctions are gaining ground, particularly in the IT services 
industry. 
6.5.2. Other research directions 
We identify several potential directions for future empirical research efforts that are 
inspired by contemplation of research approaches and techniques not utilized in our 
own research, but have the potential to generate very interesting insights.  
For instance, except for touching upon the concept of the ego network in Chapter 4, 
we have not used any of the rich arsenal of social network theory or its analytical 
techniques. Some of the vast opportunities here would include studying the network 
structure of online service marketplaces (Radkevitch et al., 2007; Van Heck & 
Vervest, 1998). Representing buyers and vendors as two types of nodes of a single 
network, with links being bids for projects and/or executed projects, could tell us 
much about the geographical aspects of IT projects and working patterns between 
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the two sides. Particularly interesting could be an examination of the evolution of 
such networks, which would allow a great deal of insight into how vendors learn to 
bid, compete, and deal with buyers; under what circumstances actors choose to leave 
the marketplace; what is the link between competitiveness and the network structure, 
etc. It should be possible to acquire the data necessary for such research by establish-
ing cooperation with online service marketplaces.  
Another potentially fruitful research avenue could be comparative studies of different 
marketplaces, by means of analysing transaction data or conducting quasi-
experiments. This is a way to gain insights into how differences in marketplace design 
(e.g. entry rules, information architecture, reputation system, etc) affect outcomes 
such as bidding for projects, auction prices, project allocation and performance in 
projects. As far as our knowledge is concerned, this research avenue has so far been 
barely touched upon (Radkevitch, van Heck, & Koppius, 2006b).  
One last opportunity to be discussed here consists in combining online transaction 
data with data on the offline activity of actors and their demographic characteristics, 
which can be done, for instance, by means of surveys. This would allow us to under-
stand how online and offline transactions differ from and complement each other, 
something that has been previously studied mostly by theoretical studies (Kim & 
Altinkemer, 2006; Kleindorfer & Wu, 2003), but has recently started to be realized in 
empirical work as well (Brynjolfsson, Hu, & Simester, 2007).  
We hope that pursuing the outlined research directions will help to further advance 
academic and practical knowledge on the procurement of services by the means of 
online reverse auctions, to which this dissertation has made several contributions. 
 
185
 
 
 
 
List of References 
Adams, J. S. 1976. The structure and dynamics of behavior in organizational bound-
ary roles. Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology: 1175-1199. 
Aggarwal, A. 2007. Person-to-Person Offshoring. Offshoring of Services Reaches 
Small Businesses and Homes. Report of Evalueserve Inc. 
Aldrich, H., & Herker, D. 1977. Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Struc-
ture. The Academy of Management Review, 2(2): 217-230. 
Allen, D. W., & Lueck, D. 1992. The" Back Forty" on a Handshake: Specific Assets, 
Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts. Journal of Law, Economics, 
& Organization, 8(2): 366-376. 
Allen, D. W., & Lueck, D. 1993. Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare 
Contracts. The RAND Journal of Economics, 24(1): 78-100. 
Alston, L. J., Datta, S. K., & Nugent, J. B. 1984. Tenancy Choice in a Competitive 
Framework with Transactions Costs. The Journal of Political Economy, 92(6): 
1121-1133. 
Altman, B. 2003. Reverse Auctions Destroy Relationships. Manufacturing Engi-
neering, 130(6). 
Arbin, K., & Hultman, J. 2003. Reversed electronic auctions B2B: Successful for 
which products? Paper presented at the 12th International IPSERA Conference, 
Budapest, Hungary. 
Axelsson, B., & Wynstra, F. 2002. Buying business services. Chichester: Wiley. 
Bajari, P. L., McMillan, R., & Tadelis, S. 2006. Auctions versus Negotiations in Pro-
curement: An Empirical Analysis. NBER Working Paper No. w9757: 1-30. 
Bajari, P. L., & Tadelis, S. 2001. Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of 
Procurement Contracts. Rand Journal of Economics, 32(2): 287-307. 
Bakos, J. Y. 1991. A Strategic Analysis of Electronic Marketplaces. MIS Quarterly, 
15(3): 295-310. 
Bakos, J. Y. 1997. Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic Market-
places. Management Science, 43(12): 1676-1692. 
Bakos, J. Y., & Brynjolfsson, E. 1993a. From Vendors to Partners: Information 
Technology and Incomplete Contracts in Buyer-Supplier Relationships. Journal of 
Organizational Computing, 3(3): 301-328. 
Bakos, J. Y., & Brynjolfsson, E. 1993b. Information technology, incentives, and the 
optimal number of suppliers. Journal of Management Information Systems, 10(2): 
37-53. 
186
 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
172
Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. 2000. Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: 
A Study of the Indian Software Industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3): 
989-1017. 
Bapna, R., Goes, P., Gupta, A., & Jin, Y. 2004. User Heterogeneity and its Impact on 
Electronic Auction Market Design: An Empirical Exploration. MIS Quarterly, 28(1): 
21-43. 
Bartezzaghi, E., & Ronchi, S. 2003. Internet supporting the procurement process: 
lessons from four case studies. Integrated Manufacturing Systems, 14(8): 632–641. 
Barua, A., Ravindran, S., & Whinston, A. B. 1997. Efficient Selection of Suppliers 
over the Internet. Journal of Management Information Systems, 13(4): 117 - 137. 
Beall, S., Carter, C. R., Carter, P. L., Germer, T., Hendrick, T. E., Jap, S. D., Kauf-
mann, L., Maciejewski, D., Monczka, R. M., & Petersen, K. 2003. The Role of Re-
verse Auctions in Strategic Sourcing: CAPS. 
Bensaou, M. 1999. Portfolios of Buyer-Supplier Relationships. MIT Sloan Man-
agement Review, 40(4): 35–44. 
Bensaou, M., & Venkatraman, N. 1995. Configurations of Interorganizational Rela-
tionships: A Comparison Between U.S. and Japanese Automakers. Management 
Science, 41(9): 1471-1492. 
Bonaccorsi, A., Lyon, T. P., Pammolli, F., & Turchetti, G. 2000. Auctions vs. Bar-
gaining: An Empirical Analysis of Medical Device Procurement, Working paper, 
Department of Economics, University of Washington. 
Boulton, W. R., Lindsay, W. M., Franklin, S. G., & Rue, L. W. 1982. Strategic Plan-
ning: Determining the Impact of Environmental Characteristics and Uncertainty. 
The Academy of Management Journal, 25(3): 500-509. 
Boyatzis, R. 1982. The competent manager: a model for effective performance: 
Wiley. 
Brynjolfsson, E., Hu, Y. U. J., & Simester, D. 2007. Goodbye Pareto Principle, Hello 
Long Tail: The Effect of Search Costs on the Concentration of Product Sales, Avail-
able at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=953587  
Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. 1996. Auctions Versus Negotiations. The American 
Economic Review, 86(1): 180-194. 
Cannon, J. P., & Perreault Jr, W. D. 1999. Buyer-Seller Relationships in Business 
Markets. Journal of Marketing Research, November: 439-460. 
Carr, S. M. 2003. Note on Online Auctions with Costly Bid Evaluation. Manage-
ment Science, 49(11): 1521-1528. 
187
 
 
 
 
References 
  
 
173
Carter, C. R., Kaufmann, L., Beall, S., & Carter, P. L. 2004. Reverse auctions - 
grounded theory from the buyer and supplier perspective. Transportation Re-
search. Part E, Logistics & Transportation Review, 40E(3): 229. 
Cheung, S. O., Yiu, T. W. Y., & Yeung, S. F. 2006. A Study of Styles and Outcomes 
in Construction Dispute Negotiation. Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management, 132: 805. 
Choudhury, V., Hartzel, K. S., & Konsynski, B. R. 1998. Uses and Consequences of 
Electronic Markets: An Empirical Investigation in the Aircraft Parts Industry. MIS 
Quarterly, 22(4): 471-507. 
Clemons, E. K., Hann, I. H., & Hitt, L. M. 2002. Price Dispersion and Differentiation 
in Online Travel: An Empirical Investigation. Management Science, 48(4): 534-549. 
Clemons, E. K., Reddi, S. P., & Row, M. 1993. The Impact of Information Technol-
ogy on the Organization of Economic Activity: The "Move to the Middle" Hypothe-
sis. Journal of Management Information Systems, 10(2): pp. 9-36. 
Coppinger, V., Smith, V., & Titus, J. 1980. Incentives and Behavior in English, Dutch 
and Sealed-Bid Auctions. Economic Inquiry, 18(1): 1-22. 
Corts, K. S., & Singh, J. 2004. The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract 
Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling. Journal of Law, Economics, and Or-
ganization, 20(1): 230-260. 
Cox, J., Roberson, B., & Smith, V. 1982. Theory and Behavior of Single Object Auc-
tions. Research in Experimental Economics, 2: 1-43. 
Daly, S., & Nath, P. 2005. Reverse Auctions for Relationship Marketers. Industrial 
Marketing Management, 34(2): 157-166. 
Dani, S., Burns, N., & Backhouse, C. 2005. Buyer–supplier behaviour in electronic 
reverse auctions: a relationships perspective. International Journal of Services and 
Operations Management, 1(1): 22-34. 
Day, G. S. 1995. Advantageous alliances. Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 23(4): 297-300. 
Dollinger, M. J. 1984. Environmental Boundary Spanning and Information Process-
ing Effects on Organizational Performance. The Academy of Management Jour-
nal, 27(2): 351-368. 
Donnet, M. L., Jeitschko, T. D., & Weatherspoon, D. D. 2007. The Impact of E-
Auctions in Adjusting Procurement Strategies for Specialty Coffee, SSRN. 
Duncan, R. B. 1972. Characteristics of Organizational Environments and Perceived 
Environmental Uncertainty. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(3): 313-327. 
Dwyer, F. R., Schurr, P. H., & Oh, S. 1987. Developing Buyer-Supplier Relationships. 
Journal of Marketing, 52(April): 21-34. 
188
 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
174
Economist. 2007. Business schools and research. Practically irrelevant?, The 
Economist, Vol. Aug 28th. 
Edum-Fotwe, F. T., & McCaffer, R. 2000. Developing project management compe-
tency: perspectives from the construction industry. International Journal of Project 
Management, 18(2): 111-124. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14: 532-550. 
Ellison, G., & Ellison, S. F. 2005. Lessons about Markets from the Internet. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 19(2): 139-158. 
Elmaghraby, W. 2007. Auctions within e-Sourcing Events. Production and Opera-
tions Management, 16(4): 409-422. 
Emiliani, M. L. 2004. Sourcing in the global aerospace supply chain using online re-
verse auctions. Industrial Marketing Management, 33(1): 65. 
Emiliani, M. L., & Stec, D. J. 2002. Realizing savings from online reverse auctions. 
Supply Chain Management, 7(1): 12. 
Emiliani, M. L., & Stec, D. J. 2004. Aerospace Parts Suppliers' Reaction to Online 
Reverse Auctions. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 9(2): 
139-153. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. 2000. Empirical Contributions to the Theory of Auc-
tions or Why Do Real Bidders Bid the Way They Do? Paper presented at the 
Notes prepared for the Clarence W. Tow  Conference on Applied Research Concern-
ing Auctions and Mechanism Design., Iowa City, IA. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Katok, E. 2006. E-Sourcing in Procurement: Theory and 
Behavior in Reverse Auctions with Non-Competitive Contracts. Management Sci-
ence, 52: 581-596. 
Fleming, L., & Waguespack, D. M. 2007. Brokerage, Boundary Spanning, and Leader-
ship in Open Innovation Communities. Organization Science, 18(2): 165. 
Franz, C., & Robey, D. 1984. An investigation of user-led system design: rational and 
political perspectives. Communications of the ACM, 27(12): 1202-1209. 
Friedman, R., & Podolny, J. 1992. Differentiation of Boundary Spanning Roles: La-
bor Negotiations and Implications for Role Conflict. Administrative Science Quar-
terly, 37(1): 28-47. 
Galbraith, J. R. 1973. Designing Complex Organizations: Addison-Wesley Long-
man Publishing Co., Inc. Boston, MA, USA. 
Galliers, R., Markus, M. L., & Newell, S. 2007. Exploring Information Systems 
Research Approaches: Readings and Reflections: Routledge. 
189
 
 
 
 
References 
  
 
175
Ganesan, S. 1994. Determinants of Long-term Orientation in Buyer-Supplier Rela-
tionships. Journal of Marketing, 58: 1-19. 
Gardiner, P., & Simmons, J. 1998. Conflict in Small- and Medium-Sized Projects: 
Case of Partnering to the Rescue. Journal of Management in Engineering, 14(1): 
35-40. 
Gartner. 2007. Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies, 2007. 
Gattiker, T. F., Huang, X., & Schwarz, J. L. 2007. Negotiation, Email, And Internet 
Reverse Auctions: How Sourcing Mechanisms Deployed By Buyers Affect Suppliers 
Trust. Journal of Operations Management, 25: 184-202. 
Gefen, D., & Carmel, E. 2008. Is the World Really Flat? A Look at Offshoring at an 
Online Programming Marketplace. MIS Quarterly, 32(8). 
Goerzen, A., & Beamish, P. W. 2005. The Effect of Alliance Network Diversity on 
Multinational Enterprise Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26(4): 333-
354. 
Goldberg, V. P. 1977. Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract In-
formation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 8(1): 250-261. 
Greene, W. H. 2003. Econometric Analysis. 5th edn. edition. New Jercy: Prentice-
Hall. 
Grey, W., Olavson, T., & Shi, D. 2005. The role of e-marketplaces in relationship-
based supply chains. IBM Systems Journal, 44(1): 109-123. 
Griffith, D. A., Harvey, M. G., & Lusch, R. F. 2006. Social Exchange in Inter-
organizational Relationships: The Resulting Benefits of Procedural and Distributive 
Justice. Journal of Operations Management, 24(2): 85-98. 
Grönroos, C. 2000. Service Management and Marketing. Chichester: Wiley. 
Grover, V., & Ramanlal, P. 1999. Six Myths of Information and Markets: Information 
Technology Networks, Electronic Commerce, and the Battle for Consumer Surplus. 
MIS Quarterly, 23(4): 465-495. 
Gulati, R. 1995. Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for 
Contractual Choice in Alliances. The Academy of Management Journal, 38(1): 85-
112. 
Hansen, R. G. 1985. Empirical Testing of Auction Theory. The American Eco-
nomic Review, 75(2): 156-159. 
Hansen, R. G. 1986. Sealed-Bid versus Open Auctions: The Evidence. Economic 
Inquiry, 24(1): 125-142. 
Heide, J. B., & John, G. 1992. Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships? Journal 
of Marketing, 56(2): 32-44. 
190
 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
176
Heide, J. B., & Miner, A. S. 1992. The Shadow of the Future: Effects of Anticipated 
Interaction and Frequency of Contact on Buyer-Seller Cooperation. The Academy 
of Management Journal, 35(2): 265-291. 
Hoetker, G. 2007. The Use of Logit and Probit Models in Strategic Management Re-
search: Critical Issues. Strategic Management Journal, 28(4): 331-343. 
Holland, C. P., & Lockett, A. G. 1997. Mixed Mode Network Structures: The Strate-
gic Use of Electronic Communication by Organizations. Organization Science, 
8(5): 475-488. 
Hornby, S., Atkins, J., Beale, H., Campbell, M., & Sanders, L. 2000. Collaborative 
Care: Interprofessional, Interagency and Interpersonal: Blackwell Science Inc. 
Jaccard, J. 2001. Interaction Effects in Logistic Regression: Sage Publications. 
James, P. 2003. Buyer Auctions and Supplier Relationships. Government Opportu-
nities, October. 
Jap, S. D. 2002. Online Reverse Auctions: Issues, Themes, and Prospects for the Fu-
ture. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 30(4): 506. 
Jap, S. D. 2003. An Exploratory Study of the Introduction of Online Reverse Auc-
tions. Journal of Marketing, 67(3): 96-107. 
Jap, S. D. 2007. The Impact of Online Reverse Auction Design on Buyer-Supplier 
Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 71: 146-159. 
Jap, S. D., & Haruvy, E. 2007. Inter-organizational relationships and bidding behavior 
in industrial online reverse auctions, working paper. 
Johnson, M., & Selnes, F. 2004. Customer Portfolio Management: Toward a Dynamic 
Theory of Exchange Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 68(April): 1-17. 
Johnson, R. 1979. Oral Auction versus Sealed Bids: An Empirical Investigation. 
Natural Resources Journal, 19(2): 315-335. 
Kagel, J., Harstad, R., & Levin, D. 1987. Information Impact and Allocation Rules in 
Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study. Econometrica, 55(6): 
1275-1304. 
Kahn, R. H., Wolfe, D. M., Quinn, R., & Snoek, D. J. 1964. Organizational Stress: 
Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity. New York: Wiley. 
Kalnins, A., & Mayer, K. J. 2004. Relationships and Hybrid Contracts: An Analysis of 
Contract Choice in Information Technology. Journal of Law, Economics, and Or-
ganization, 20(1): 207-229. 
Kalwani, M. U., & Narayandas, N. 1995. Long-term Manufacturer-Supplier Relation-
ships: Do They Pay Off for Supplier Firms? Journal of Marketing, 59(January): 1-
16. 
191
 
 
 
 
References 
  
 
177
Kambil, A., & van Heck, E. 2002. Making Markets - How Firms Can Design and 
Profit from Online Auctions and Exchanges. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
Kamecke, U. 1998. Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction. Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 27: 407-426. 
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. 1978. The Social Psychology of Organizations. New York. 
Kaufmann, L., & Carter, C. R. 2004. Deciding on the Mode of Negotiation: To Auc-
tion or Not to Auction Electronically. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 
40(2): 15. 
Kennedy, P. 2003. A Guide to Econometrics: MIT Press. 
Kern, M. C., Brett, J. M., & Weingart, L. R. 2005. Getting the Floor: Motive-
Consistent Strategy and Individual Outcomes in Multi-Party Negotiations. Group 
Decision and Negotiation, 14(1): 21-41. 
Kern, T., Willcocks, L. P., & van Heck, E. 2002. The Winner's Curse in IT Outsourc-
ing: Strategies for Avoiding Relational Trauma. California Management Review, 
44(2): 47-69. 
Kim, J. Y., & Altinkemer, K. 2006. E-lancing: A Tool for Yield Management in the 
IT Service Industry, Krannert School of Management, Working Draft. 
Kleindorfer, P. R., & Wu, D. J. 2003. Integrating Long- and Short-Term Contracting 
via Business-to-Business Exchanges for Capital-Intensive Industries. Management 
Science, 49(11): 1597-1615. 
Koppius, O. R. 2002. Information Architecture and Electronic Market Perform-
ance. Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Kumar, K., & Christiaanse, E. 1999. From static supply chains to dynamic supply 
webs: principles for radical redesign in the age of information. International Con-
ference on Information Systems: 300-306. 
Kumar, N., Stern, L. W., & Achrol, R. S. 1992. Assessing Reseller Performance from 
the Perspective of the Supplier. Journal of Marketing Research, 29(2): 238-253. 
Kwak, M. 2002. Potential Pitfalls of E-Auctions. MIT Sloan Management Review, 
43(2): 18. 
Lafontaine, F. 1992. Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results. The 
RAND Journal of Economics, 23(2): 263-283. 
Lambe, C. J., Spekman, R. E., & Hunt, S. H. 2000. Interimistic Relational Exchange: 
Conceptualization and Proposition Development. Journal of the Academy of Mar-
keting Science, 28: 212-225. 
192
 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
178
Langley, A. 1999. Strategies for Theorizing from Process Data. The Academy of 
Management Review, 24(4): 691-710. 
Lee, A. S. 1989. A Scientific Methodology for MIS Case Studies. MIS Quarterly, 
13(1): 33-52. 
Lee, A. S., & Baskerville, R. L. 2003. Generalizing Generalizability in Information 
Systems Research. Information Systems Research, 14(3): 221-243. 
Leffler, K. B., Rucker, R. R., & Munn, I. A. 2003. The Choice Among Sales Proce-
dures: Auction V. Negotiated Sales Of Private Timber, Working paper, Depart-
ment of Economics, University of Washington. 
Leifer, R., & Huber, G. P. 1977. Relations Among Perceived Environmental Uncer-
tainty, Organization Structure, and Boundary-Spanning Behavior. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 22(2): 235-247. 
Levina, N. 2005. Collaborating on Multiparty Information Systems Development 
Projects: A Collective Reflection-in-Action View. Information Systems Research, 
16(2): 109-130. 
Levina, N., & Ross, J. W. 2003. From the Vendor's Perspective: Exploring the Value 
Proposition in IT Outsourcing. MIS Quarterly, 27(3): 331-364. 
Levina, N., & Vaast, E. 2005. The Emergence of Boundary Spanning Competence in 
Practice: Implications for Implementation and Use of Information Systems. MIS 
Quarterly, 29(2): 335-363. 
Loosemore, M. 1998. Reactive Crisis Management in Constructive Projects - Patterns 
of Communication and Behaviour. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Man-
agement, 6(1): 23-34. 
Loosemore, M. 1999. Bargaining tactics in construction disputes. Construction 
Management and Economics, 17(2): 177-188. 
Lovelock, C. H. 1983. Classifying Services to Gain Strategic Marketing Insights. 
Journal of Marketing, 47: 9-20. 
Lucking-Reiley, D. 1999. Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence between Auc-
tion Formats: Magic on the Internet. The American Economic Review, 89(5): 
1063-1080. 
Lui, S. S., Ngo, H., & Hon, A. H. Y. 2006. Coercive strategy in interfirm cooperation: 
Mediating roles of interpersonal and interorganizational trust. Journal of Business 
Research, 59(4): 466-474. 
Lysonski, S. 1985. A Boundary Theory Investigation of the Product Manager's Role. 
Journal of Marketing, 49(1): 26-40. 
193
 
 
 
 
References 
  
 
179
Lysonski, S., & Woodside, A. G. 1989. Boundary role spanning behavior, conflicts 
and performance of industrial product managers. Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 6(3): 169-184. 
Malhotra, D., & Bazerman, M. H. 2007. Investigative negotiation. Harvard Business 
Review, 85(9): 72-78. 
Malone, T. W., & Laubacher, R. J. 1998. The Dawn of the E-lance Economy. Har-
vard Business Review, 76(5): 144-152. 
Malone, T. W., Yates, J., & Benjamin, R. 1987. Electronic Markets and Electronic 
Hierarchies: Effects of Information Technology on Market Structure and Corporate 
Strategies. Communications of the ACM, 30(6): pp. 484-497. 
Manelli, A. M., & Vincent, D. R. 1995. Optimal Procurement Mechanisms. Econo-
metrica, 63(3): 591-620. 
Mayer, K. J., & Argyres, N. S. 2004. Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Per-
sonal Computer Industry. Organization Science, 15(4): 394-410. 
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. 1987. Auctions and Bidding. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 25(2): 699. 
McDougall, P. 2005. Small-Scale Offshoring InformationWeek, Vol. July 25. 
McGinn, K. L., & Keros, A. T. 2002. Improvisation and the Logic of Exchange in 
Socially Embedded Transactions. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(3): 442-
475. 
Mead, W. J. 1966. Competition and Oligopsony in the Douglas Fir Lumber In-
dustry: University of California Press Berkeley. 
Meyer, A. 2008. Virtual pros, real assistance: As outsourcing grows, online tools find 
helpers who can do the job, Chicago Tribune, Vol. March 3. 
Michell, V., & Fitzgerald, G. 1997. The IT Outsourcing Market-Place: Vendors and 
their Selection. Journal of Information Technology, 12(3): 223-237. 
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook: Sage. 
Milgrom, P. R. 1989. Auctions and bidding: a primer. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 3: 3-22. 
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, J. R. 1982. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding. 
Econometrica, 50: 1089-1122. 
Mingers, J. 2001. Combining IS Research Methods: Towards a Pluralist Methodology. 
Information Systems Research, 12(3): 240-259. 
194
 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
180
Missbauer, H., & Hauber, W. 2006. Bid calculation for construction projects: Regula-
tions and incentive effects of unit price contracts. European journal of operational 
research, 171(3): 1005-1019. 
Mithas, S., & Jones, J. L. 2007. Do Auction Parameters Affect Buyer Surplus in E-
Auctions for Procurement? Production and Operations Management (Forth-
coming). 
Mithas, S., Jones, J. L., & Mitchell, W. 2005. Determinants of Governance Choice in 
Business-to-Business Electronic Markets: An Empirical Analysis. Under first review 
at MIS Quarterly. 
Morris, M., Nadler, J., Kurtzberg, T., & Thompson, L. 2002. Schmooze or lose: So-
cial friction and lubrication in e-mail negotiations. Group Dynamics: Theory Re-
search and Practice, 6(1): 89-100. 
Motorola. 1999. IT Auction Site Is Ace for Buyers, Online business Toolkit Mo-
torola. 
Nair, A. 2005. Emerging internet-enabled auction mechanisms in supply chain. Sup-
ply Chain Management: An International Journal, 10(3): 162-168. 
Nam, K., Rajagopalan, S., Rao, H., & Chaudhury, A. 1996. A Two-level Investigation 
of Information Systems Outsourcing. Communications of the ACM, 39(7): 36-44. 
Noordewier, T., John, G., & Nevin, J. 1990. Performance Outcomes of Purchasing 
Arrangements in Industrial Buyer-Vendor Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 
54(4): 80-92. 
Olsen, R. F., & Ellram, L. M. 1997. A Portfolio Approach to Supplier-Relationships. 
Industrial Marketing Management, 26: 101-113. 
Pearcy, D., & Giunipero, L. 2006. The impact of electronic reverse auctions on pur-
chase price reduction and governance structure: an empirical investigation. Interna-
tional Journal of Services Technology and Management, 7(3): 215-236. 
Pearcy, D., Giunipero, L., & Wilson, A. 2007. A Model of Relational Governance in 
Reverse Auctions. The Journal of Supply Chain Management, 43(1): 4-15. 
Perrone, V., Zaheer, A., & McEvily, B. 2003. Free to Be Trusted? Organizational 
Constraints on Trust in Boundary Spanners. Organization Science, 14(4): 422-439. 
Pettigrew, A. M. 1990. A Longitudinal Field Research on Change: Theory and Prac-
tice. Organizational Science, 1(3): 267-292. 
Pinker, E., Seidmann, A., & Vakrat, Y. 2003. Managing Online Auctions: Current 
Business and Research Issues. Management Science, 49(11): 1457-1484. 
Pinto, J. K. 2000. Understanding the role of politics in successful project manage-
ment. International Journal of Project Management, 18(2): 85-91. 
195
 
 
 
 
References 
  
 
181
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. R. 2002. Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance 
Function as Substitutes or Complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8): 
707-725. 
Poppo, L., Zhou, K. Z., & Ryu, S. 2008. Alternative Origins to Interorganizational 
Trust: An Interdependence Perspective on the Shadow of the Past and the Shadow of 
the Future. Organization Science, 19(1): 39-55. 
Pruitt, D. G., & Lewis, S. A. 1975. Development of integrative solutions in bilateral 
negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31(4): 621-633. 
Radkevitch, U., & van der Valk, W. 2005. Buying Business Services through Auc-
tions: From a Transactional to a Relational Approach. Paper presented at the 
14th annual IPSERA Conference, Archamps, France. 
Radkevitch, U., van Heck, E., & Koppius, O. R. 2006a. Buyer commitment and op-
portunism in an electronic market for IT services, ERIM Report Series Reference 
No.ERS-2006-046-LIS. RSM Erasmus University. Rotterdam. 
Radkevitch, U., van Heck, E., & Koppius, O. R. 2006b. Leveraging Offshore IT Out-
sourcing by SMEs through Online Marketplaces. Journal of Information Technol-
ogy Case and Application, 8(3). 
Radkevitch, U., van Heck, E., & Koppius, O. R. 2006c. Portfolios of Exchange Rela-
tionships: An Empirical Investigation At An Online IT Marketplace For Small Firms, 
RSM Erasmus University Working Paper. Rotterdam. 
Radkevitch, U., van Heck, E., & Koppius, O. R. 2007. Coping with Costly Bid 
Evaluation in Online Reverse Auctions for IT Services., ERIM Report Series Ref-
erence No.ERS-2006-046-LIS. RSM Erasmus University. Rotterdam. 
Radkevitch, U., van Heck, E., & Koppius, O. R. 2008. Choosing between Auctions 
and Negotiations in Online B2B Markets for IT Services: The Effect of Prior Rela-
tionships and Performance, Working paper. Erasmus Research Institute of Man-
agement (ERIM), Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Richmond, W. B., Seidmann, A., & Whinston, A. B. 1992. Incomplete contracting 
issues in information systems development outsourcing. Decision Support Systems, 
8(5): 459-477. 
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. 1992. Structuring Cooperative Relationships be-
tween Organizations. Strategic Management Journal, 13(7): 483-498. 
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. 1994. Developmental Processes of Cooperative In-
terorganizational Relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19: 90-118. 
Robey, D., & Markus, M. L. 1998. Beyond rigor and relevance: producing consum-
able research about information systems. Information Resources Management 
Journal, 11(1): 7-15. 
196
 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
182
Rothkopf, M. H., & Harstad, R. M. 1994. Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical 
Essay. Management Science, 40(3): 364-384. 
Rothkopf, M. H., & Whinston, A. B. 2007. On E-Auctions for Procurement Opera-
tions. Production and Operations Management, 16(4): 404–408. 
Sabherwal, R. 1999. The Role of Trust in Managing Outsourced IS Development 
Projects. Communications of the ACM, 42(2): 80-87. 
Sabherwal, R., Hirschheim, R., & Goles, T. 2001. The Dynamics of Alignment: In-
sights from a Punctuated Equilibrium Model. Organization Science, 12(2): 179-197. 
Sawhney, M. 2003. Forward thinking about reverse auctions. CIO Magazine, 1. 
Sawhney, M., & Zabin, J. 2002. Managing and Measuring Relational Equity in the 
Network Economy. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 30(4): 313. 
Smart, A., & Harrison, A. 2002. Reverse Auctions as a Support Mechanism in Flexi-
ble Supply Chains. International Journal of Logistics: Research & Applications, 
5(3): pp. 275-285. 
Smart, A., & Harrison, A. 2003. Online reverse auctions and their role in buyer-
supplier relationships. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 9(5-6): 
257-268. 
Smith, C. W. 1990. Auctions: The Social Construction of Value: University of 
California Press. 
Snir, E. M., & Hitt, L. M. 2003. Costly Bidding in Online Markets for IT Services. 
Management Science, 49(11): 1504. 
Söderholm, A. 2007. Project management of unexpected events. International Jour-
nal of Project Management. 
Spekman, R. E. 1979. Influence and Information: An Exploratory Investigation of 
the Boundary Role Person's Basis of Power. The Academy of Management Jour-
nal, 22(1): 104-117. 
Stark, R. M. 1974. Unbalanced Highway Contract Tendering. Operational Research 
Quarterly (1970-1977), 25(3): 373-388. 
SupplyManagement.com. 2007. Most buyers shun e-auctions, Vol. November 29. 
Tassabehji, R., Taylor, W., Beach, R., & Wood, A. 2006. Reverse e-auctions and sup-
plier-buyer relationships: an exploratory study. International Journal of Operations 
& Production Management, 26(2): 166-184. 
Thibodeau, P. 2007. Outsourcing the eBay Way: Web Sites Match Users, Contract 
Programmers, Computerworld. 
197
 
 
 
 
References 
  
 
183
Tinsley, C. H., O'Connor, K. M., & Sullivan, B. A. 2002. Tough guys finish last: the 
perils of a distributive reputation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 88(2): 621-642. 
Trigunarsyah, B. 2004. Project owners' role in improving constructability of construc-
tion projects: an example analysis for Indonesia. Construction Management and 
Economics, 22: 861-876. 
Tunca, T. I., & Zenios, S. A. 2006. Supply Auctions and Relational Contracts for Pro-
curement. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 8(1): 43. 
Turnbull, P., Ford, D., & Cunningham, M. 1996. Interaction, relationships and net-
works in business markets: an evolving perspective. Journal of Business & Indus-
trial Marketing, 11(3/4): 44-62. 
Tushman, M. L., & Scanlan, T. J. 1981. Boundary Spanning Individuals: Their Role in 
Information Transfer and Their Antecedents. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 24(2): 289-305. 
Uzzi, B. 1997. Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of 
embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 35-67. 
Våland, T. 2002. Emergence of Conflicts in Complex Projects. Unpublished Dis-
sertation. 
Valsamakis, V., & Groves, G. 1998. Supplier-Customer Relationships and Company 
Performance. The International Journal of Logistics Management,, 9(2): 51-64. 
Van der Blonk, H. 2003. Writing case studies in information systems research. Jour-
nal of Information Technology, 18(1): 45-52. 
Van Heck, E., & Vervest, P. 1998. How should CIOs deal with Web-based auctions? 
Communications of the ACM, 41(7): 99-100. 
Van Tulder, R., & Mol, M. 2002. Reversed Auctions or Auctions reversed: First ex-
periments by Philips. European Management Journal, 20(5): 447-456. 
Vangen, S., & Huxham, C. 1998. The role of trust in the achievement of collaborative 
advantage. 14th EGOS Colloquium, Maastricht: 1-8. 
Vickrey, W. 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. 
Journal of Finance, 16(1): 8-37. 
Wang, S., & Archer, N. 2004. Strategic choice of electronic marketplace functional-
ities: A Buyer-Supplier relationships perspective. Journal of Computer-mediated 
communication, 10(1). 
Wathne, K. H., Biong, H., & Heide, J. B. 2001. Choice of Supplier in Embedded 
Markets: Relationship and Marketing Program Effects. Journal of Marketing, 65(2): 
54-66. 
198
 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
184
Weitz, B., & Jap, S. 1995. Relationship Marketing and Distribution Channels. Journal 
of the Academy of Marketing Science, 23(4): 305-317. 
Whang, S. 1995. Market Provision of Custom Software: Learning Effects and Low 
Balling. Management Science, 41(8): 1343-1352. 
Williams, P. 2002. The Competent Boundary Spanner. Public Administration, 
80(1): 103-124. 
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Mar-
kets and Relational Contracting. New York: The Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. 1991. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete 
structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: pp. 269-296. 
Wilson, D. T. 1995. An integrated model of buyer–seller relationships. Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 23: 335–345. 
Yin, R. K. 2002. Case Study Research, Design and Methods (3rd ed.). Newbury 
Park: Sage Publications. 
Zhong, F. 2007. Empirical Analyses Of Online Procurement Auctions: Business 
Value, Bidding Behavior, Learning And Incumbent Effect. Georgia Institute of 
Technology. 
Zhong, F., & Wu, D. 2006. E-sourcing: Impact of Bidding Behavior and Non-
price Attributes. Paper presented at the 27th International Conference on Informa-
tion Systems, Milwaukee, WI. 
 
199
 
 
 
 
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Online omgekeerde veilingen voor het inkopen van services 
 
Online omgekeerde veilingen, waarbij de kopers de verkopers selecteren en de 
winnende verkoper het contract krijgt, hebben zakelijke inkoopactiviteiten sterk 
verander in het begin van de 21ste eeuw. Kort nadat General Electric de eerste 
omgekeerde veilingen introduceerde, waren bedrijven snel in het adopteren van deze 
type veilingen om de inkoopprocessen van producten en diensten te optimaliseren. 
Echter, de adoptie van omgekeerde veilingen werd tegengewerkt door leveranciers, 
industriële verenigingen en zelfs een aantal kopers door het ontstaan van negatieve 
effecten van veilinggerelateerde concurrentie. De hype is inmiddels verdwenen en 
bedrijven gaan door met hen experimenteren met online omgekeerde veilingen. 
Daarom is het belangrijk om begrip te krijgen voor effecten van de interacties tussen 
de veilingcontext, dienstkarakteristieken en koper-verkoper relaties op 
veilingresultaten en het succes van veilinggerelateerde projecten. 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt het gebruik, proces en uitkomsten van online 
omgekeerde veilingen in dienstensector. Doordat diensten (zoals 
softwareontwikkeling, bouw van gebouwen) over het algemeen complexer zijn dan 
producten, zijn diensten tevens moeilijker te omschrijven, informatie betreffende 
transactieaspecten is vaak asymmetrisch en intensievere communicatie tussen 
bedrijven is vereist. Dit vormt een uitdaging voor bestaande theorieën, die 
veilinguitkomsten analyseren. Om systematisch praktisch inzichten te verkrijgen en 
een theoretische begrip te ontwikkelen omtrent omgekeerde veilingen voor diensten, 
werden in deze studie verschillende aspecten van veilinggerelateerde contracten 
geanalyseerd, waaronder de keuzes van kopers tussen veilingen en onderhandelingen, 
de beslissingen rondom contracttoekenning binnen veilingen, de heterogeniteit van 
inkoopgedrag van kopers en de gerelateerde prestaties, en het effect van 
veilinguitkomsten op koper-verkoper relaties en projectprestaties gedurende de 
uitvoeringsfase van projecten.  
Vier empirische onderzoeken zijn uitgevoerd om onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden. 
Drie van deze empirische onderzoeken zijn uitgevoerd in de context van online 
markten voor IT diensten, waar duizenden kopers en verkopers elkaar ontmoeten en 
transacties uitvoeren. We hebben data over 10,000 afzonderlijke transacties 
verzameld. We hebben tevens data over ongeveer 100 actieve kopers. Deze gegevens 
beslaan hun individuele koopactiviteiten over enkele jaren. Verschillende statistische 
technieken, waaronder zowel confirmerende als verkennende benaderingen, zijn 
gebruikt om de data te analyseren. Het vierde onderzoek is een 9-maanden durende 
longitudinaal verkennende case study over de veiling en realisatie van een 
gemeentelijke gebouwrenovatie project in Amsterdam. 
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De onderzoeksresultaten leiden tot de volgende inzichten: 1) door de herhaaldelijke 
interacties met verkopers én de tevredenheid over de eerdere verkoperprestaties 
hebben kopers meer voorkeur voor onderhandelingen (in plaats van gebruik van 
veilingen) om het volgende project, 2) de identificatie van vijf koperstactieken, die de 
waarschijnlijkheid van contracttoekenning vergroten 3) de identificatie van vier 
patronen voor het aankopen diensten (transactie kopers, herhaaldelijke kopers, kleine 
diversifieerders, en grote diversifieerders) en tevens de theoretische eigenschappen 
geïdentificeerd, en (4) uitleggen hoe de uitkomsten van omgekeerde veilingen in de 
bouwsector kunnen bijdragen aan verregaande beperkingen van de rollen van 
projectmanagers en hoe project managers relationele marktcompetenties kunnen 
gebruiken om deze beperkingen te overwinnen. 
Het aankopen van diensten via omgekeerde veilingen verschilt van het aankopen van 
producten. Dit proefschrift maakt de eerste step in de ontwikkeling van theorieën om 
dat verschil te verklaren. 
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Аннотация (Summary in Russian) 
 
Онлайновые обратные аукционы для закупки услуг 
 
Распространение онлайновых обратных аукционов, на которых покупатели 
выбирают поставщика, а поставщики конкурируют за контракты, произвело 
революцию в сфере корпоративных закупок в начале 21-го века. Вскоре после 
того, как такие аукционы был впервые внедрены корпорацией Дженерал 
Электрик, множество компаний поспешили принять их на вооружение для 
оптимизации деятельности по закупке товаров и услуг. Однако, в скором 
времени распространение обратных аукционов натолкнулось на сопротивление 
со стороны ряда поставщиков, промышленных ассоциаций и даже некоторых 
покупателей, поскольку стали проявляться отрицательные последствия жесткой 
конкуренции, которую такие аукционы поощряют среди поставщиков. Сегодня 
ажиотаж вокруг обратных аукционов несколько спал, но множество компаний 
продолжают активно экспериментировать с их использованием для 
организации закупок. В связи с этим представляется важным выяснить, каким 
образом взаимодействие контекста, в котором проводятся аукционы, 
характеристик покупаемых услуг, и взаимоотношений между покупателями и 
поставщиками, влияет на результаты аукционов, а также на успешную 
реализацию размещенных посредством аукционов контрактов.  
Данная диссертация на соискание степени PhD исследует использование, 
процессы и результаты онлайновых аукционов по закупке услуг. Поскольку 
услуги (такие как разработка программного обеспечения, строительные услуги) 
зачастую более сложны для четкого описания, чем товары, а информация 
касательно различных аспектов транзакций асимметрична, возникает 
необходимость более интенсивного взаимодействия между покупателем и 
поставщиками для осуществления таких транзакций. Эти обстоятельства 
бросают вызов существующим теориям, объясняющим результаты аукционов. 
Для того, чтобы получить систематическое представление о реальной практике 
проведения обратных аукционов по закупке услуг и расширить их понимание с 
теоретической точки зрения, мы изучили ряд важных аспектов проведения 
таких аукционов. В частности, мы изучили проблему выбора покупателя между 
использованием аукциона и двусторонних переговоров для размещения 
контрактов на онлайновых рынках ИТ-услуг; проблему принятия решения о 
размещении или не размещении контракта покупателем по результатам 
аукциона; гетерогенность поведения покупателей ИТ-услуг и ее последствия 
для успешной реализации контрактов; а также влияние результатов аукционов 
на взаимоотношения между покупателем и поставщиком и успешность 
контракта на стадии его реализации в контексте строительной отрасли.  
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Для того, чтобы ответить на поставленные вопросы было осуществлено четыре 
исследовательских проекта. Три из них были реализованы в контексте 
онлайнового рынка IT-услуг, где десятки тысяч покупателей и поставщиков IT-
услуг находят партнеров и реализуют проекты по созданию веб-сайтов и 
программного обеспечения. Мы собрали и проанализировали данные о более 
чем 10.000 подобных транзакций, а также подробные данные об истории 
закупок, осуществеленных сотней активных покупателей за период 
протяженностью в несколько лет. Для анализа данных был использован 
широкий набор статистических методов, направленных как на верификацию, 
так и на генерацию гипотез. Четвертый проект – это анализ конкретного случая 
(longitudinal case study) проведения онлайнового тендера и реализации 
строительного проекта по реновации муниципального здания в Амстердаме.  
В результате исследования получены следующие основные результаты. Во 
первых, установлено, что повторные транзации между поставщиками и 
покупателями, а также уровень удовлетворения от оказанных поставщиком 
услуг в предыдущих транзакциях положительно влияют на использования 
переговоров (а не аукционов) покупателем для размещения следующего 
проекта. Во-вторых, выявлено пять тактик, которые позволяют покупателям 
повысить вероятность размещения контракта за счет снижения издержек на 
оценку предложений поставщиков в контексте онлайнового рынка IT-услуг. В 
третьих, выявлено четыре вида устойчивого поведения покупателей (мы 
назвали их Транзакционные покупатели, Реляционные покупатели, Малые 
диверсификаторы и Большие диверсификаторы) и их теоретические свойства; 
В-четвертых, выявлен механизм, посредством которого результаты обратных 
аукционов в строительной отрасли могут усилить ролевые ограничения прокт-
менеджеров, а также, как менеджеры могут пользоваться своими социальными 
компетенциями для преодоления таких ограничений.  
В целом, закупка услуг посредством онлайновых обратных аукционов 
значительно отличается от закупки товаров. Данная диссертация делает первый 
шаг к тому, чтобы отразить существующие различия в усовершенствованных 
научных теориях. 
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Online reverse auctions, in which a buyer seeks to select a supplier and suppliers
compete for contracts by bidding online, revolutionized corporate procurement early this
century. Shortly after they had been pioneered by General Electric, many companies
rushed to adopt reverse auctions but the adoption soon slowed down due to the negative
effects of auction-induced competition. Today, as firms continue to experiment with the
reverse auctions, it is important to understand how the interplay of the auction context,
the service characteristics, and buyer-supplier relationships affects auction outcomes and
the success of the auctioned projects. 
This PhD dissertation investigates online reverse auctions in service industries (e.g.
software development, building construction). The differences between services and pro ducts
(services can be more difficult to describe and require more intensive communica tion)
challenge theories that try to explain auction outcomes. We study several aspects of
auctioning service contracts: the buyer’s choice between auctions and negotiations; the
contract allocation decisions in auctions; the heterogeneity of buyers’ procurement
behaviour; and the effect of auction outcomes on buyer-supplier relationships and project
performance during the project execution.
Some of the key findings are: 1) that the buyer’s repeat exchange interaction with ven -
dors as well as the satisfaction with a vendor’s past performance lead to the buyer’s
preference for using bilateral negotiation to allocate the next project; 2) that there are five
buyers’ tactics that allow to increase the likelihood of contract allocation; 3) that the
outcomes of online reverse auctions can aggravate project managers’ role constraints and
that project managers can use relational exchange competences to overcome these
constraints. 
Overall, buying services through online reverse auctions is quite different from buying
products. This thesis makes the first steps to develop theoretical knowledge to account for
that difference. 
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The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder -
zoek school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, and the
Erasmus School of Econo mics. ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm
relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
advanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research
programmes. From a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity
is united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
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